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I. Introduction
The primary objective of this article is to analyze the contextual
turn' in contract interpretation during the past century. This analysis is
1. The contextualist turn in American contract law interpretation is part of a
broader phenomenon popularly known as the interpretive turn in law. One definition is
offered by Professor Martha Minow: "[T]he interpretive turn in law.. . depict[s] law as a
communal language and attaching law to the social contexts in which norms can be
generated and given meaning." Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert
Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1861 (1987). The rising prominence of the contextual
analysis of meaning represents a fundamental paradigm shift in American contract law.
Other commentators have taken different slants on the issue of what was the major shift
or development in American contract law during the twentieth century. See, e.g. Michael
B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and the Evolution of Contract
Law, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 139 (1989) (rise of reliance theory); Walter F. Pratt, Jr., American
Contract Law at the Turn of the Century, 39 S.C. L. REV. 415 (1987) [hereinafter, Pratt,
Turn of the Century] (emergence of the doctrine of good faith as the means by which
contract law was transformed to deal with reduced specificity in contracts, along with the
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important because the use of contextual inquiries, often foreclosed under
classical legal thought or legal formalism, 2 has resulted in a contractual
interpretation process that includes a wide variety of extrinsic evidence.
The admission of extrinsic evidence not only allowed for fuller
arguments of the merits of contractual obligation, it also allowed for
alternative views of contractual obligation. The resulting contextual
methodology of interpretation has directly affected doctrinal
development in such areas as reliance recovery, pre-contractual liability,
and implied-in-fact contracts.3
The movement toward contextual interpretation of meaning was at
increased complexity and uncertainty in contractual relations). I believe that these views
of the main contract law change produced by the economic and social pressures of
twentieth century America can be folded into the umbrella of contextualism. The
development of the duty of good faith and reliance theory was heavily dependent on
contextualism, or in the alternative, required contextual inquiry.
2. Classical legal thought refers to the style of judicial reasoning that characterized
the period from about 1875 to 1940. It has also been labeled as formalism and more
pejoratively as "mechanical jurisprudence." See, Roscoe Pound, The Need of a
Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 THE GREEN BAG 607 (1907); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical
Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605 (1908) [hereinafter Pound, Mechanical
Jurisprudence]; Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence
(pts. 1-3), 24 HARV. L. REv. 591 (1911) and 25 HARV. L. REv. 140, 489 (1912). Duncan
Kennedy in discussing the concept of legal formalism in American law states: "the
critical use of the term formalism, against the abuse of deduction and the fantasy of
gaplessness in legal discourse, is part of the twentieth century battle between those who
have wanted to depoliticize the drama as much as possible, through reason, and those
who have seen it as inevitably a dangerous improvisation." Duncan Kennedy, Legal
Formalism 13 (January 1, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
[hereinafter Kennedy, Legal Formalism]. Kennedy notes that this formal style of legal
reasoning is best described as a "legal consciousness." Id. Such a consciousness is
somewhat autonomous--"it is a set of concepts and intellectual operations that evolves
according to a pattern of its own, and exercises an influence on results distinguishable
from those of political power and economic interest." Duncan Kennedy, The Rise and
Fall of Classical Legal Thought 8 (1975) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
[hereinafter, Kennedy, Classical Legal Thought]. Karl Llewellyn posited that the modem
era (post-1940) has seen a return to the pre-classical age of instrumental reasoning
prevalent in the early and mid-nineteenth century. See, KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION 62-72, 446-461 (Little, Brown, & Co 1960) [hereinafter,
COMMON LAW TRADITION]. Kennedy rejects Llewellyn's "return thesis," stating: "we
live not in a time of return to the sound practice of 1830, but in a post-Classical age of
disintegration." Kennedy, Classical Legal Thought at 9. He further explains that
classical legal thought recognized various spheres of power (private, public, legislative).
In this system of spheres, the domain of contract was reserved to the private sphere
through the will theory. Thus, the judge's role in the private sphere of contracts was
simply to enforce the will of the parties. See id. In order to prevent judicial usurpation,
or more accurately the appearance of usurpation, the judge acted through general
principles: "The basic mode of this influence of theory on results is that the ordering of
myriad practices into a systematization occurs through simplifying and generalizing
categories, abstractions that become the tools available when the practitioner (judge or
advocate) approaches a new problem." Id.at 13.
3. Infra Part V.C.2.
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least partially initiated by the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
(Code). Karl N. Llewellyn was the main crafter of the Code's
interpretive methodology. 4  Grant Gilmore provided the strongest
statement of Llewellyn's role in drafting the Code. "[T]his Code was
Llewellyn's Code; there is not a section, there is hardly a line, which
does not bear his stamp and impress; from the beginning to end he
inspired, directed, and controlled it."'5 Llewellyn is a seminal scholar in
American contract law because of his role as reporter for the Code and
principal drafter of Articles One (General Provisions) and Two (Sales).
At the time of his appointment as Code reporter, Llewellyn had already
established himself as a contract scholar and jurisprude. The depth of his
scholarship makes him an intriguing figure for analysis.
Llewellyn was also one of the founding fathers of the Legal Realist
movement of the 1930s. 6 The importance of Llewellyn as a legal realist
will be explained but will not be the central focus of the article. Legal
realism focused attention on the issue of judicial decision-making. As a
subset of their critique of the judge as a disinterested, unbiased
technocrat was the Realists' view that contract interpretation needed to
expand beyond the literal meaning of words. But it was not until the
drafting of the Code, under the supervision of Llewellyn, that the
contextual methodology of contract interpretation received its proper
attention.
The major theme of this article will be the exploration of
Llewellyn's contextualism and its subsequent application in the law of
contracts. This article poses that Llewellyn's most enduring influence,
embodied in the Code, was the promotion of the contextualist turn in
contract interpretation. It will be argued that his interpretive
methodology is best characterized by the term full contextualism and not
4. Karl N. Llewellyn (1893-1962), after a few years at Yale, joined the faculty at
Columbia in 1925 and remained until 1951, when he joined the faculty at Chicago. He
made significant contributions to the fields of jurisprudence (as a leader of the Legal
Realists), law of contracts, and commercial law. He was a student of Arthur Corbin and
was the principal writer of the Uniform Commercial Code for which his wife Soia
Mentschikoff served as Associate Chief Reporter.
5. Grant Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71
YALE L.J. 813, 814 (1962).
6. See generally, WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT (University of Oklahoma Press 1973) [hereinafter, TWINING, REALIST
MOVEMENT]; AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horwitz &
Thomas A. Reed eds. 1993) [hereinafter, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM]; LAURA Kalman,
LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (The University of North Carolina Press 1986);
Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465 (1988); Edward A. Purcell,
Jr., American Jurisprudence between the Wars: Legal Realism and the Crisis of
Democratic Theorv, 75 AM HIST. REV. 424 (1969).
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the hierarchical methodology generally associated with the Code.7
This article will show that Llewellyn has been fundamentally
misread. Instead of being an anti-conceptualist rule-skeptic, he offered a
vision of law and contract interpretation that bridged the conceptual-
contextual divide. Llewellyn, from his criticism of abstract
conceptualism 8 and the dangers of systematizing contract law, intended
to frame the Code as one characterized by merchant rules and open terms
("non-fixed rules") 9 that would act to infuse contracts with commercial
reasonableness. This framework exposed a particular relationship
between law and society. Llewellyn, through his model, saw this
relationship as a two-way street: context informing rule and rule through
self-adjustment guiding context.
The article provides an intellectual history of Llewellynian thought
to better understand the contextual turn in contract interpretation. It
begins in Part II by examining the brand of abstract conceptualism that
Llewellyn sought to expunge from the law. It then offers a brief
historical analysis of the conceptual-contextual divide that preceded the
Legal Realist movement. This discussion includes an analysis of the
works of Christopher Langdell, Joseph Beale, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Wesley Hohfeld, Benjamin Cardozo, and Samuel Williston.' ° Part III
focuses on the intellectual context of Llewellyn's work. It reviews works
7. Infra Part V.B.3.
8. Abstract conceptualism refers to the mode of legal thought and legal reasoning
affixed to the formal deduction from abstract legal concepts. It is associated with the
legal formalism that developed in America towards the end of the nineteenth century.
Duncan Kennedy states that a "descriptive use of the term legal formalism refers to a
range of techniques of legal interpretation that are based on the meaning of norms
(whether established privately, as in contracts, or publicly, as in statutes), and refuse
reference to the norms' purposes, or to the general policies underlying the legal order, or
to extra-juristic preferences of the interpreter." Kennedy, Legal Formalism, supra note 2,
at 3. Duncan Kennedy provides an excellent description of the various sides of abstract
conceptualism or legal formalism. He distinguishes textual, conceptual, and precedential
formalism. Textual formalism is "literalist to the extent that it refuses to vary meaning
according to context." Id. at 4. Conceptual interpretive formalism "constructs general
principles necessary if the legal system is to be understood as coherent." Id. Precedential
interpretive formalism interprets according to the meaning of norms derived as the
holdings of prior cases." Id. When combined they provide the interpretive structure to
support the faqade of a gapless legal order. "Interpretation positing gaplessness requires
the interpreter to apply, according to their meanings, the legal norms he or she can derive
textually, conceptually, or through precedent; it categorically forbids reference to
purposes and policies." Id.
9. In reflecting on the drafting of the Code, Llewellyn states that "open-ended
drafting, with room for courts to move in and readjust over the decades, had been a basic
piece of the planning." COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 2, at 183 n. 186.
10. Samuel Williston (1861-1963) joined the faculty at Harvard in 1890 and taught
there until his retirement in 1938. He was the drafter of the Uniform Sales Act, the
predecessor to Article 2 of the U.C.C. and was Reporter for the Restatement of Contracts.
His treatise on contracts is considered a classic.
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of legal and sociological writings from before 1930 that likely influenced
Llewellyn." l The focus then shifts to Llewellyn's jurisprudential and
doctrinal writings in the period from 1930 to 1940. Part IV examines the
main features of Llewellyn's jurisprudence, and how those features
impacted the Code project.
Parts I1 through IV set the foundation for the evolution of
contextualism in contract rule application and contract interpretation that
is explored in the coverage of the Code in Part V. Part V includes a
discussion of two models of contextual interpretation: hierarchical and
inverted contextualism. It then argues that a third model, full
contextualism, better explains Llewellyn's vision of the Code's
interpretive methodology. Finally, Part VI offers a dual track theory of
interpretation that reflects Llewellyn's vision.1 2  To provide a better
understanding of the above blueprint, the remaining two sections of the
introduction will briefly examine the phrases "abstract conceptualism"
and the "conceptual-contextual divide."
A. Abstract Conceptualism and Contextualism
In order to study the contextualist turn in American contract law it is
important to establish a working understanding or definition of
contextualism and its pseudo-jurisprudential counterpoise, abstract
conceptualism. Both contextualism and abstract conceptualism have as a
focus the determination of the meaning of law. The meaning of law
involved here includes the meaning of common law rules or precedent,
the meaning of statutory enactments, and the meaning of private
contracts.
Providing meaning to the words or silence (gaps) in a contract is the
interpretive exercise for both the abstract conceptualist and the
contextualist. The meanings attributed to a contract will, at times,
diverge because the conceptualist and contextualist live in different
methodological worlds. The conceptualist receives the contractual text
as sacred and looks to the precepts of law that are applicable to the
(linguistic) facts. For the conceptualist, the words of the contract are
facts. The resolution of an interpretive dispute involves uncovering the
pre-existing legal concept or derived rules applicable to the facial
11. The focus here will not be on the measuring of the relative influences of different
writers on Llewellyn but on the affinity between different sources inside and outside of
legal scholarship. The fact that Llewellyn's interests were so expansive assures that these
writings were known and at some level internalized by him. The reviewed writings
include legal, sociological, and philosophical predecessors such as Holmes and Hohfeld
again, George Gardner, Morris and Felix Cohen, Max Weber, and Arthur Corbin, as well
as William Graham Sumner, and James C. Carter.
12. See infra Part VI.C-D.
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meaning of the linguistic facts. I refer to this formalistic brand of
conceptualism, embodied in the writings of Christopher C. Langdell,
Joseph Beale, and Samuel Williston, as abstract conceptualism. This is
the form of conceptualism that the article refers to when discussing the
world of the conceptualist and the form of conceptualism existing at the
turn of the twentieth century.
For the contextualist, true understanding is found somewhere in the
contextual background. It is from this background that the words of a
contract are infused with meaning. This contextual meaning represents
the true understanding of the parties. Given the varied nature of
contextual meaning, the rules derived from the concepts of contract law
should not be viewed as static. The dynamic interface between the
contextual meaning of a contract and the rules of contract law will be
examined in the discussion of singing rules13 in Part VI. Llewellyn's
vision of contract interpretation is particularly evidenced by the interface
of singing rule and context.
B. Rule and Context
All creative endeavors and meaning-inducing activities occur within
a context. At the level of the individual, the education, experiences, and
intellectual milieu of the rule or contract creator can be mined for insight
into the meaning of her work. At the level of law application, the
meaning of a rule, statute, or contract is exposed by the context in which
it was written. This contextual search is necessitated by the fact that the
written form always represents a diminished reality. Inquiry into its
context and purpose is required to infuse the writing with a deeper
reality.
Contextualism in its broadest sense is the incorporation of non-
textual elements into the interpretive process. It is the attempt to gain a
fuller meaning of the disembodied symbols of text. Contextualism also
includes the recognition that mere exposition of a text is unlikely to
uncover the true understanding of the writer or writers.
This article touches upon three contextual perspectives. First, the
intellectual context that surrounded or informed the writings of
Llewellyn, and the Code, will be examined. Second, a contextual
understanding of specific Code rules will be provided and used to
understand the methodology it envisions for contract interpretation.
Finally, the grassroots of contract interpretation will be explored. This
involves the process of rule application to novel cases. The first two
13. The term "singing rule" was coined by Llewellyn to describe the right kind of
rules. These rules "sing" with patent reason which provides guidance to the judge in
applying rules to novel cases.
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contextual strata will set the stage for the exploration of the third:
theories concerning judicial interpretation of contracts. Such a pursuit is
an attempt to describe how contract interpretation in its contextualist
form can, and in many concrete cases does, operate within a conceptual
understanding of contract law.
It will be necessary first to examine the rich literature that has
informed the conceptual-contextual debate in contract law in order to
offer theoretical insights. Given the size of this literature, an ordering
tool is needed. The tool selected for this purpose is the work of Karl
Llewellyn in the area of contract interpretation. This work includes his
general jurisprudential writings and the application of his realistic
jurisprudence in the drafting of Articles One and Two of the Code.
II. Prequel: Fin De SiA'cle
The rise of contextualism in contract interpretation is a testament to
the impact that twentieth century analytic philosophy has had on multiple
disciplines. The view of meaning as dependent upon context is a
foregone conclusion today. 14 It is important to remember that this was
not always the case.
Further, despite the increased understanding of language as context
dependent, problems endemic to language and the law remain. First,
legal rules, tightly knit or open-ended, remain conceptual in nature.
Thus, any theory of contractual interpretation needs to provide a bridge
between the conceptualism of rules and the contextualism of the real
world. Second, at times a full contextual analysis of a contract formation
fails to imbue the contract with sufficient clarity. It is important to
realize that contextualism is not a foolproof methodology. In the end,
law's response to linguistic indeterminacy is likely to be a formal,
conceptual one.
The growth in law cases, especially the ambitious expansion of
contract law throughout the nineteenth century, provided the pressure for
the conceptualization of law at the end of the century. Professor
Farnsworth asserts that the courts began to perceive that it was their
mandate to systematize and order the law:
14. See LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G. Anscombe
trans. 1953); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PRELIMINARY STUDIES FOR THE "PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS" (1965). For an explanation of the similarities between Wittgentstein
and Liewellynian thoughts on meaning see, Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender
Liability, and Discretionary Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 68 TEX L. REV. 169, 176, 199 n.190, 204-208 (1989) [hereinafter,
Patterson, Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein].
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During the final quarter of the [nineteenth] century much of the law
of the formative era began to crystallize and the role of the judge
became one of systematizing rather than creating. As the volume of
case law increased, the uncertainty that had been inevitable in earlier
years became unpopular and efforts turned toward a search for
predictability. The principle achievements of the courts were the
ordering of the system and the logical development of details.
15
The systematization of American law at the end of the nineteenth century
was the product of a liberal jurisprudence or legal consciousness
characterized as formalism. The idea of systematizing the great body of
common law cases along a modest number of general principles 16 was
advanced by Christopher Columbus Langdell 17 and Joseph H. Beale. 18
The umbrella of general principles provided, through the process of
logical deduction, all of the rules needed for deciding concrete cases.
19
Furthermore, these rules were welded into a harmonious whole. Max
Weber described this wholeness as producing a rational, gapless legal
order. Weber's description of such a gapless legal order of rational rules
is the desideratum for a legal science based on abstract conceptualism.
Weber states that:
Present day legal science.., proceeds from the following five
postulates: first, that every concrete legal decision be the
"application" of an abstract legal proposition to a concrete "fact
situation"; second, that it must be possible in every concrete case to
derive the decision from abstract propositions by means of legal
logic; third, that the law must actually or virtually constitute a gapless
system; fourth, that whatever cannot be "construed" rationally in
legal terms is also legally irrelevant; and fifth, that every social action
of human beings must always be visualized as either an "application"
or "execution" of legal propositions, or as an "infringement" thereof,
since the "gaplessness" of the legal system must result in a gapless
15. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, UNITED STATES CONTRACT LAW 31 (Juris Publishing
1999) [hereinafter, FARNSWORTH, UNITED STATES CONTRACT LAW].
16. See generally, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 6, at 79. Corbin, Issacs,
Llewellyn, and Fuller saw the classical view of contract law as internally inconsistent.
"The attempt to explain all of contract doctrine on the basis of a few general principles is
chimerical and destructive." Id.
17. See CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS (Little, Brown, & Company 1871) [hereinafter, LANGDELL, CONTRACTS].
18. See JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.2 (1935)
[hereinafter, BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS].
19. "[Flor any legal question, there was the possibility that properly analyzed, the
correct answer could be arrived at by applying basic principles that were both derived
from and reflected in case law." Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle
of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and Form," 100 COLUM. L. REv. 94,
106 (2000).
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legal ordering of all social conduct.
20
Langdell and Beale's abstract conceptualism is a reflection of Weber's
schematic. Their basic premise was that all necessary rules could be
produced internally through deduction from general, pervasive
principles. 2  From this gapless order, according to conceptualists, law
provides the one right answer to all real world disputes.
Soon after consolidating its gains, abstract conceptualism's claims
to gapless, deductive purity came under attack. The lineage of pre-
Realist attacks can be debated, but the importance of a number of
writings to the Realist cause is without dispute. 22  The pre-Realist
writings with the greatest impact include Oliver Wendell Holmes'
groundbreaking The Path of Law (1899),23 Roscoe Pound's Mechanical
Jurisprudence (1908),24 Wesley Hohfeld's Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions (1913),25 and Robert Hale's Coercion and Distribution in a
20. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 657-658 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich
eds. 1968).
21. See, LANGDELL, CONTRACTS, supra note 17. "To have such a mastery of these
[principles or doctrines] as to be able to apply them with constant facility and certainty to
the ever-tangled skein of human affairs." Id. at vi.
22. The first Realist writing is attributed to Joseph Bingham for his 1912 article
What is the Law? and his 1913 writing on The Nature of Legal Rights and Duties. See,
Joseph Bingham, What is the Law? (pts. 1 & 2), 11 MICH. L. REv. 1 & 109 (1912);
Joseph Bingham, The Nature of Legal Rights and Duties, 12 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1913).
Whether Bingham's early writings are viewed as Realist or pre-Realist is open to debate.
Roscoe Pound had this to say about Bingham's works: "While one finds the core of the
realist approach in these early articles of Bingham, it is hardly fair to class Bingham with
the modem realist school." Pound explains that Bingham believed that what judges
actually do should be studied but not at the exclusion of other forms of research. In
contrast, "the left-wingers of realism seem to assume that this neutral observation of
official behavior constitutes the whole of legal science." Lon L. Fuller, American Legal
Realism, LXXVI PROCEEDINGS AM. PHIL.SOC. 191 (1936) [hereinafter, Fuller, Legal
Realism].
23. Oliver Wendell Homes, Jr., The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 (1897)
[hereinafter, Holmes, Path of Law].
24. Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, supra note 2. Dean Pound asserted that Sir
Henry Maine's idealized view of legal development as the increased recognition of
individual liberty provided the historical support for the sanctification of freedom of
contract. Pound also cites the writings of Herbert Spencer as being in "great vogue in
America" at the time. This positivist orientation held that legal evolution was the product
of mechanical laws. The result was the establishment of the freedom-centered formalism
of classical legal thought. See Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Juristic
Thought (pts 1 &2), 30 HARV. L. REv. 201, 222 (1917). This was the second part of a
two-part article under the same name. The first part appeared at 27 HARV. L. REv. 605
(1914). See also, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909) [hereinafter, Pound,
Liberty of Contract].
25. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in




Supposedly Noncoercive State (1923).26 The next section will briefly
discuss the pre-Realist critique of classical legal thought.
A. The Pre-Realist Critique of Conceptualism
In the first few decades of the twentieth century, the citadel of
conceptualism began to suffer an initial wave of assaults. The law of
contracts was the center of a number of localized skirmishes.27 In his
famous article attaching the Realist label to the ferment swelling against
abstract conceptualism, Llewellyn cited Holmes's pragmatic and
instrumental approach to law as a touchstone.2 8  Holmes offers the
interpretive model of the objective prudent person to surrounding
circumstances in his 1899 essay The Theory of Legal Interpretation.
29
Holmes's view of externality is singularly focused on the third-party
prudent person. Thus, an objective interpretation of a statute or a
contract focuses not on what the writer meant, but on what the words
mean from the perspective of the external prudent person.3 °
Unlike the conceptualist external interpretation of meaning,
however, Holmes's prudent person was created contextually.
Llewellyn's view of the importance of the background of trade usage and
custom in contract interpretation is consistent with this Holmesian
objectification of contract meaning. Trade usage and custom are part of
the prudent person's construction. It is the prudent person that
26. Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Noncoercive State, 38
POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923) [hereinafter, Hale, Coercion and Distribution].
27. See, e.g., Edward A. Harriman, Nature of Contractual Obligation, 4 N.W.L.
REv. 98; Clarence D. Ashley, Conditions in Contracts, 14 YALE L. J. 424 (1905); Charles
Morse, The Common Law Theory of Contract, 39 CAN. L.J. 379 (1903); Jerome C.
Knowlton, Freedom of Contract, 3 MICH. L. REv. 617 (1905); Clarence D. Ashley,
Should There be Freedom of Contract, 4 COLUM. L. REv. 423 (1904); Lewinsohn,
Contract Distinguished form Quasi-Contract, 2 CAL. L. REv. 171 (1914); Nathan Issacs,
Contractual Control over Adjective Law, 29 W. VA. L.Q. 1 (1922); Arthur R. Corbin,
Discharge of Contracts, 22 YALE L.J. 513 (1913); Castigan, Implied-in-fact Contracts
and Mutual Assent, 33 HARV. L. REv. 376 (1920); Lorenzen, Law Determining the
Nature of a Transaction, 28 YALE L.J. 806 (1919); and Mercantile Contracts and the
Principle ofEjusdem Generis, 25 SCOT. L. REV. 217 (1909).
28. Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REV.431 (1930) [hereinafter Realistic Jurisprudence]. "Holmes' mind had traveled most
of the road two generations back." One set of commentators described the Holmes-
Llewellyn connection as follows: "Indeed, one might fairly characterize substantial
portions of Llewellyn's jurisprudential work as no more (and no less) than
popularizations and applications of Holmes." AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 6,
at 52.
29. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, A Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REv.
417 (1899) [hereinafter Holmes, Legal Interpretation].
30. See id. "Yet in fact we do not deal differently with a statute from our way of
dealing with a contract. We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what
the statute means." Id. at 419.
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determines the reasonable expectations and meanings of the contesting
parties. For Holmes and Llewellyn the prudent person's interpretation of
a contract was not achieved through the plain meaning of words, but
through a contextual understanding of the surrounding circumstances.
In The Path of the Law,31 Holmes noted the dangers of
conceptualism. 32  In doing so he advances the importance of patent
reason in rule formation. Holmes championed what Llewellyn would
later refer to as the singing rule. Holmes stated that "law is more rational
and more civilized when every rule it contains is referred articulately and
definitely to an end which it sub-serves, and when the grounds for
desiring that end are stated.., in words. 3 3 Llewellyn would later bring
this mantra to the drafting of the Code.
The hollowed rationality of classical legal thought was the subject
of Wesley Hohfeld's methodological restructuring of abstract
conceptualism. 34 His ambition was to look at things in a fresh manner,
stripped of conceptual blinders.35 Hohfeld's methodology laid the basis
for the Realists' critique of legal reasoning.
Hohfeld recognized that the disaggregation of abstract legal
concepts in each area of the law was crucial innovation.36 He viewed
legal concepts as the "chameleon-hued words [that] are a peril to both
clear thought and to lucid expression. 3 7  Disaggregation of legal
concepts required the isolation of operative facts. For Hohfeld those
operative facts were relational facts. Therefore, grand concepts like
property or contract rights were not independent of real world
relationships.
31. Holmes, Path of the Law, supra note 23.
32. One of the primary arguments in favor of abstract conceptualism and formalistic
rule application is systemic certainty and predictability. Holmes response is that
"certainty generally is illusion." Id.
33. Id. Later he states "the practical importance, for the decision of actual cases, of
understanding the reasons of the law." Id.
34. See Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 25. See generally,
Walter Wheeler Cook, Hohfeld's Contribtions to the Science of Law, 28 YALE L.J. 721
(1919) (the importance of an adequate analytical jurisprudence for efficient adjudication).
35. The Realists later championed this methodology. The core feature of Realism is
to look into the world and "see it fresh; see it as it works." WILLIAM TWINING, THE KARL
LLEWELLYN PAPERS 16 (The University of Chicago Law School 1968) [hereinafter,
LLEWELLYN PAPERS].
36. Hohfeld's article begins with an example of the nature of a trust. He notes that
abstract conceptualism had failed to provide a coherent explanation of the nature of
trusts. In making this claim he provides a laundry list of famous conceptualists that had
helped create the situation-Austin, Maitland, Salmond, (Walter) Hart, Langdell, and
Ames. He asserts that the only way to make sense of the conceptual apparatus of the law
is by "endeavoring to 'think straight' in relation to all legal problems." Hohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 25, at 18.
37. Id. at 29.
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Asking whether a party had a property or contract right was
meaningless. Instead, the crucial inquiry is whether a party has a right in
relation to a particular other party. The true legal question then becomes
does that other party owe a duty to the so-called rights holder? The
Hohfeldian inquiry is consistent with Holmesian legal thought in that a
right is meaningless unless the law provides a remedy (Holmes); a
remedy is not available unless a duty is found (Hohfeld). This focus on
duty avoids overgeneralization for it is not the general right but a specific
duty that is the focal point. The focus on finding a specific duty is
primarily a contextual undertaking. The facts will determine if a duty is
owed. In the words of Hohfeld, "legal relations are, after all, sui
generis." 38 This contextual rights-determining process is the opposite of
the abstract conceptualist's deduction from a general right.
What Hohfeld did for doctrinal analysis Robert Hale did for policy
analysis.39 Hale noted that court enforcement of a right such as freedom
of contract is inherently coercive: "[T]he systems advocated by professed
upholders of laissez-faire are in reality permeated with coercive
restrictions of individual freedom.' 4° According to Hale, the decision to
impose a duty on someone is infused with normative and distributive
consequences. 41 Over-interpreting such policies as freedom of contract
fully engages the coercive power of the state. The question then
becomes is this necessarily a bad thing?42 Hale asserted that it was when
state-enforced relational duties were in fact a product of a one-sided
coercive power.43 Hence, a decision involving the application of rights
and the enforcement of duties is one that entails policy analysis, not
deductive logic.
1. Borrowings from the Continent: European Free Law
The European Free Law movement of the first two decades of the
twentieth century offered a similar substantive critique of abstract
conceptualism decades before the beginnings of the American Realist
movement.44 Despite passing references to the works of Gfny and
38. Id. at 30.
39. Hale, Coercion and Distribution, supra note 26.
40. Id. at 470 (emphasis in original).
41. "The channels into which industry shall flow, then, as well as the apportionment
of the community's wealth, depend upon coercive arrangements." Id. at 493.
42. "[L]et it be kept in mind that to call an act coercive is not by any means to
condemn it." Id. at 471.
43. See, e.g., "This power is frequently highly centralized, with the result that the
worker is frequently deprived, during working hours and even beyond, of all choice over
his own activities." Hale, Coercion and Distribution, supra note 26, at 477.
44. See generally, James E. Herget & Stephen Wallace, The German Free Law
Movement as the Source of American Legal Realism, 73 VA. L. REV. 399 (1987)
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Ehrlich, the Realist scholars never ftilly recognized the connections
between the two movements. Instead, an implicit acknowledgement of
the importance of the Free Law movement to the Realist movement is
found in the fact that Free Law thinking openly influenced the pre-
Realists, with the possible exception of Holmes.45 Thus, by citing pre
(proto)-Realist writings, the Realists implicitly recognized the
groundbreaking works of the Free Law scholars. This section examines
the tenets of Free Law most relevant to Llewellyn's contextualism. It
will also highlight some of the explicit and implicit Free Law influences
on pre-Realist and Realist writers.
The European Free Law movement offered some of the same
46insights that were at the center of the Realist movement. It wedded the
importance of customary law expounded upon decades earlier by Rudolf
von Jhering 47 with the inevitability of gaps in any statutory or formal
legal order.48 The Free Law insights included a critique of the alleged
[hereinafter, German Free Law]. Herget and Wallace demarcate the operative era of the
Free Law Movement as 1899 to 1912. Id. at 401; see also, Stephen J. Lubben, Chief
Justice Traynor's Contract Jurisprudence and the Free Law Dilemma: Nazism, The
Judiciary, and California's Contract Law, 7 So. CAL. INTERDiSC. L.J. 81 (1998)
[hereinafter, Free Law Dilemma]. "The Free Law Movement was, in many ways, the
intellectual forerunner of the Legal Realist movement." Id. at 90. See also, WILLIAM M.
WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN
AMERICA, 1886-1937 (1998). "Pound, who read German and French with ease, was
influenced by recent continental ... debates... Pound did not invent the concept of
sociological jurisprudence. He was merely the American exponent of an idea ... earlier
expounded by the Austrian Eugen Ehrlich and the French scholar Francois Grny." Id. at
192. "Llewellyn stands out as the promoter of the Realist movement; a movement that
owes much to the German Free Law movement from the beginning of this century."
Bernhard Grossfeld & Peter Winship, The Law Professor Refugee,18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L
L. & CoM. 3, 11 (1992) (emphasis in original).
45. This point was made by Professor Herget: "Thus, through a two-step process,
writers like Llewellyn, Frank, Oliphant, and others, drew. . . mainly from earlier
American thinkers [Pound, Cardozo, Gray] who, with the exception of Justice Homes,
had in turn learned from the Free Law scholars [regarding the issue of legal
indeterminacy]." James E. Herget, Unearthing the Origins of a Radical Idea: The Case
of Legal Indeterminacy, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 59, 63 (1995) [hereinafter, Herget, Legal
Indeterminacy]. "German influence, it is more discernible in the assimilation of the work
of nineteenth-century German jurists by Llewellyn's American forerunners, such as
Carter, Gray, Holmes, Hohfeld, and Pound." William Twining, Book Review, The Case
Law System in America, 100 YALE L.J. 1093, 1097 (1991).
46. "The parallels between the two movements are striking: Both schools reacted to
formalism, and both fell from grace after being painted as undemocratic." Free Law
Dilemma, supra note 44 at 91, n.47.
47. Jhering was an early critic of formalism and what he referred to as "conceptual
jurisprudence." See generally, RUDOLF VON JHERING, DER ZWECK IM RECHT (2 vol. 1877
& 1893), subsequently translated as, LAw AS A MEANS To AN END (trans. I. Husik 1913).
"The great contribution of Jhering was in demonstrating the necessity of taking into
account non-legal factors in constructing an adequate theory of law." Herget, Legal
Indeterminacy, supra note 45 at 65.
48. The formalism that pervaded German jurisprudence stemmed from its code-
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• 41gaplessness of abstract conceptualism.
Free Law scholars attacked the dominant view that the role of the
judge was simply to place case problems within the Civil Code's
machinery.50  Max Radin, in a 1925 article in the American Bar
Association Journal, stated that "[t]o use a figure contemptuously
applied by the German jurist Kantorowicz, the whole transaction [of
judicial decision making] is dropped into its proper category like a nickel
in a slot-machine,-and click! Out comes the decision at the bottom!
'" 5 1
The gapless Civil Code was purported to provide solutions to all present
and future legal problems. Free Law scholars, such as Hermann
Kantorowicz and Gustav Radbruch from Germany, Eugen Ehrlich from
Austria, and Francois G6ny in France argued that there would always be
gaps within any statutory system. G6ny in his 1899 The Science of Legal
centered view of law. The 1900 enactment of the German Civil Code provided the
capstone for the systematization and conceptualization of German law that had begun
with the work of the Pandects in the 1850s. The height of German (abstract)
conceptualism is seen as the adoption of the German Civil Code or Buigerliches
Gesetzbuch (BGB) in 1896 and its taking effect on January 1, 1900. The new code was
conceived as a comprehensive and organic whole that provided all the law that a judge
needed to know. "In short, the law-broadly conceived as an interrelated system, of
concepts, principles, and rules-was a logically closed system." German Free Law,
supra note 44 at 407. "The last fruit of the systematic Romanist legal science was the
German Civil Code... a system of leading concepts interconnected through logical
operations, was the hallmark of conceptualism." Mathias Reimann, Nineteenth Century
German Legal Science, 31 B.C. L. REv. 837, 867 (1990). The Pandects are Romanists
scholars who attempted to create a gapless conceptual legal system based upon the
reformulation of the Pandects found in Justinian's Digest. "[T]he systematic or
Pandectist movement in law, that movement whose practitioners attempted to reduce law
virtually to a mathematical system consisting entirely of principles or axioms." M.H.
Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 103, 104 (1986).
49. Professor Horwitz offers the boldest statement regarding the influence of Free
Law on one of the founding documents of American Legal Realism-Llewellyn's 1930s
article A Realistic Jurisprudence. Llewellyn, Realistic Jurisprudence, supra note 28. He
states, "A Realistic Jurisprudence is, in a word, an intellectual cut and paste job
reflecting some existing tendencies in American jurisprudence read in conjunction with
his newly acquired knowledge of Germanfree law jurisprudence." MORTON J. HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 172 (1992) (emphasis in original)
[hereinafter, TRANSFORMATION II].
50. Friedrich Wilhelm II and other German rulers "liked the idea of reducing judges
to legal calculating machines.... [T]he German Civil Code aimed at the ideals of having
no gaps and of binding judges strictly." Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of
Codification in the Common-Law World, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 435, 458-459 (2000). Von
Jhering made the notion of a conceptual machine famous in his "heaven of legal
concepts." Felix Cohen begins his Transcendental Nonsense by paying homage to the
"great German jurists['s] ... curious dream." Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense
and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 809 (1935) [hereinafter, Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense].
51. Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 ABA J.
357, 358 (1925).
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Method 2 first elaborated on the difference between formal law and free
law. Through his method he saw legal interpretation tied to a purposive
search for the societal effects of alternative law applications.53 G~ny's
mthode required the judge to draw from social reality in filling gaps in
the law: "The nature of things, open to legal inquiry, is the analysis and
combination of factual relationships which provoke the need for, and
determine the structure of, legal rules.",54  G~ny's purposive
interpretation is reflected in Llewellyn's notion of singing rules.
55
Ehrlich and Kantorowicz56 focused on the use of social facts, such
as customs and practices, as sources of free law to be used to fill the gaps
of formal law. 57 This strain of legal thought laid the foundation for
Llewellyn's methodology of rule application and contract interpretation.
Free Law's use of customary law is reflected in Llewellynian situation-
sense58 and in the central place of trade usage and custom in the
interpretive methodology of the Code.59 Ehrlich and Llewellyn saw the
symbiotic nature of custom and law as especially pronounced in
commercial law. 60 According to both Realism and Free Law, one must
go outside formal legal sources to social reality in order to resolve the
52. FRANCOIS GtNY, METHOD OF INTERPRETATION AND SOURCES OF PRIVATE
POSITIVE LAW: CRITICAL ESSAY (Jaro Mayda trans. 1963).
53. See, e.g., JARO MAYDA, FRANCOIS GtNY AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE 5 (1978)
("G~ny's thesis is that judges under codes have always.., done more than apply
legislated law with the use of processes of formal logic.").
54. It is this insight that makes G~ny the pivotal figure in instigating the Free Law
movement. See Herget, Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 45 at 66.
55. Infra Part V.A-B.
56. "The two founding scholars of the movement, Eugen Ehrlich and Hermann
Kantorowicz, enjoyed more attention in the United States." Free Law Dilemma, supra
note 44, at 89. It is in the area of sociology of law that Ehrlich heavily influenced the
work of Llewellyn. Soia Mentschikoff in her biographical note on Llewellyn states that
"[h]e admired Holmes, Pound, Cardozo, Max Weber, and Eugen Ehrlich." Soia
Mentschikoff, Karl N Llewellyn, 9 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. SCI. 440, 440 (1968)
[hereinafter, Mentschikoff, Llewellyn]. In later years, Ehrlich re-directed his research
interests as the founding "father" of legal sociology. German Free Law, supra note 44 at
408, n.40. "Eugen Ehrlich ... has been called the inventor of sociology of law as well as
the founder of sociological jurisprudence.... [His] central insight ... was that law
consists of and can be found in the regularized conduct and patterns of behaviour in a
community, association, or society." BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL
THEORY: PRAGMATISM AND A SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW 93 (1997) [hereinafter,
TAMANAHA] (emphasis in original).
57. See, e.g., Hermann Kantorowicz, Legal Science-A Summary of its
Methodology, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1928) (explaining formal law as the primary
source of interpretation and free law as a primary source for filling in gaps in the formal
law).
58. Infra Part V.A.
59. See discussion infra Part IV.
60. "Commercial transactions are the one area where there is often a match between
lived social norms (actually followed business practices) and the norms enforced by legal
institutions, in Ehrlich's time as well as our own." TAMANAHA, supra note 56 at 118.
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gaps and contradictions found in formal law.
Within the Realist continuum of scholars, the work of Kantorowicz
is most closely affiliated with the position of Llewellyn.61 Both hold
moderate positions within their respective schools of critique. Despite
61. In his writings, however, Llewellyn downplayed the importance of free law
insights. It is clear, however, that Llewellyn was knowledgeable of the work of the free
law scholars given the fact that Kantorowicz delivered a guest lecture in Llewellyn's
seminar at Columbia University in 1934. One possible reason for Llewellyn's dismissal
of Kantorowicz in particular and the Realists general disregard is a conflict of
personalities. "Perhaps anti-German feeling generated by World War I had an effect on
the fashionability of German scholarship. There is evidence of anti-German attitudes in
the Academic community." German Free Law, supra note 44 at 432. This does not
explain why the influences of G6ny (France) and Ehrlich (Austria) were also downplayed
by the Realists. In the Case Law System in America, written during his 1928-29 sojourn
to Germany, he stated that "[t]he only noteworthy contribution of the Free Law
movement is then to advocate that this freedom of movement [judicial discretion] be
consciously understood and not exercised blindly." KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW
SYSTEM IN AMERICA 78 (Paul Gewirtz, ed. 1989) [hereinafter, CASE LAW SYSTEM]. The
free play of law envisioned by the radical form of free law was not to his liking. It failed
to reflect the constraints of craft values and well crafted legal rules that were more central
to his view of the common law system. In addition, this slight may be due to the fact that
what was more vital to his agenda was the sociology of law insights beginning with
Jhering and culminating in Ehrlich. "This whole paper builds at every point on Ehrlich,
as any such paper must." Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in
Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 706, n.6 [hereinafter, What Price Contract?], see also,
Karl N. Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract, 47 YALE L.J. 1243
(1938) [hereinafter, Rule of Law]. "Ehrlich made this point .... Id. at 1253, n.28. See
also, Karl N. Llewellyn, The Theory of Legal 'Science', 20 No. CAR. L. REv. 1 (1941).
"Ehrlich's book on the subject.., has juice and is worth study .. " Id. at 9, n.8.
Finally, Llewellyn's discounting of free law insights may have been partially a response
to Kantorowicz' 1934 critique of realism in an article titled Some Rationalism About
Realism. Herman Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, 43 YALE L.J. 1240
(1934). In that article, Kantorowicz criticized Llewellyn's separation of ought from law
as it exists at a given point of time. See id. The is-ought dichotomy provided a major
thematic difference between the two movements. "One distinction that could be drawn
between the two schools is that while American Realists were primarily concerned with
how law is, the Free Law School argued for how law, or at least judicial decision making,
ought to be and urged a complete change in the existing situation." Free Law Dilemma,
supra note 44, at 91, n.47 (emphasis in original). He asserts that the Realists suffered
from a number of prejudices including the belief that rules do not decide cases. In fact,
discretion is a necessary component of a rule-based system. "Discretion is not opposed
to rules, as [the Realist say]; it is an intuitive way of finding rules." Id. at 1244.
Llewellyn summarily rejected Kantorowicz' critique four years later in a footnote in
which he refers the reader to Some Rationalism About Realism as a "further instance of a
misconception." Karl N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and A Bit Beyond, 15
N.Y.U. L. Q. REv. 159, 162, n.5 (1938) [hereinafter, Title to Contract]. Unlike Pound,
Kantorowicz, despite his prolific work product, did not rate a scholarly response. Despite
Llewellyn's disregard of the writings of Free Law scholars, with the notable exception of
Ehrlich, his awareness of Free Law principles is made apparent from his 1928-29 lectures
at the University of Leipzig. In distinguishing between law and equity, he stated that
"[t]he very word 'Equity' disposes judges to a more free law way of framing norms that
the rigid-sounding words 'Law' or 'common law."' CASE LAW SYSTEM, at 41 (emphasis
in original).
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his more radical earlier writings, Llewellyn, like Kantorowicz,
recognized the primary role of rules in the private legal order.62 Calling
Llewellyn a rule skeptic and Kantorowicz an advocate of the primacy of
free law over formal law is a misconstruction of their moderate positions.
Their critiques were aimed at rule formalism and the alleged minor role
of the judiciary in the formal, gapless legal order.
The reality of legal gaps mocked the non-discretionary nature of
judicial law application advanced by legal formalism. The existence of
gaps necessarily expands the role of the judge from conceptual
automaton to one of law creator. It is in the area of gaps or Llewellynian
leeways63 that societal facts or customary law are needed to keep the
formal legal order flexible and workable. Through contextualism, the
rules of contract law are retained but transformed through a continual
immersion into the context provided by particular cases. 64 The following
analysis of Kantorowicz's work could have easily applied later to
Llewellyn:
The notion of free law, Kantorowicz suggests ... resembles natural
law in that it emanates from the natural relationships of individuals in
society, and it can be perceived in the norm-consciousness of people
interacting in concrete situations. [I]t differs from natural law ... [in
that] it is not universal but transitory and contingent, always changing
as society changes.
65
The commonality of these critiques was their attack on the conceptualist'
premise that rules and only rules decided cases. Abstract conceptualism
as exemplified in classical contract law and the formal style of legal
reasoning took a rules-only view of the legal order into the "marshes of
absurdity., 66 The absurdity of a rules-only approach is reflected in the
moderate forms of Free Law and Realism's versions of rule skepticism.
Under these moderate versions, firmly supported by the later Llewellyn,
rules remain the central core of contract law. The moderate Realist
62. "Several scholars have argued that the movement did indeed call for unfettered
judicial discretion. Others have pointed to the writings of Hermann Kantorowicz to
support the view that the Free Law Movement solely addressed the gaps in written law,
and in all other instances its methods were thoroughly conventional." Free Law
Dilemma, supra note 44, at 94.
63. COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 2, at 62-120 (leeway of precedents) &
219-222 (law of leeways).
64. For an empirical study of the role of contextualism and judicial discretion within
the codified schemes implemented by the Uniform Commercial Code and Federal Rules
of Evidence see, Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law?-Recent
American Codifications, and Their Impact on Judicial Practice and the Law's
Subsequent Development, 1994 Wisc. L. REv. 1119.
65. German Free Law, supra note 44 at 414-415 (emphasis added).
66. COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 2, at 185.
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critique holds that the absurdity of rules is more a function of the type of
rules and their application and not rules per se.
67
Llewellyn saw law's core as rule-based but the rigidity of the rules
and their application needed to be infused with flexibility. The rules
themselves needed to be formulated to allow for varied responses to
ever-changing social reality.68 The infusion of social reality into the
rules of law, by combining G6ny's purposive interpretation and Free
Law's use of non-formal legal sources, was a means to obtain the needed
flexibility in rule application. Llewellyn's version was embodied in the
"law of the singing reason" 69 or singing rules. It represented his attempt
to make rules flexible and self-reconstituting.7 ° One characteristic of
such a rule is that of direction or trend.71 Instead of a rule being a closed
space of fixed core and periphery drawn tightly to the core, Llewellyn
saw formal rules as guides and not limitations that "act as borough[s]
whose branches are growing., 72 This growth is nourished or instigated
by non-formal or free law sources.
67. "[Tlhe near-control [in the making of a judicial decision or ruling] is not because
those rules are rules of law, but because of the particular kind of rule of law they
happen... to be. So it is of the essence to distinguish among rules of law ..
COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 2, at 179.
68. "For the legal rule ... could no longer be regarded as static, but rather as
constantly undergoing a change of content." CASE LAW SYSTEM, supra note 61 at 93.
69. COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 2, at 183-84.
70. Llewellyn also made use of a core-periphery paradigm to capture the needs for
the certainty of formal rules and the flexibility of free law. He states:
That the rules of law, alone, do not, because they cannot, decide any appealed
Case.... Substantially, the mere bare rules of law do today manage alone to
decide that obnoxious but persistent body of appeals in which in fact the
applicable rules are both firmly and reasonably settled and in which the fact of
the case fall so obviously inside the core of the rule .... Again, there is that
other body of cases which falls outside any firm rule core but yet so plainly
within the urge or flavor or force-field of a rule or concept of law that its
extension either is obviously imperative or just happens so naturally as to go
unnoticed.
Id. at 189.
I watch opinions turn to neighboring jurisdictions for light or for further
butressing-especially when they pick up quotations packed with a
combination of authority and situation-sense....
Id. at 191.
71. I clearly do not regard legal rules, descriptively speaking, as something hard
and fast. Rather, with every rule there are three elements at play: a core of
completely fixed content,...; next, a fluctuating borderline area of possible
expansions ... ; and, finally, a trend affecting these possibilities, which is
determined in party by the fixed core, in part by neighboring legal rules, in part
by extralegal conditions, and in part by the needs of those affected by law at a
given time.
CASE LAW SYSTEM, supra note 61 at 80, n. 1 (first emphasis in original, second emphasis
added).
72. Id. at 80.
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Notions of influence aside, both Kantorowicz73 and Llewellyn
emphasized the existence of gaps in any formal legal order whether
statutory law (Free Law) or case law (Realists). However, the moderate
versions of both theories held that these gaps were exceptions not rules,
and that legal certainty was measurably attainable through the
application of the core of formal rules.74 Hence, the free play of
customary law was restricted to the gaps or periphery of rules and could
not trump application of the core.75 This is reflected in Llewellyn's
notion of the limited, but important, role of leeways in case law. In
addition, both moderate versions emphasized the inductive use of social
reality against the deductive reasoning of abstract conceptualism. From
this perspective, Llewellyn advocated the infusion of social context
through the substitution of abstract, fixed rules with flexible, singing
rules. In the hands of enlightened judges, such as Holmes, Brandeis,
Cardozo, and Hand,76 rules could be continuously infused with real
world content. The next section will examine the development of the
American brand of abstract conceptualism.
77
B. Conceptualism in American Law
Abstract conceptualism or formalism in American law has been
aligned with a series of tenets. These tenets allowed the courts to avoid
contextualist inquiry in favor of an internally maintained conceptual
system. The tenets of abstract conceptualism, along with the writings of
its two staunchest adherents, C.C. Langdell and Joseph Beale, are
discussed below.
A system of abstract conceptualism is more easily maintainable in a
legal order characterized by a strong view of stare decisis and issues
73. "Kantorowicz was ahead of his time in signaling the contextuality of meaning
and in taking an anti-essentialist, semiotic approach to legal analysis." Vivian Grosswald
Curran, Fear of Formalism: Indications from the Fascist Period in France and Germany
of Judicial Methodology's Impact on Substantive Law, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 101, 110
(2002).
74. See, e.g., Lewellyn states that "shaped doctrine [that] does shape actual deciding
can at times approach demonstration." COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 2, at 106.
75. See generally, Vivian Grosswald Curran, Fear of Formalism: Indications from
the Fascist Period in France and Germany of Judicial Methodology's Impact on
Substantive Law, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 101, 110 (2002) at 158-166. "Kantorowicz...
emphatically did not advocate judicial disregard of enacted law. The scope of judicial
freedom advocated by the free law school was constricted to the interstices that enacted
law failed to address." Id. at 162.
76. CASE LAW SYSTEM, supra note 61 at 93, n.3.
77. Many Free Law scholars, as well as Llewellyn, possessed a romantic notion of
the power of the enlightened judge to balance the needs of certainty and justice. In




decided as a matter of law. In contract law, this translated into the
formal "matter of law" application of doctrine. This was made possible
by the use of overarching abstract principles, applied deductively, and
through the objective lens of the will theory of obligation. The resulting
conceptual apparatus allowed the courts to avoid inquiry into contextual
reality.78 First, contract rules were not found in the real world or
situation of the case, no matter how novel, but in formal rules buried in
past cases. Second, the sensitivity of juries to contextual matters, such as
the characteristics of the parties, was avoided through the conversion of
questions of fact to questions of law. Third, the objective theory of
interpretation translated external manifestations, such as the words of a
contract, as questions of general or plain meaning. An external
manifestation was to be given the meaning of the prudent person and not
the particularized intent that a factual analysis of the case would render.
Finally, the enforcement of promise through the will theory became the
linchpin of contractual liability. The agreement-in-fact or the true
understanding of the parties was de-centered into finding the meaning of
a promise. In short, contract interpretation was a purely conceptual
inquiry into the words of the promise and not a contextual inquiry of
what the parties meant by those words.
Christopher C. Langdell's 1871 casebook on contract law was one
of the great acts in conceptualism. Langdell ordered his casebook using
the methodologies found in the physical sciences. Law was merely a
constellation of a limited number of fundamental principles. The essence
of the formalist method envisioned by the late nineteenth century
conceptualists is found in the Preface to Langdell's casebook:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or
doctrines....
Moreover, the number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less
than is commonly supposed; [they appear in] many different
guises....
If these doctrines could be so classified and arranged that each should
be found in its proper place, and nowhere else, they would cease to
be formidable from their number.
79
These three sentences, and one more, set the conceptualist agenda.
78. See generally, Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable
Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441,442-443 (1979). See also, Daniel J. Klau, Note,
What Price Certainty? Corbin, Williston, and the Restatement of Contracts, 70 B.U. L.
REV. 511 (1990) (reviews the ideological spilt between Williston and Corbin).
79. LANGDELL, CONTRACTS, supra note 17.
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First, legal analysis could achieve scientific precision through the
discovery and application of general principles and doctrine. Second,
these principles and doctrines are to be induced from the cases. Third,
through a process of deduction these scientifically derived principles
could than be applied to future cases. Fourth, the eventual conceptual
system constructed from the case law would be reasonably easy to
operate. The individual judge would be able to derive specific rules of
law from a relatively few meta-principles.
A fourth sentence in Langdell's preface is vital to the conceptual
construction project. It provides the methodology needed to confront the
induction of principles from an ever-expanding set of law reports.
Langdell's answer to the numerical press of law cases was selectivity.
Langdell notes: "Only one mode occurred to me which seemed to hold
any reasonable prospect of success; and that was, to make a series of
cases, carefully selected from the books of reports." 80  Thus, the
conceptualist's methodology consisted of the selection of the few good
cases while ignoring the many poorly reasoned cases. The selective
pursuit of cases was defended as a short-term process needed in order to
systematize the law. The lack of a sound conceptual structure had led to
judicial confusion and poor judicial reasoning. Once the conceptual
infrastructure was scientifically established then the number of poorly
reasoned cases would diminish drastically.
Joseph Beale's 1935 Treatise on the Law of Conflicts8 provides a
capstone for the evolution of abstract conceptualism 82 begun by
Langdell. Beale saw the common law as a rationally arranged, all-
embracing system of principles. He describes principles as "the largest
portion... of the ... law of a state [that] are general premises which can
be used for deduction and analogy., 83 He further defines standards and
rules but attaches much less significance to them in the overall working
of the system of private law.84  Beale states that the most important
feature of law "is not a mere collection of rules, but a body of scientific
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 18.
82. See Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Notes on Consideration, 17 HARV. L. REV. 71, 81
(1903) (Beale undertakes a formal analysis of consideration in which the giving of a
promise alone produces a change in a legal relation where the promise-giver "gives
another man such control over his acts .. ")
83. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 18 at § 3.2.
84. Beale defines a standard as "a rule which is stated as a degree of a continuously
changing series." A rule is defined as "a statement of law applicable only to a narrowly
defined class of cases and incapable of extension by deduction or analogy." Therefore,
under Beale's scheme all rules are independent of each other and all rules are directly
deduced from a general principle of common law. He gives the Rule in Shelley's case as
an example of a rule. Id.
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principle., 85 The proper application of these a priori principles leads to
law's ultimate praxis: that of "purity of doctrine. 86
Beale recognized the need for law to respond to changing and novel
fact patterns. But his response was the prototypical solution of an
abstract conceptualist. Even though a particular rule applicable to the
novel situation did not formally exist in the common law, it could be
found at the level of principles. The rule needed only to be brought to
light by the judge.
As an example, Beale refers to the decision of Justice Shaw in
Commonwealth v. Temple.87 In that case, the novel situation was the
introduction of the streetcar to Boston in the 1850s. The issue was
whether the existing dray and omnibus line should be removed to prevent
delay of the swifter moving streetcars. Shaw decided in favor of the
streetcar company.88 Beale argues that this is an illustration of the
systematic and seamless nature of the common law
89
85. Id. at § 3.4. It is these scientific principles of law that allow for the formulation
of "a single homogeneous philosophical system." Id.
86. Only two things result in the adulteration of doctrinal purity-bad judicial
reasoning and legislative intervention. To the first he asserts that "wrong decisions are
after all uncommon"; to the second he states that "doctrine is not greatly changed by
statute." Id.
87. 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 69 (1859).
88. Id. at 80.
89. It was a system "based upon principles which covered every possible
occurrences in which [e]very human act was either permitted or forbidden." BEALE,
CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 18 at § 4.12. This use of Justice Shaw as an example of
formalism in action must have particularly galled Llewellyn. Llewellyn viewed Shaw as
a prototypical "grand style" judge. See generally, COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note
2, at 62-71. Professor Horwitz affixes the term "instrumentalism" to this brand of
judging that appeared in the early part of the nineteenth century. MORTON J. HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 1-30 (1977) [hereinafter,
TRANSFORMATION I]. "In short, by 1820 the process of common law decision making
had taken on many of the qualities of legislation." Id. at 2. In reference to Shaw's
decision in Farwell v. Boston & Worcester RR Co. Llewellyn states that "conscious
policy is at plain work upon the rule." COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 2, at 67. In
Farwell, Shaw displays the characteristics of a grand style judge basing his recognition of
the fellow servant rule on policy arguments. The rule denies recovery to an employee
against her employer for injuries caused due to the negligence of a fellow employee.
Shaw argued that such a denial would lead to safer railroads. 4 Met. (45 Mass.) 49
(1842). He also demonstrates a cavalier attitude to precedent and further justifies the
denial on equity or fairness grounds. Horwitz sees this as an example of instrumentalism
or social engineering in which existing principles were disregarded. The existing
principles were re-shaped or displaced to make private law more favorable to the
entrepreneur. This re-shaping culminated sometime near the end of the 1870s. In this
context the age of abstract conceptualism or formalism is seen as a way of locking in the
pre-entrepreneurial class slant of the law. For a discussion of the landmark nature of
Farwell ("elevating the paradigm of contract to its supreme place in nineteenth century
legal thought") see TRANSFORMATION I at 209-210. The point here is, issues of
substantive justice aside, a formalistic decision it was not.
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1. Systemization, Disaggregation, and Retreat
Professor Horwitz describes the period towards the end of the
nineteenth century as one characterized by the conceptualization and
systemization of American law as described above:
Between 1870 and 1900, one sees everywhere this tendency to
generalize and systematize fields of law that had previously been
conceived as a series of special cases and particular rules. The
reorganization of legal architecture can be understood as an effort to
create a systematic and autonomous system of private law derived
from such concepts as will [contract law], fault [tort law], and
property. It strove to erect an abstract set of legal categories that
would subordinate particular legal relationships to a general system
of classification. As we have witnessed the disintegration of these
late-nineteenth century imperial categories during the past seventy-
five years-as the law of contract, for example, has been
disaggregated into specialized areas of sales, labor, consumer, and
land-lord-tenant law-we see once again the historically contingent
character of legal architecture.
The process of generalization and abstraction in late-nineteenth-
century law was identified with the goal of rendering private law
more scientific. . . . For example, generalization permitted judges to
apply the same set of rules that were applicable between sophisticated
businessmen of relatively equal information and bargaining power to
labor and consumer contracts between vastly unequal parties.
Indeed, such indifference to context was regarded as an important
safeguard that would ensure that the law would remain neutral and
non-political.
90
Professor Horwitz believes that the conceptualist response to the
contradictions produced by systematization, and the conflicts between
abstract conceptualism and a changing commercial-social reality, was the
disaggregation of contract law.9 1 Towards the end of the nineteenth
90. TRANSFORMATION II, supra note 49, at 14-15 (emphasis added). Implied in law
or quasi-contract was one of the major areas of law spun off from the core of contract
law. See generally, WILLIAM KEENER, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS
(1893); Joseph L. Lewinsohn, Contract Distinguished from Quasi Contract, 2 CAL. L.
REv. 171 (1914).
91. Conversation with Morton J. Horwitz (January 25, 2002). The disaggregation
process can still be seen at work to the present. The disaggregation process not only
resulted in the separating out separate bodies of law previously contained in contract but
also to erect strict boundaries between the new bodies of law. See generally, Thomas
Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REv. 1 (1983). See also, Gregg Temple,
Freedom of Contract and Intimate Relationships, 8 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 146 (1985)
(marriage and intimate relations):
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century, areas traditionally within the core of contract law were spun off
to retain the harmonious quality of the conceptual apparatus. The
process of disaggregation eventually grew to include contracts in
employment law, real property law, common carrier and bailment law,
insurance law, sales law, and government contracts.92
The disaggregation process, however, was only a stopgap. By the
beginning of the twentieth century, the conceptual hold on contract law
was already in abeyance. The recognition of the enforceability of
requirements contracts is a specific example of the loosening of the
conceptual infrastructure. The 1873 case of Bailey v. Austrian93 held that
requirements contracts were illusory because they failed to satisfy the
requirement of mutuality of consideration. 94 In that case, one party had
agreed to supply the pig iron requirements of another company.95 The
case reflected the static nature of contract doctrine that required certainty
of obligation at the time of formation. The commercial needs and reality
of an evolving industrial economy were ignored.
96
Less than three decades later, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
informally overruled Bailey in Ames-Brooks Co. v. Aetna Insurance
[T]here is a strong trend in the courts and legislatures to create bodies of law
that control areas once governed by contract. In these areas, as in traditional
marriage, the parties are free to decide whether or not to enter into the
relationship. Once there, however, the terms of the relationship are to some
extent dictated by the state.
Id. at 146.
92. Professor Horwitz lists "sales, labor, consumer, and landlords-tenant law" as
those areas that were disaggregated from the main body of contract law.
TRANSFORMATION II, supra note 49, at 14. He previously mentions common carrier law
as another example. Id. He latter adds the law of insurance. Id. at 14-15. I have added
government contract law as another example.
93. 19 Minn. 535 (1873). For an excellent discussion of the transformation of
contract law at the turn of the century in the area of requirements and output contracts
see, Pratt, Turn of the Century, supra note 1, at 443-450. For a discussion of the doctrine
of Bailey v. Austrian see generally, Thomas Claffey Lavery, The Doctrine of Bailey v.
Austrian, 10 MINN, L. REv. 584 (1926).
94. "Without such absolute engagement.., there is no absolute mutuality of
engagement, so that defendant has the right at once to hold plaintiffs to a positive
agreement." 19 Minn. 535, 538 (1873).
95. Id. at 537.
96. The reality of an industrial economy is that merchants need to enter into
enforceable long-term supply contracts without always fixing the quantity term in order
to insure a steady stream of supplies or sales. This was alluded to in the case of Ames-
Brooks Co. v. Aetna Insurance Co., 83 Minn. 346, 86 N.W. 344 (1901) which recognized
the enforceability of requirements contracts. Justice Start stated that "[i]n considering...
whether such a contract is sufficiently definite... a proper administration of justice will
not permit us to be oversubtle, but we must interpret the contract from the standpoint of
the practical business men who made it... and the established course of business
between them." Id. at 349.
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CO.
9 7 Ames-Brooks shipped grain on the Great Lakes. Aetna agreed to
supply insurance coverage to Ames-Brooks for the year at a fixed rate.
98
When insurance rates increased it ceased to provide coverage for future
shipments. The court held that even though the amount of coverage was
uncertain, a contract was nonetheless formed for the entire year.99 It
reasoned that a court must "interpret the contract from the standpoint of
the practical businessmen who made it."'
00
Nonetheless, the conceptual approach continued to maintain its
dominant position in contract law analysis. Contextual inquiries were
isolated to specific developments such as the recognition of requirement
and output contracts, implied duty of reasonable efforts in agency
contracts,10' and a greater recognition of reliance. The implication of
good faith in requirement, output, and agency contracts required
contextual inquiry into historical levels of output or requirements, and
the normal activities of agents. Reliance theory required a contextual
determination of the reasonableness of the promise-receiver's reliance.
The attack was not overt in nature, however, but was folded into the
conceptual apparatus. For example, even though the Ames-Brooks court
took a realistic view of requirements contracts it followed classical
reasoning to align its decision with the conceptualism of mutuality of
consideration. It reasoned that its decision was distinguishable from the
ruling in Bailey.'0 2  Because the parties in the case had previously
contracted, there was enough evidence to support the mutuality of
obligation required under classical contract doctrine. 03 There was no
real discussion of commercial practice or the duty to act in good faith.
The court simply ruled that there was a mutuality of obligation
presentiated0 4 at the time of contract formation.
2. Conceptualism and the Law of Contract
The publication of Samuel Williston's Treatise on the Law of
Contracts in 1920 represented the preeminent conceptualization of
contract law. In the Preface to the original edition, Williston
optimistically stated goal was "to treat the subject of contracts as a
97. 83 Minn. 346, 86 N.W. 344 (Minn. 1901).
98. Id. at 346-47.
99. Id. at 349-50.
100. Id. at 345. See, Pratt, Turn of the Century, supra note 1, at 446.
101. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
102. Pratt, Turn of the Century, supra note 1, at 447.
103. Id.
104. This word is attributed to the writings of Ian Macneil. See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil,
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589 (1974); IAN R.
MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980).
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whole, and to show the wide range of application of its principles."' 15 At
the same time, case law began to call into question this optimism.'
0 6
In the case of Jacob & Youngs v. Kent,'1 7 for example, the Grand
Style contextualism of Justice Cardozo was pitted against the abstract
conceptualism of Justice McLaughlin. The case is symbolic in that it
shows formalism on the defensive and evidences that formalistic doctrine
was no match for the skillful analysis of Cardozo. The case involved the
construction of a home in which the construction contract provided for
the use of "Reading" water pipe. 10 8 Instead, the contractor used mostly
the pipe of another manufacturer.'0 9 All indications were that the
substituted pipe was of equal or better quality.1 0 The homebuyer refused
to make final payment until the contractor replaced the pipe. Such a
replacement was impossible without the contractor incurring high
costs. 111
Two issues presented themselves to the court. First, was the
homebuyer wrong in withholding the final payment? Second, what was
the proper measure of damages? Cardozo writing for a closely divided
court discarded the formal solution to deciding both of the issues. With
regard to the propriety of the buyer withholding payment, he criticized
105. SAMUEL W. WILLISTON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS Preface (1920).
See generally, FARNSWORTH, , UNITED STATES CONTRACT LAW supra note 15. For an
example of the conceptualist quibbling over the conception of promise see, Clarence D.
Ashley, What is a Promise in Law?, 16 HARV. L. REV. 319 (1903). In addition, the
dominance of promise in classical contract law is embodied in the offer-acceptance
paradigm. See generally, Hugh Evander Willis, Rationale of Agreement, 27 Ky. L.J. 284
(1938). For a critique of the formal offer-acceptance model see, Karl N. Llewellyn, Our
Case Law of Contract-Offer and Acceptance (Part 2), 48 YALE L.J. 779 (1939). For an
earlier attack on Willstonian abstract categorizations see George Costigan's analysis of
implied-in-fact contracts. George P. Costigan, Jr., Implied-in-Fact Contracts and Mutual
Assent, 33 HARV. L. REv. 376 (1920). Another example, of the doctrinal abstraction and
rigidity and the beginnings of its deterioration in the late nineteenth century is the area of
third party rights. The general premise was that "an agreement between A and B cannot
be sued upon by C, even though C would be benefited by its performance." Jesse W.
Lilienthal, Privity of Contract, 1 HARV. L. REv. 226 (1887). In its most abstract
incarnation, the contracting parties could not even expressly grant third party rights. The
evidence of deterioration is noted in the first footnote: "This doctrine is not taught in the
[Harvard Law S]chool at the present day." Id. at 226, n. I.
106. See, e.g., "The emergence of industrial society thus meant not only redistributive
motives would inevitably be activated.... It also meant that the relatively fixed common
law categories on which police power doctrines had been erected would fall apart ..
TRANSFORMATION II, supra note 49, at 30.
107. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
108. Id. at 890.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Justice Cardozo held that "we think the measure of the allowance in not the cost
of replacement, which would be great, but the difference in value, which would be
nominal or nothing." Id. at 891.
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the formal analysis of dependent-independent conditions." 12 Under the
conceptualism of conditions, the answer would be that where the
installation of Reading pipe is a dependent condition, the obligation of
the homebuyer to make final payment had never been triggered. If the
condition was considered independent, then the homebuyer was wrong in
withholding payment. Cardozo suggested that such a dichotomy is too
simplistic. Some conditions "though dependent and thus conditions
when there is departure in point of substance, will be viewed as
independent and collateral when the departure is insignificant."
'" 3
Therefore, the issue was not whether a condition is formally worded or
considered as dependent or independent. The issue was whether the
departure or defect is substantial or minor.
Cardozo's attack upon the abstract conceptualism of dependent-
independent conditions is elegantly stated in the following oft-cited
passage:
Those who think more of symmetry and logic in the development of
legal rules than of practical adaptation of the attainment of a just
result will be troubled by a classification where the lines of division
are so wavering and blurred. Some-thing, doubtless may be said on
the score of consistency and certainty in favor of a stricter standard.
The courts have balanced such considerations against those of equity
and fairness, and have found the latter to be the weightier. "14
The determination of the materiality of a defect is a contextual
undertaking. Cardozo states: "where the line is to be drawn between the
important and the trivial cannot be settled by a formula. The same
omission may take on one aspect or another according to its setting."
' 15
Cardozo took a similar tact in assessing the amount of damages to be
awarded for the improper installation. The issue was whether the amount
of damages should be based on replacement costs, a very high amount, or
diminishment of value, at best, a nominal amount. Once again, Cardozo
argued that there is no formulaic solution but rather that the answer must
be found in the context of the particular case." 16 He held in favor of the
contractor in the awarding of diminishment value." 7
112. "[Some conditions], though dependent and thus conditions when there is
departure in point of substance, will be viewed as independent and collateral when the
departure is insignificant." Id. at 890.
113. Id. at 890.
114. Id.at891.
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. He refers to the need for a contextual analysis by beginning his discussion of the





In comparison to the rationality of Cardozo's contextual analysis,
Justice McLaughlin's formalism seems quaint. Regarding the issue of
the homebuyer's withholding payment, he simply deduces from the
principle of dependent conditions that "he had a right before making
payment to get what the contract called for."'1 18 For the conceptualist all
things are black and white. In this case, no distinction is made between
important and trivial conditions. Any evidence of the homebuyer's
reason for wanting the specific pipe was irrelevant to the conceptual
deduction.1 9 Therefore, there can be only one true measure of damages:
replacement costs. The key fact for McLaughlin was that more than half
of the pipe installed was "non-conforming."' 120 The fact that the defect
was insignificant in relation to use or value is ignored in the face of such
non-conformity. An injustice in this case, perhaps, but to hold otherwise
would encourage loose performances in the future.
12 1
The contextual-conceptual divide is again illustrated in the 1925
case of Clifton Shirting Co. v. Bronne Skirt Co.122 Two merchants, in
that case, entered into a multiple installment sales contract for "delivery
in June, July, [and] August. , 123 After an initial delivery in May, the rest
of the order was not delivered until September. The buyer rejected the
remaining goods as untimely. At trial, the buyer offered evidence to
show that according to trade usage the contract term included three equal
shipments in each of the three months. 24 The trial court admitted the
evidence of usage and held for the buyer. On appeal, the majority
advanced a purely rule-based conceptual argument. 25  In short,
according to these judges, the extrinsic evidence of trade usage was not
admissible because the contract term had been fixed by previous case
law. 126 The dissent disagreed, stating that usage is admissible even when
118. Id. at 892.
119. In the words of McLaughlin: "What his reason was for requiring this kind of
pipe is of no importance." Id.
120. McLaughlin observes that the contractor "installed between 2,000 and 2,500 feet
of pipe, of which only 1000 feet at most complied [Reading pipe] with the contract." Id.
121. McLaughlin quotes the case of Smith v. Brady for the following proposition: "To
hold a different doctrine would be simply to make another contract, and would be giving
to parties an encouragement to violate their engagements...." Id. at 893.
122. 209 N.Y. Supp. 709, 1925 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8466 (N.Y. App. Div. 1925).
See also, Case Note, 35 YALE L.J. 633, 633 (1926).
123. 1925 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8466 at 6.
124. "The court upon the trial permitted the defendant to prove ... that there was a
well-known and universal trade custom as to the meaning of the expression .. " Id. 9-
10.
125. "It has been repeatedly decided ... as a rule of law.., that were a sales contract
provides for delivery ... by use of words ... to wit: Delivery June, July, August, such
words mean the seller has to the last day of the last month ... to make delivery
thereunder." Id. at 2-3 (emphasis in original).
126. "In light of the rule laid down by the court the meaning of the words used is
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the applicable rule of law is different than the usage. 127  While both
opinions recognized the important role of contextual evidence in
interpreting contracts, the majority saw the process as ongoing. The
minority judges saw the prior conceptualization of the trade usage as a
fixed rule of law that prevented further contextual inquiry.
a. Competing Visions of "Freedom of Contract"
The power of abstract conceptualism, and the evolution of the
realist critique, can be gleaned from a series of law review articles that
appeared in the early twentieth century. These articles dealt with the
underlying theme of American contract law: freedom of contract. The
first two articles appeared during the first decade of the twentieth
century: Clarence Ashley's Should There be Freedom of Contract
(1904),128 and Roscoe Pound's The Liberty of Contract (1909).129 The
third article, Samuel Williston's Freedom of Contract (1921),
130
appeared over a decade later.
Williston, the formalist, examined the philosophical and theoretic
basis for freedom of contract. In the introductory paragraph he refers to
Pound's 1909 article as examining the "philosophical basis for past and
current legal theorizing."'131 His view of the power of abstraction is
summarized in the opening page:
When... the study of abstract principles with logical deductions
from them, rather than the observation of concrete facts and the
drawing of inferences from them, occupies the intellectual leaders of
the time, similar principles are apt to find expression in varying
departments of thought. Some effects of the pursuit of an abstract
idea in the latter part of the eighteenth century and during the
nineteenth century and particularly upon the law of contracts form the
subject of this paper.32
He then established that freedom of contract evolved out of the "theories
entirely clear. It was ... improper to allow ... testimony to establish a custom or usage
giving such words an entirely different meaning .. " Id. at 3.
127. "[A]I1 agree that the words used had a real trade significance and meaning.... I
am therefore, of the opinion that the court properly received evidence.., to show the
existence of such a trade custom." Id. at 14-15 (Merrel, J. dissenting).
128. Clarence Ashley, Should There be Freedom of Contract, 4 COLUM. L. REv. 423
(1904) [hereinafter, Ashley, Freedom of Contract]. Cf Jerome C. Knowlton, Freedom
of Contract, 3 MICH. L. REv. 617 (1905) (defends judicial voiding of regulatory statutes
as enlightened).
129. Pound, Liberty of Contract, supra note 24.
130. Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365 (1921).
131. Id. at 365.
132. Id. Note again, Williston's belief in abstract principles and the importance of
tracing their genealogy as evidence of their omnipotence.
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of individualism and liberty."' 33 Williston then criticized the Lochner
era decisions as strict applications of that belief system, which were out
of touch with modem times. 134  Williston's seemingly realist view of
freedom of contract can only be understood in the narrow focus of his
article. He rejected, as an exaggeration of the truth, the assertion that
limitations on the freedom of contract are "a recurrence to a theory of
status.' 35  Williston merely supported legislative incursions that were
narrowly tailored to specific concerns of public health and safety. He
argued that except in the area of common carriers, most incursions into
contract law are minor and the private nature of contracts as supported by
freedom of contract remained intact. 
136
In contrast, Professor Ashley advocated the correctness of systemic
judicial intervention into freedom of contract. 37  This type of
discretionary modification of contract is an anathema to Williston's core
view of the sanctity of promise and the strict enforcement of the bargain.
Professor Ashley's review of judicial limitations of freedom of
contract predates the realist premise that freedom of contract is more
illusion than real. 38 He argued for the ability to avoid the dictates of
absolute freedom of contract by implying conditions in law, or by
disregarding "unreasonable" express conditions under the guise of the
parties' "true" intention. 139 Through the fiction of contract interpretation,
judges uncover the true intent of the parties. Instead of criticizing
judicial activism, Ashley endorsed the view that contractual intent is only
the first step in the process of contract enforcement. "It is well enough
for us to classify contracts as those obligations having their initiative in
133. Id. at 375 (referencing Jeffersonian democracy, along with the works of Smith,
Ricardo, Bentham, and John Stuart Mill).
134. "Observations of results have proved that unlimited freedom of contract... does
not necessarily lead to public or individual welfare." Id at 374. Williston asserted that
simply citing the banner of freedom of contract is no longer a sufficient argument. "It is
no longer possible... [to] mere[ly] appeal to liberty and freedom of contract to avert...
'the tragedy of a fact killing a theory,' by putting a Constitutional sanction behind a
cherished dogma."' Id. at 379. In another context, this quote would have been fodder for
a realist attack on the Willistonian construct.
135. Id. at 379. Cf Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34
(1917) (treating the standard form contract as a return to status).
136. Williston ends the article thusly: "In different degrees, which can be determined
by no reasoning a priori, the sphere of [freedom of] contract is limited in various
relations but is seldom wholly excluded." Id. at 380.
137. Professor Ashely states that "it is well enough for us to classify contracts as
those obligations having their initiative in the intent... but.., there seems to be no
essential reason why the courts cannot modify the obligation." Ashley, Freedom of
Contract supra note 130, at 426.
138. See supra notes 39-43, and accompanying text.
139. "As a matter of fact, however, in all these cases the courts have in reality made a
new contract for the parties." Ashley, Freedom of Contract supra note 130, at 424.
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the intent and agreement of the parties, but when that preliminary has
taken place, there seems to be no essential reason why the courts cannot
modify the obligation., 140  The courts, thereby, should perform two
tasks: uncovering the descriptive contract, and then applying it
selectively based upon society's normative vision of contract.
Roscoe Pound's 1909 article titled Liberty of Contract was a full
frontal attack on formalism's view of freedom of contract. 141  His
criticism of the conceptualists' obsession with doctrinal freedom of
contract laid the foundation for the realists' tenets of rule skepticism, and
the masking function of grand abstractions. Pound characterized the
freedom of contract dogma that underpinned contract doctrine as being
incongruent with the level of inequality and one-sided bargaining power
that exists in industrialized society. 142 The masking of this incongruence
was due to an exaggeration of private right over the public good and the
evolution of mechanical jurisprudence. Pound stated that "deduction
from conceptions has produced a cloud of rules that obscures the
principles from which they were drawn. 143 The solution required the
stripping of away of the formalism of contract rules to uncover
underlying principles. 144
Pound saw in the invalidation of social legislation the perfect
illustration of the harm of mechanical jurisprudence. 45  Formalism
places a premium on generality of application, while reasoning from
underlying principles requires a more discerning analysis of facts.146 The
masking methodology behind the prohibition against legislative
intervention into freedom of contract was the same as the prohibition
against judicial adjustment of contracts. It was a methodology
characterized by "rigorous logical deduction from predetermined
conceptions in disregard of and often in the teeth of the actual facts. 147
140. Id. at 426.
141. Pound poses this question toward the beginning of his article: "Why do so
many ... force upon legislation an academic theory of equality in the face of practical
conditions of inequality?" Pound, Liberty of Contract, supra note 24, at 454.
142. AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 6, at 6-7.
143. Pound, Liberty of Contract, supra note 24, at 457.
144. See also, Larry A. DiMatteo, The History of Natural Law Theory: Transforming
Embedded Influences into a Fuller Understanding of Modern Contract Law, 60 U. PITT.
L. REV. 839 (1999) (examines the equitable principles found in natural law theory and
argues that they continue to underpin much of contract doctrine).
145. "Manifestations of mechanical jurisprudence are conspicuous in decisions as to
liberty of contract." Pound, Liberty of Contract, supra note 24, at 462.
146. Id.
147. Id. Cf Professor Horwitz view of Pound as a conservative historian primarily
focused on the evolution of legal doctrine. His was the historical truth premised upon the
internal perspective of "the received legal tradition." Morton J. Horwitz, The




Legal equality need not equate with bargaining equality. This
divergence masked by the separation of the public from the private realm
of contract eventually worked to weaken the rhetorical power of freedom
of contract.
b. The Uniform Sales Act
The heyday of conceptualism in contract law, in its second
generation of evolution, can be seen in the first major American
codification, the Uniform Sales Act (Act). 148  Written by Samuel
Williston, the Act was meant to simplify the convoluted rules of sales
law. Instead, it was a monument to the conceptual thinking inherent in
Langdellian legal science.1 49  The Sales Act was a statement of
generalized first principles void of any workable rules. It was a "non-
codification" in that it was not an act of reform or modernization but an
act of preservation of the abstract conceptual status quo.
150
Llewellyn's transition from advocating a revision to the Sales Act to
a more comprehensive Code was shaped by his view of the Uniform
Sales Act as an unsalvageable conceptual anachronism, meaning that any
revision effort would be a piecemeal failure. He argued that much of the
law embodied in acts like the Uniform Sales Act had "become outmoded
as the nature of business, technology, and financing [had] changed."'
151
In the process, sales law had done something that no law should do; it
lost "contact with people in their daily affairs.' 1 52 To ensure that the new
Sales Act, and subsequently the Code, did not fall prey to the same
rigidification, Llewellyn sought to include in the text and comments "a
full statement of situation, principle, and specific intent."' 53 This is what
can be called Llewellyn's "patent reason" method of rule making. By
incorporating patent reason into the rules, he hoped that the courts would
interpret them through an analysis not only of their words, but also by
148. Llewellyn's work on the Code began with the task of revising the Uniform Sales
Act. His work on revising the Sales Act eventually became Article 2 of the Code.
149. "[Llewellyn] believed that the 1906 Act embodied an obsolete form of law-
consisting of rules derived from a few broad abstractions, removed from practical
experience, and expected to answer all questions." Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The
Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARv. L. REv. 465, 473
(1987) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter, Wiseman, Merchant Rules].
150. Professor Gilmore's review of the Sales Act critically states that it failed to
provide rules of guidance, but instead was "designed to provide access to the prevailing
academic wisdom"-the wisdom of Samuel Williston. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF
AMERICAN LAW 71 (1977).
151. Id.
152. REPORT AND SECOND DRAFT: THE REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT 9 (1941).
153. Id. at 19.
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their sense and purpose. 154
The incorporation of patent reason into the text of the new Sales Act
served two functions: flexibility to prevent freezing of the law, and
increased predictability. As to the first objective, Llewellyn had this to
say: "It is not where the words leave off, but where the reason leaves
off [;] the borders need to be left open for new cases of similar reason, as
yet unimagined."'' 55 As to the second objective, the mandate of reasoned
decision-making increases the predictability of law. Providing the rule's
reason forces courts to respond by outlining how that reason is advanced
through the court's interpretation of the rule. This process produces
better-reasoned decisions that in the long term increase the predictability
of law application. 1
56
In a memorandum to the Executive Committee of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1940,
Llewellyn discussed the reasons for replacing the old Uniform Acts
157
with a new Code. 58 His critique included the assertion that the Acts'
formal, abstract rules had made them unresponsive to growth in the real
business world. He warned that this failure must be avoided in any new
code:
[A new code] must encourage development by the courts [and
incorporate]... language which is clear as to direction, but does not
undertake too nicely to mark off the outer edges of its application.
The language of principle, not that of rule drawn in derogation, is
called for. Language drawn in distrust or anxiety about courts'
understanding may accomplish its immediate purpose, but it paves
the way with stumbling blocks within a decade.
154. ld. at 25 ("as much in terms of its sense and purpose as in terms of its
meticulously examined wording").
155. Id. at 26.
156. Rule reason "results both immediately and over the long haul in a more
reckonable course of decision and a more reckonable body of interpretation." Id. at 27.
The vigilance needed to avoid unneeded abstraction and the freezing of formal rules
would guide Llewellyn in his subsequent drafting of the Code. His distaste for abstract
concepts had already been displayed in his attack on the title concept in sales law. See
Karl N. Llewellyn, C.LF. Contracts in American Law, 32 YALE L.J. 711 (1923);
Llewellyn, Title to Contract, supra note 61, at 159.
157. Uniform Sales Act, Negotiable Instruments Law, and Uniform Trust Receipts
Act.
158. In 1940, Llewellyn accepted William Schnader's invitation to become the Chief
Reporter of the new Uniform Commercial Code. See generally, William Schnader, A
Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1967).
159. Memorandum to Executive Committee on Scope and Program of the NCC
Section of Uniform Acts, "Possible Uniform Commercial Code" (1940), reprinted in,
TWINtNG, REALIST MOVEMENT, supra note 6, at 526.
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The groundwork for a code of "singing" rules 160 is seen in the above
statement. Tight rules with clearly defined "outer edges" are to be
supplanted by the language of principle. Principle here is to be translated
by infusing the rules with statements of patent reason. Courts would
then use that reason as a guide to expanding or contracting Code
provisions in the face of novel business developments. In this way,
contextual developments would be allowed to flow into the Code in
order to keep it coherent with commercial reality. For Llewellyn the
shift from a conceptualist to a contextualist orientation was the necessary
ingredient in creating a living commercial code.
III. Llewellyn in the 1930s: The Intellectual Context
Karl Llewellyn was a major figure in a number of areas of law
including contract and commercial law, as well as jurisprudence and the
sociology of law. His ideas influenced legal education, doctrine, theory,
and the general perceptions of the judiciary, practitioners, and the legal
system.' 61 Ultimately, the key to Llewellyn's originality is the breadth of
his interests and knowledge. His knowledge of Continental law and
sociology elevated his view of law and its relationship to society from a
vantage few legal scholars have been able to achieve. 62 His originality
evidences a keen mind able to synthesize input from a wide variety of
sources and ideas into an often fresh and critical script.
63
160. Infra Part VI.B.
161. Soia Mentschikoff wrote this in a biographical note: "Llewellyn was a leading
exponet of realism in the field of jurisprudence. Applying the realistic method to
commercial law.... He also wrote on legal education, emphasizing craft skills..., on
the professional responsibility and organization of the bar; on the sociology of law.... A
study he made with E.A. Hoebel of the law government of the Cheyenne Indians...
broke ground in anthropological method." Mentschikoff, Llewellyn, supra note 56, at
440-41.
162. "[H]is writings reflected a preoccupation with the relation of commercial
practice and economics to law; his work also revealed his expanding interest in legal
sociology. He admired... Max Weber and Eugen Ehrlich." Id. at 440.
163. "If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulder of giants." Letter to
Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1676), in 1 CORRESPONDENCE OF ISAAC NEWTON 416 (H.W.
Turnbull ed., 1959). Extending the Newtonian metaphor of attributing most
achievements to the works of earlier intellectual "giants," Llewellyn can be thought of as
a giant standing on the shoulders of other giants. Lon Fuller made a not so nice comment
regarding Llewellyn's failure to acknowledge his intellectual forebears. "The citation of
authorities is so often a form of intellectual exhibitionism that one hesitates to criticize a
man who is free from this ostentation. Yet it does seem to me that Llewellyn errs too
much in the opposite direction." Fuller, Legal Realism, supra note 22, at 218. He gives
the following example: "I am particularly distressed at the absence of reference to that
great pioneer among realists, Rudolf von Ihering." Id. Llewellyn's singularity was
enhanced by a writing style that presented both a curious flare and obstacle to the
reader's understanding. This stylistic extravagance was most apparent in his
phraseology. An example, from his 1931 article What Price Contract?, brings this point
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Before analyzing the intellectual context and influences that likely
impacted Llewellyn's thought during the 1930s, it is important to note
that the breadth of these influences debunk preconceived views of him as
being dominated by any one ideology or school of thought. 164 His views
of law in society were shaped by his drive for pragmatic understanding.
This understanding was built from the ground up. The depth of
to life: "Chimerical such a sketch must be-compounded of parts strangers to each other,
a dream-thing, and mayhap a monster; worse than chimerical in the gaping
incompleteness of content and form." This is the way Llewellyn described the problems
of developing a general theory of contracts and at systematizing contract doctrine. What
Price Contract?, supra note 61, at 707. Grant Gilmore attributes to Llewellyn the
tripartite division of American legal history or legal thought into the "Revolutionary Era
to Civil War" (Pre-Classical/Grand Style/Instrumental Style), "Civil War to World War
I" (Classical or Formal Style), and the Post World War I to Present (Modem Style). W.
David Dawson states that Llewellyn was the first to offer an extended legal analysis of
the problem of standard form contracting with his bifurcation of assent into specific and
blanket assent. W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation
of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITTS. L. REV. 21, 32 (1984). See, generally,
What Price Contract?, supra note 61, at 731-32; Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52
HARV. L. REV. 700 (1939). Llewellyn's work on standard form contracting also gives an
initial glance at his evolving contextualism. The specific intent is simply attached to the
"dickered terms" of the contract. In a standard form these are the terms entered into the
blanks provided in the form. They usually include the identity of the parties, price,
quantity, description of the goods, terms of payment, and shipment obligations. The
blanket assent given to not unreasonable or surprising terms is clearly a contextual
undertaking. The blanket assent is used to determine which of the unread, fine print
terms shall be incorporated into the enforceable contract. Llewellyn's methodology for
making this determination is that the parties assented to terms that can be brought within
the "broad form of the transaction." Slawson at 36. Llewellyn can best be seen as a
bricoleur-a handiman building a theoretical edifice from parts found in different
intellectual domains. In contemplation of his impending work on revising the Uniform
Sales Act, Llewellyn likened the task to that of a craftsman. See CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS,
THE SAVAGE MIND 1-33 (1962) (making a similar analogy). Professor Hull elegantly
describes Llewellyn as bricoleur: "Once we conceptualize Llewellyn as bricoleur . . . we
can begin to recover the motives of his academic enterprise ... [h]e was from start to
finish an applied jurisprudent, cobbling together the bits and pieces in the universe of law
and social science around him." N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN:
SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 11-12 (1997). "Nor can I think of any
body of material [sales law] better suited to the training of a craftsman." Karl N.
Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725, 727 (1939) [hereinafter,
Across Sales on Horseback]. Possibly the line between the bricoleur and the craftsman is
not so much in the source of his raw materials but in the perceived quality of the end
product.
164. There is a common view that Llewellyn's call for a separation of the "is" and
"ought" meant that he did not see a normative dimension to law. See e.g., AMERICAN
LEGAL REALISM, supra note 6, at 52 (notes the controversial nature of Llewellyn's
assertion that in reforming law there needs to be a separation of is and ought); Richard
Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 621, 621 (1975) [hereinafter, Danzig, Jurisprudence of the U.C.C.]. Professor
Wiseman notes that Danzig "assails Llewellyn for disguising critical ethical choices in
the Code." Wiseman, Merchant Rules, supra note 149, at 468 n. 13. Part VI investigates
the normative dimension of Llewellyn's vision of contract interpretation.
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Llewellyn's knowledge of the intricacies of commercial law, and more
impressively of actual practice, was profound. In the end, jurisprudence
for him was a concrete discipline. The worth of any jurisprudence was to
be measured in its usefulness in understanding actual practice. A theory
that failed to connect to actual social practice was to be discarded.
1 65
Early in his career, Llewellyn understood that legal theory could be
verified only through its application. In the Preface to his 1930 casebook
on sales he stated that, "I have lifted my own voice to the lone moon,
more than once. Yet it is a far cry from desire to fulfillment ... theories
take on a different aspect when they are matched against a concrete effort
to apply them."' 66  Llewellyn's unique place in American law is
bolstered by his success in bridging the divide between theory and
praxis. His work on the Code enabled him to put his theoretical ideas
about law into practice.167 The rest of this Part examines legal and non-
legal influences in Llewellyn's writings.
A. Sociological Influences
What made Llewellyn unique to American legal scholars was his
very "German" approach to legal theory. He actively incorporated
sociological and philosophical insights into his jurisprudence.1
68
165. TRANSFORMATION II, supra note 49, at 6.
166. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE LAW OF SALES ix (1930) [hereinafter, LAW OF
SALES].
167. Professor Danzig begins his critical analysis of Llewellyn's work on the Code by
noting this connection:
Article II of the Uniform Commercial Code is one of those rare statutes which
have been drafted by a self-conscious jurisprude: a person at least as reflective
about the role of law in society and the relation of lawmaking institutions to
each other as he was concerned about the particular lawmaking task at hand.
Danzig, Jurisprudence of the UC.C., supra note 164 (footnote omitted). Danzig further
states that "the genius of the Code is derived in large measure from the mesh Llewellyn
effected between the pragmatic demands he faced and the jurisprudential views he held."
Id. at 623. See also, Patterson, Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, supra note 14. "Llewellyn's
ultimate achievement in the Code, the articulation of a social vision of the proper
relationship between doctrine and theory." Id. at 175. Professor Danzig develops the lack
of a normative theory criticism of legal realism as Llewellyn's contextualist approach.
The Code's referencing of trade usage and custom fails to provide an answer to how one
defines good commercial practice or "commercially decent dealers?" He argues that
Llewellyn fails to answer such questions, and instead retreats into his descriptive world of
contextualism. In short, the goodness or badness of a commercial practice or a
merchant's conduct will be made self-evident in a careful analysis of the context. Danzig
argues that such questions are only answerable not through contextual discovery but as a
matter of ethical choice. Id.at 629.
168. Professor Patterson phrased it as follows: "I think Llewellyn as very German in
his approach to the subject of theory. He combined sociology and philosophy-a real
German approach." Letter from Professor Dennis M. Patterson to author (Nov. 1, 2001)
(on file with author)). See also, Michael Ansaldi, The German Llewellyn, 58 BROOK. L.
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Llewellyn's contextualism is understandable given his sociological-based
understanding of law's place in society. 169  Llewellyn understood that
law, knowledge, and language were socially determined constructs.
70
This external view of the meaning of law set him apart from the
conceptualists who saw law as a self-contained system of meaning.
Despite Max Weber's patronage of the logically formal rational
system, there was much for Llewellyn to draw upon from Weber's
analysis of commercial law. Weber did acknowledge the existence of an
immanent commercial law and the importance of good faith. First, he
saw the tension between the use of a logically formal rational system of
commercial law and the expectations of businesspersons. 71 To some
degree the expectations of businesspersons will be frustrated due to the
formal nature of pre-existing legal rules. This tension for Weber could
never be fully resolved because legal certainty could only be achieved
through the inherently formal nature of rules. Llewellyn never did
REv. 705 (1992) [hereinafter, Ansaldi, German Llewellyn]. Llewellyn's German writings
witness his "obsession with knowing truth about law, and knowing it sociologically." Id.
at 777. See also, Shael Herman, Llewellyn the Civilian: Speculations on the Contribution
of Continental Experience to the Uniform Commercial Code, 56 TUL. L. REV. 1130
(1982) (exposing German law influences) [hereinafter, Herman, Llewellyn the Civilian].
169. Thomas Kuhn explains the social (contextual) nature of knowledge and language
as "intrinsically the common property of a group or nothing at all. To understand it we
shall need to know the special characteristics of the groups that create and use it."
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 210 (2d ed. 1970), as
quoted in, Dennis M. Patterson, The Pseudo-Debate over Default Rules in Contract Law,
3 SO. CAL. INTERDISCIP. L.J. 235 (1993).
170. Soia Mentschikoff, Llewellyn's wife, listed the following individuals as those
that influenced him: William Graham Sumner, A.G. Keller, Arthur Corbin, Wesley
Hohfeld, and Walter W. Cook, he also admired "Holmes, Pound, Cardozo, Max Weber,
and Eugen Ehrlich." Mentschikoff, Llewellyn, supra note 56, at 440. Max Weber's
writings on law provide an example of a sociological approach to understanding the place
of law in society. Weber's rejection of Marxist economic determinism in favor of law's
facilitative role in creating capitalism allowed for an internal analysis of law. Weber's
formal-rational typology saw the evolution of a logically formal rational legal order as
the ultimate achievement of European law. This elevation of a logically formal
rationality to the apex of world legal systems is an antithesis to the Realists attack on the
logically formal rational system existing at the beginning of the twentieth century.
Weber defines the logically formal as "where the legally relevant characteristics of the
facts are disclosed through the logical analysis of meaning and where definitely fixed
legal concepts in the form of highly abstract rules are formulated and applied." MAX
WEBER, SOCIOLOGICAL WRITINGS 205 (Wolf Heydebrand ed., Continuum 1999). This
rational system envisions an acontextual application of the law. "Law is formal to the
extent that... unambiguous general characteristics of the facts of the case are taken into
account." Id. These were the premises of abstract conceptualism about which Llewellyn
and the Realists were at odds.
171. "[Tlhe expectations of parties will often be disappointed by the results of a
strictly professional legal logic. Such disappointments are inevitable indeed where the
facts of life are juridically 'construed' in order to make them fit the abstract propositions
of law." Id. at 216-217.
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concede to this view. His thoughts on purposive interpretation,
contextualism, singing rules, and situation-sense1 72 were attempts to
diminish the formal nature of rules and to bridge the gap between legal
rules and commercial practice.
Despite his "disappointment thesis," Weber did see the importance
of formal law incorporating the immanent law of commerce. His vehicle
for this incorporation was the commercial principle of good faith. He
saw good faith as attendant to the determination of contractual intent and
one that is contextually determined:
In the sphere of private law the concern for a party's mental attitude
has quite generally entailed evaluation by the judge. "Good faith and
fair dealing" or the "good" usage of trade or, in other words, ethical
categories have become the test of what the parties are entitled to
mean by their "intention." Yet, the reference to the "good" usage of
trade implies in substance the recognition of such attitudes which are
held by the average party concerned with the case, i.e., a general and
purely business criterion of an essentially factual nature, such as the
average expectation of the parties in a given transaction. It is this
standard which the law has consequently to accept.
173
This excerpt contains much of what interested Llewellyn, including the
important role of trade usage, transaction types, situation-sense, meta-
principles of good faith and fair dealing, and the law's awareness of
these contextual matters.174  The next section reviews the works of
William Graham Sumner and James Coolidge Carter who also likely
influenced Llewellyn.
1. Status Quo and Dynamic Contextualism: Of Sumner, Carter,
and Llewellyn
According to Llewellynian, contextualism law formation should be
a dynamic, contextually driven process in which law instantaneously
adjusts to real world novelty. 175 By its fluid, continuous invocation of
context into rule adjustment Llewellynian contextualism is synchronic in
nature. This view of contextualism was, however, opposed in the early
part of the past century by the works of sociologist William Graham
Sumner and attorney James Coolidge Carter and their status quo-
172. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
173. WEBER, SOCIOLOGICAL WRITINGS, supra note 170, at 216 (emphasis added).
174. It is also important to note the is-ought view of trade usage. The role of law is to
recognize and encourage good trade usage. These are the elements that Llewellyn
explores in developing his jurisprudence of commercial law.
175. Infra Part VI. C. (discussing dual track theory of interpretation).
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preserving model of contextualism."76 In the Sumner-Carter model,
context was embedded historical custom, and the process of change was
slow and historical deferring. Legal rules were not to focus on the more
idiosyncratic nature of trade usage, but reflect ancient custom. 
177
While the dynamic contextualism of Llewellyn was an antithesis to
the formalism of abstract conceptualism, Sumner-Carter contextualism
was easily reconcilable with the existing formal-deductive apparatus of
classical legal thought. Sumner-Carter contextualism provided the
rationale for formalizing the application of rules as a depository of
ancient customs. 178 The formalization process separated rule formation
from contemporary contextual factors by tying it to an evolving
historically connected custom.
At the highest level of abstraction, Sumner and Carter speak of the
ever-changing law and the "necessity of adjustment to mutable life-
conditions."' 179  But their idea of adjustive change18° was the slow
evolutionary change of Spencerian sociology. 18' According to this
176. The works of Sumner and Graham were well known to Llewellyn. See, e.g.,
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (Univ. of
Chicago Press 1962) [hereinafter, LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE]. "Carter's saying as to
custom holds: 'more and better than known -felt."' Id. at 107; "[Carter's LAW: ITS
ORIGIN, GROWTH, AND FUNCTION] is the best known work; much more satisfactory is the
little-known pamphlet, THE IDEA AT THE ACTUAL IN LAW (1890)." Id. at 146, n. 15; "But
ten years later [1906] Carter was still teaching at Harvard that law is but discovered by
judges." Id. at 516; "Llewellyn himself later credited Keller and Sumner as direct
influences on his intellectual formation, claiming that reading Sumner in particular had
been one of the most exciting experiences of his undergraduate days." Ajay K. Mehrotra,
Law and the 'Other': Karl N. Llewellyn, Cultural Anthropology, and the Legacy of the
Cheyenne Way, 16 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 741, 746 (citing, TWINING, REALIST MOVEMENT,
supra note 6 at 92, 414, n.25); "Llewellyn's early engagement with the ideas of Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., Benjamin Cardozo, Roscoe Pound, Jerome Frank, the American
philosopher John Dewey, the American sociologist William Graham Sumner ......
Ansaldi, German Llewellyn, supra note 168, at 770-71; "Llewellyn's principal mentor at
the Yale Law School, Arthur L. Corbin, was a great enthusiast of Sumner's mores...
Llewellyn found the same message in Carter's customary jurisprudence .. " Daniel R.
Ernst, The Critical Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 102 YALE L.J.
1019, 1071-1072 (1993).
177. "From his cradle to his grave [a human being] is the slave of ancient custom."
WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE
OF USAGES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, MORES, AND MORALS 4 (1906).
178. Llewellyn asserted that Carter's work on customary law was a "belated
monument" to the theoretical side of the Formal Period of legal thought. LLEWELLYN,
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 176, at 187.
179. WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER & ALBERT GALLOWAY KELLER, THE SCIENCE OF
SOCIETY 651 (Yale Univ. Press 1927) [hereinafter, SUMNER & KELLER].
180. Id. at 653.
181. "No man who has seriously followed Spencer's sociological writings.., has any
excuse for not knowing that law, .. . is a matter of growth from unpromising beginnings,
through illimitable time .. " Id. at 657. See also, Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock,
The Influence of Ecological Science on American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI-KENT L.
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model, law was a crystallized form of long-standing societal mores.
These mores and their subsequent crystallization into law evolve slowly
over long stretches of time. The evolutionary framework of legal change
is expressed by Carter when he asserts "that habit and custom... furnish
the rules which govern human conduct, and they still exert over
enlightened man the same imperious dominion that they did among the
primeval hordes."'182  Thus, Sumner and Carter saw legal change as
radically graduated.' 83 The diachronic nature of status quo contextualism
mandated that the legal interpreter look deep into the past of customary
common law. The primary importance of rule application, even to novel
fact patterns, was not to adjust the rule to fit context, but to seek to
harmonize the application with historical custom.
Llewellyn rejected Sumner-Carter's brand of contextualism in The
Cheyenne Way as "wooden, externalized, graceless, and cumbersome
maladaptation."'' 84 He argued "[t]hat [the] ideal type of regularity and
predictability which it is law's office to provide is one in which laymen's
reasonable expectations are not upset by over-crystallized law-stuff.'
185
Llewellyn emphasized the rapidity of social change and the need to
provide flexibility in legal rules so that they could be constantly
updated. 1
8 6
Dynamic contextualism looks to contemporary and more
importantly to the future of law application. The interpreter focuses on
the trade usage and evolving business customs of the day. The flow of
contextual factors into the law necessitates, and directs, the continuous
adjustment of rule to context. Novel fact patterns viewed as situation-
REV. 847 (1994). "One of the most prominent Social Darwinists, Yale sociologists
William Graham Sumner .. " Id. at 849; "William Graham Sumner was the most vocal
advocate of Herbert Spencer's 'social statics.' Sumner contended that 'even a drunkard
in the gutter is just where he ought to be."' Anthony E. Cook, The Death of God in
American Pragmatism and Realism: Resurrecting the Value of Love in Contemporary
Jurisprudence, 82 GEO. L.J. 1431, 1517, n.100 (1994), quoting, WILLIAM GRAHAM
SUMNER, SOCIAL DARWINISM: SELECTED ESSAYS OF WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, 24, 122-
123 (William E. Leuchtenburg & Bernard Wishy eds. Prentice-Hall Inc. 1963).
182. JAMES COOLIDGE CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND FUNCTION 119 (G.P.
Putnam's Sons 1907) (hereinafter, CARTER, LAW].
183. For Sumner the transformation of mores into law was a process of
"imperceptible graduations." SUMNER & KELLER, supra note 179, at 660-61.
184. KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY 288 (1941)
[hereinafter, CHEYENNE WAY].
185. Id. at 287 (emphasis in original).
186. Llewellyn states the following as one of the tenets of Legal Realism: "The
conception of society in flux, and in flux typically faster than the law, so that the
probability is always given that any portion of law needs reexamination to determine how
far it fits the society is purports to serve." LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 176,
at 55.
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types 187 require a relatively ahistorical rule adjustment. The primary
objective is rule modification not rule preservation. In an even greater
break with custom, rule adjustment is forward-looking, taking into
account the consequences of the rule adjustment to the case at bar and to
future categories of cases. i88 In this way, the contemporary context does
not simply affect law formation, but law formation recursively affects the
future context of law in turn. For example, a "good" trade usage could
be used to inform the rule adjustment, while a "bad" trade usage could be
eradicated by the rule adjustment. 1 89
187. For an analysis of Llewellyn's notion of situation sense or types see infra Part
IV.B.
188. "[T]he monumental demand by Llewellyn for judges.., to elaborate logically,
cogently, and deductively, their reasons for a rule and for a holding, but at the same time
relating logical process inductively to the situation-type including the times and needs of
the time." Charles D. Breitel, Llewellyn: Realist and Rationalist, 18 RUTGERS L. REV.
745, 752 (1964). The forward-looking dimension of rule adjustment was clearly stated in
The Common Law Tradition: "[A]n adequately resilient legal system... regularly,
absorb the particular trouble[d case or novel legal issue] and resolve it each time into a
new, usefully guiding, forward-looking felt standard-for-action or even rule-of-law."
COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 2, at 513.
189. The function of law to recognize and channel trade usage toward the "good" is
alluded to in The Cheyenne Way. Llewellyn states that "a trouble-case drives strongly
toward becoming precedent gives the imperative or standard repeatedly a chance to jump
ahead of the actual behavior pattern." CHEYENNE WAY, supra note 184, at 287 (emphasis
added). For an explanation of the notions of good and bad business practices of usage
see, infra Parts VI.C., VI.D. For Llewellyn, the proper evolution of commercial practices
included a weeding out of bad practices by the courts. The role of a codification would
be to weed out the practices adopted by the courts but that have been rendered obsolete
with the passage of time. See generally, Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the
Uniform Commercial Code: 1940-1949, 51 S.M.U. L. REv. 275, 285-286 (1998) (stating
that desirable practices were selected for legal recognition gradually by the courts).
Llewellyn's and Sumner-Carter's models of contextualism led to different views on
the propriety of legal codification. The graduated view of legal change promoted by
Sumner-Carter saw the slow change of historical context as the means of ensuring legal
certainty and predictability. Llewellyn, in contrast, saw the primary threat to certainty in
law as a divergence between legal rules based in past custom and rapidly changing
commercial practice. It was through dynamic contextualism that such divergence could
be minimized:
To the extent that when the court is called upon its judgment will jump with the
layman's prior non-legal expectation, that layman can plan safely, counting on
the law, although without knowing it. In a r6gime of change, certainty in law is
attained whenever change in the judges' ways moves in step and pace with
changes in the ways-and so in the expectations--of the relevant laymen.
Certainty fails for most laymen, whatever the fixity of the formula, when the
judge's reaction fails to jump with the change in laymen's ways, and only then.
LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 176, at 107 (emphasis original). Llewellyn's
view that divergence between legal rules and real world practice is the primary cause of
legal uncertainty was asserted at a much earlier time. "[W]orse confusion and worse
misleading would be the inevitable outcome if the Bylaw-stuff operating in the trade
should be ignored because it does not happen to be Class A Law-stuff for official courts."
CHEYENNE WAY, supra note 184, at 52.
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For Llewellyn, the Code project was a vehicle to discard the old
rules that had diverged from modem commercial practice, while for
Sumner-Carter such radical change was anathema to the stabilizing force
of law.' 90 For Carter, the recognition of customary law is best left to the
judicial branch and not by preemptive legislation.' 91 Thus, Carter only
favored codification as a formal recognition of evolutionary
developments in the customary law, and at most to act as supplement to
that law.' 92
Despite the different views of the graduated and dynamic models of
contextualism, Llewellyn owed much to Sumner and Carter. The
importance of custom to rule formation underlies the works of all three.
For example, Sumner espoused the concept of the folkway, the primary
roles that social mores and practices play in society's control of human
conduct, 193 suggested to Llewellyn the primary role of groups in
society. 194 Llewellyn used the principle of groups to argue that effective
legal rules could never be the product of simple deduction from abstract
principles. Legal rules needed to be open to the induction of meaning
through a constant analysis of the practices of merchant groups. It was in
the customs and usage of these groups that Llewellyn found the living,
customary law that he brought to the Code project. It was from
Sumner's folkways and Carter's customary jurisprudence that Llewellyn
derived the importance of legal rules changing to reflect commercial
reality and the need to balkanize commercial society into relevant sub-
groups.1
95
190. Carter was the chief spokesperson for the group that fought against the adoption
of the Field Code in New York, and in his 1907 lectures, Law: Its Origin, Growth, and
Function, he asserted that "no real advance is possible except through the slow, gradual,
unconscious, but willing change of thoughts, and consequent changes of conduct and
custom." CARTER, LAW, supra note 182, at 324.
191. "The judges are both by appointment and tradition the experts in ascertaining
and declaring the customs of life." Id. at 327.
192. "The American advocates of legal evolution were William G. Hammond and
James C. Carter. In this paradigm, law was viewed as the slowly evolving customs of the
people; courts merely declared law, and law could not deliberately be changed by
legislation, although legislation might be occasionally necessary to clarify the law."
James E. Herget, Organic Natural Law: The Legal Philosophy of George Hugh Smith, 41
CATH. U. L. REV. 383, 386 (1992).
193. "The folkways are a societal force." WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A
STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF USAGES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, MORES,
AND MORALS 3 (Ginn & Co. 1906).
194. For Sumner the "folkways are the widest, most fundamental, and most important
operation by which interests of men in groups are served." Id at 34 (emphasis added).
195. Sumner saw folkways as developing mainly from sub-groups within society.
"Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other
groups have other folkways, these excite its scom. ... It therefore strengthens the
folkways." Id. at 13. See generally, Allen R. Kamp, Legal Development: Between-the-
Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism, and The Uniform Commercial
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B. Pre-1930 Legal Writings
Arthur Corbin, as the promoter of a reliance-based alternative to
contractual liability, challenged the established Willistonian promise-
based construct. The result was Williston's reluctant incorporation of the
reliance-based liability of promissory estoppel in Section 90 of the
Restatement of Contracts.1 96 Corbin had been a teacher and mentor of
Llewellyn. His view of the need for reliance-based recovery was
nurtured by his reading of cases not as bastions of doctrinal purity, but as
illustrations of law-molding fact patterns. 197 His fact-based analysis of
cases was not conducive to the unity of doctrine thesis advanced under
the Willistonian construct.
198
Corbin's obsession with "operative facts"' 99 had a profound
influence on the younger Llewellyn. Corbin and Llewellyn believed that
contract law needed to better reflect commercial reality. Their
innovation included reversing the causal flow from contract rules to
practice envisioned by the conceptualists, and replacing it with a flow
that worked commercial practice into contract rules. 200  Llewellyn
understood that the conceptualism of contract law needed to be tailored
to a fact-focused inquiry.
One source for the re-conceptualization of law was found in the
previously noted work of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld.20 '  Hohfeld's
Code in Context, 59 ALB. L. REv. 325 (1995) [hereinafter, Kamp, Between-the Wars].
"[The] message of sociology and anthropology figure substantially in Llewellyn's
thought. William Graham Sumner and Boas, the anthropologists cited by Llewellyn,
focused on the behavior of particular groups rather than individual behavior .... Id. at
353.
196. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdie, Jr., The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L. J. 52, 64 (1936) (containing Fuller and Perdue's
discussion of Williston's reluctance to recognize reliance damages as a measure of
damages).
197. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 150, at 79.
198. Corbin believed that the presumption of intention from the law's view of legal
relations was a serious undertaking. "To indulge such a presumption is merely to hold
that the actual intention of the parties is not the determinative fact, or even that it is
wholly immaterial." Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting
Legal Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169 204-05 (1917).
199. "Arthur L. Corbin... studied cases not so much for their doctrinal statements
but for the essential facts, from which the great variety of applications of contract law
could be seen." FARNSWORTH, UNITED STATES CONTRACT LAW supra note 15, at 45.
Corbin used cases "to tear down or challenge current over-statements." Rule of Law,
supra note 61, at 1265.
200. Patterson, OfLlewellyn, Wittgenstein, supra note 14, at 171.
201. Soia Mentschikoff wrote that Llewellyn was "influenced by the fact-to-result
analysis of cases used by Arthur L. Corbin and by the narrow-issue thinking of Wesley
Hohfeld and Walter W. Cook." Mentschikoff, Llewellyn, supra note 56, at 440. "[A]
challenge to the very structure of Contract doctrine ... [t]he precursor was Walter Cook,
following Hohfeld's jurisprudence. " Rule of Law, supra note 61, at 1267.
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work, along with Corbin20 2 and Walter Wheeler Cook's 20 3 elaborations,
provided insight as to the role of conceptual systems in providing
practical guidance to legal disputes. Hohfeld reasoned that there were a
few broad types of jural relations that cut across all legal categories.20 4
Clearer understanding of these fundamental legal conceptions was not an
exercise in "transcendental nonsense" but provided "solution[s] [to]
practical, every-day problems of the law."
20 5
Hohfeld attempted to demonstrate that the existing conceptual
apparatus was the product of "ambiguity of thought and language.,
20 6
The device for recognizing fundamental legal conceptions or jural
relations was operative or constitutive facts. Thus, classical contract
thought's fixation on the formation of contract by exchange of offer and
acceptance were not constitutive but merely evidence of a creation of a
jural relationship.20 7 What likely attracted Llewellyn to Hohfeld's
conceptualism was its attempt to deconstruct existing concepts like
"right" or "contract" into real world relationships.20 8 Hohfeld's use of
operative facts also had a natural affinity with the works of Llewellyn
and Corbin. In Hohfeld's scheme, the introduction of new operative
facts is what changed one jural relation into another. Llewellyn's
contextual analysis was aimed at the same discovery of operative facts.2 09
202. The follow-up work of Corbin and Cook was made necessary by the untimely
death of Hohfeld in 1918 at the age of 39. See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, Legal Analysis
and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J 163 (1919-20); Arthur L. Corbin, Jural Relations and
Their Classification, 30 YALE L.J. 226 (1921).
203. Walter Wheeler Cook, Hohfeld's Contributions to the Science of Law, 28 YALE
L.J. 721 (1919).
204. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 25. See also, WESLEY N.
HOFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS As APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND
OTHER ESSAYS (1923); Albert Kocourek, The Hohfeld System of Fundamental Legal
Concepts, 15 ILL. L. REv. 24 (1920).
205. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 25, at 20.
206. Id. at 23.
207. The true operative fact is proving the written agreement is the same as the one
exchanged at the earlier time, that it had not been modified, and that it was indeed
exchanged. Id. at 28. Another example as taken from contract law is the equation of
written agreement with contract is not an example of an operative fact disclosing the
nature of the jural relation. A written agreement is an example, instead, of an evidential
fact.
208. Llewellyn wrote a brief biographical note on Hohfeld in 1932. In it he stated
that while Hohfeld's conceptual analysis "can obviously solve no cases it makes for
clarification and cuts very close to the atomic structure of the law on its conceptual side."
Karl N. Llewellyn, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. SCI. 400, 401
(1932).
209. Hohfeld's analysis also allowed for a broadening of the judicial inquiry into
finding the applicable law. In Hohfeld's concluding paragraph he noted that his analysis
allowed the "use of persuasive judicial precedents that might otherwise seem altogether
irrelevant." Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 25, at 59. In addition
to Corbin-Hohfeld operative facts' analysis, Llewellyn's views of the importance of the
2004]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
The writings of John Dewey, a colleague at Columbia University,
also proved to have a natural connection to Llewellyn's thoughts. The
convergence of theory and praxis at the heart of pragmatism fit into
Llewellyn's view of the relationship between jurisprudence and law.
Dewey, in his 1924 Logical Method and Law,210 presented the
philosophical grounding for the Realist cause. First, according to
Dewey, in the area of legal reasoning, deduction needed to give way to
induction.21 1 Second, legal rules needed to be open, flexible, and
responsive to social reality.212
Dewey's schematic of proper legal reasoning is aligned with
Llewellyn's views of contextual interpretation and the use of singing
rules. General rules or principles need to be adjusted to comport with
concrete situations. In such a methodology of rule interpretation/
application, the focus is on social facts.2 13 The role of social facts in rule
application was subsequently encompassed by Llewellyn's concept of
situation-sense.21 4
concrete in the application of contract rules were partially informed by the work of Levin
Goldschmidt:
Every fact-pattern of common life, so far as the legal order can take it in,
carries within itself its appropriate, natural rules, its right law. This is a natural
law which is real, not imaginary; it is not a creature of mere reason, but rests on
the solid foundation of what reason can recognize in the nature of man and the
life conditions of the time and place; it is thus not eternal or changeless nor
everywhere the same, but is indwelling in the very circumstances of life. The
highest task of law-giving consists in uncovering and implementing this
immanent law.
COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 2 at 122. Goldschmidt was a mid nineteenth
century German legal historian and commercial lawyer. The quote is from the Preface to
Kritik des Entwurfs, eines Handelsgesetzbuchs, Krit. Zeitschr. F.d. ges,
Rechtswissenschaft, Vol. 4, No. 4. He was a firm believer that law was immanent-to be
found in the Natur der Sache or "the nature of the matter." Goldschmidt was also the
leading figure in the failed German commercial codification movement of 1861. See
generally, James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on
Llewellyn's German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156,157-
159, 163-166 (1987). It is this interest in Romantic thought represented by Goldschmidt
that influenced Llewellyn's view of the role of commercial practice in law reform. Id. at
167 The free play of custom advanced by Goldschmidt is evident in the full contextual
analysis advanced by the Code. Id. at 170-73 It is also evident in Llewellynesque
concepts like situation-sense and singing rules.
210. John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17 (1924) [hereinafter,
Dewey, Logical Method).
211. "It follows that logic is ultimately an empirical and concrete discipline. Men
first employ certain ways of investigating, and of collecting, recording and using data in
reaching conclusions, in making decisions[.]" Id. at 19.
212. They are to be "conceived as tools to be adapted to the conditions in which they
are employed rather than as absolute and intrinsic 'principles."' Id. at 27.
213. If this is allowed to happen, then "attention will go to the facts of social life, and
the rules will not be allowed to engross attention .. " Id. at 27.




George Gardner asserts in his 1932 article, Principles of the Law of
Contracts,215 that it was time for the theoretical jurist to develop a new
approach to the jurisprudence of contract law.2t 6 He believed that the
next step in the improvement (simplification) of contract law was the
quantification of reasonableness.21 7 This view represented a rejection of
the pure formalism of law as strict logical deduction. Gardner provided a
curious definition of the rules of contract law as "merely so much
intellectual apparatus designed to bring the fact which will end the
proceedings into a satisfactory relationship to the facts that went
before. 21 8  Thus, the next step in the progress of contract was the
simplification of this legal apparatus.219
Morris Cohen attempted to simplify the conceptual apparatus of
contract law in his 1933 classic The Basis of Contract.220 Cohen cited
the modem industrial enterprise as the impetus for the rise of the
importance of contract. He stated that "extensive commerce ... tends to
introduce the disintegrating force of rational reflection into the hard crust
of traditional mores and beliefs., 221  Cohen concluded that Maine's
215. George K. Gardner, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Law of Contracts, 46
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1932) [hereinafter, Gardner, An Inquiry]. Llewellyn had this to say
about Gardner's article: "Gardner, if I read him right, was shocked at the disorder and
disharmony and un-thought-throughness which he found in the doctrines gathered under
the label Contract." Rule of Law, supra note 61, at 1267.
216. Gardner concludes that "[w]hat is needed [is] ... a system of criticism by which
new decisions will be constantly tested by [underlying] principles, and by which alleged
principles, whether old or new, will be constantly tested against them." Gardner, An
Inquiry, supra note 215, at 42.
217. Quoting Pollock, "reasonableness, no doubt, is the ideal of the common law[.]"
Id at 1.
218. Id. at 4.
219. "The simpler and more direct this intellectual apparatus the smaller will be the
chance of error and the more just and certain the result of the litigation will become." Id.
at 4.
220. Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 553 (1933). Morris
Cohen 's 1933 article holds a special place in contract lore. It was one of the first
American law review articles to provide a general accounting of the philosophical basis
of Anglo-American contract.
221. Id. at 555-556. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1921). The following quote is most apropos in reviewing Cohen's The Basis of
Contract: "We no longer interpret contracts with meticulous adherence to the letter when
in conflict with the spirit. We read covenants into them by application when we find
them instinct with an obligation imperfectly expressed." Id. at 100 (emphasis added). Id.
at 166-167. Cardozo supports Cohen's notion of the inevitability of regulation:
"Property, like liberty, though immune under the Constitution from destruction, is not
immune from regulation essential for the common good. What that regulation shall be,
every generation must work out for itself." Id. at 87.
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stages of legal progression are partially true, but incomplete.22 2  For
Cohen, the shift from status to contract (from the medieval to the modem
era) was not the final transition. Instead, it seemed inevitable that
freedom of contract's reign would be short-lived. Inequality of
bargaining and other vices would need to be restrained by government
regulation.223 For Cohen, the end-state of Maine's evolutionary process
would be quasi-contract, quasi-status. In this end-state, freedom of
contract would be scrutinized on behalf of the weaker against the
stronger. This status-based recognition of protecting the weak through
regulation is reflected when the law, courts or legislators recognize such
classifications as merchant-consumer, franchisor-franchisee, large
company-small company, professional-lay person. The different statuses
would attach certain duties and protections to the parties.
224
Cohen asserted that distributive concerns should play a role in
limiting the scope of this private right to contract.225  In short, Cohen
argued that the fixation on enforcing the will of the parties in the
classical theory of contract should not be the only factor weighed in
contract enforcement decisions.226 What Cohen had in mind was not the
per se re-ordering of the rules of contract; they would remain a relatively
pristine reflection of personal liberty. Rather, Cohen envisioned an
external regulatory apparatus that would guard against the blossoming of
a Nietzschean extermination of the weak.227
222. Cohen states:
Maine's observation that the progress of the law is from status to contact is...
partly true in certain periods of expanding trade. But close on the heels of
expansion comes consolidation.., and in the wake of increased freedom of
contract we find increased regulation.... At no time does a community
completely abdicate its right to limit and regulate the effect of private
agreements.
Cohen, The Basis of Contract supra note 220, at 558.
223. In the wake of increased freedom of contract we find increased regulation, either
through the growth of custom or standardization or through direct legislation." Id.
224. Cohen recognizes the distinction between freedom of contract and "real"
freedom when he states that "[r]egulations involving some restrictions on the freedom of
contract are necessary to real liberty .. " Id. at 587.
225. "But mere freedom as absence of restraint, without positive power to achieve
what we deem good, is empty and of no real value." Id. at 560.
226. "But the notion that in enforcing contracts the state is only giving effect to the
will of the parties rests upon the utterly untenable theory as to what the enforcement of
contracts involves." Id. at 562.
227. Id. at 563-64. In addition, Cohen analyzes the justifications for contract law.
The traditional adage for the importance of the public enforcement of private contracts is
the sanctity of promises. The practicality of such a standard is rejected on two fronts.
First, it would be inefficient for a legal system to attempt to enforce all promises. "No
legal system does nor can attempt to enforce all promises." Id. at 572. Second, the
injustice to categorical application must give way, at times, to ensure needed flexibility in
business dealings. See id. at 572-73. From these two caveats to the sanctity of the
promise adage, the evolution of doctrines of changed circumstances and the importance
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Morris Cohen's analysis of the foundations of contract law was
followed by Felix Cohen's 1935 critique of conceptualism in general. In
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,228 Felix Cohen
rejected legal formalism in favor of an instrumental-pragmatic-
contextual approach.229 In this work, he provided an eloquent accounting
of the static nature and indeterminacy of rules. Cohen's basic
methodology is consequentialist.230 His attack on conceptualism called
for a redefinition of conceptions "as functions of actual experience. 231
Cohen invoked contextualism in his discussion of the morality of
the application of a given rule: "[T]he ethical appraisal of a legal
situation is not be found in the spontaneous outpourings of a sensitive
conscience unfamiliar with the social context, the background of
precedent, and the practices and expectations, legal and extra-legal,
which have grown up around a given type of transaction. 232 Here we
see a version of Llewellyn's notion of situation-sense. Elsewhere, Cohen
stated that "one may suspect that a court would not consistently hide
behind a barrage of transcendental nonsense if the grounds for decisions
were such as could be presented without shame to the public." 233 The
importance of singing rules is implicit in this statement. Llewellyn
believed that rules that sing with patent reason234 would force courts out
from behind abstract concepts and result in singing decisions.
These articles were part of a prolific outpouring of Realist writings
throughout the 1930s that included an array of articles on jurisprudence,
of formality in the Anglo-American system can be drawn. The twentieth century has
seen an expansion of the contractual excuse doctrines, along with the expansion of
traditional duress to include economic duress are cases in point. Cohen notes the
importance of contract law refraining from attaching liability during the negotiation of a
contract. "Negotiations would be checked by such fear [of liability]. In such cases men
do not want to be bound until the final stage, when some formality like the signing of
papers gives one the feeling of security, of having taken the proper precautions." Id. at
574 (emphasis added). See generally, Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41
COLUM. L. REv. 799 (1941).
228. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 50.
229. Cohen states that "functionalism represents an assault upon all dogmas and
devices that cannot be translated into terms of actual experience." Id. at 822.
230. "If the functionalists are correct, the meaning of a definition is found in its
consequences." Id. at 838.
231. Id. at 827.
232. Id. at 840.
233. Id. at 820.
234. Llewellyn's concept of a singing rule is a rule that expressly states ("sings") with
the reason for its existence or its patent reason. "To begin with. Then, a rule with a
singing reason is by definition both well designed to purpose and unmistakably so."
COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 2, at 246. In more cumbersome terms, he states that
the "law of singing reason" is a "rule which wavers both a right situation-reason and a
clear scope-criterion on its face yields regularity, reckonability, and justice all together."
Id. at 183.
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contract, and sales by Llewellyn. 235 These writings laid the basis for the
more overarching jurisprudence of contract rules and interpretation that
he brought to the Code project. Part IV examines Llewellyn's writings
during this period. This examination is structured by the major features
of Llewellynian jurisprudence: fact sensitivity, situation sense, emptiness
of conceptualism and paper rules, indeterminacy of rules, and
transaction-types.
IV. Flowering of Llewellynian Jurisprudence
Realism owes its name to Llewellyn's 1930 article A Realistic
Jurisprudence ("Realistic Jurisprudence ,).236 This article was followed
the next year with the equally important Some Realism about Realism
("Some Realism ,).237 Taken together, they provide insight into the
contextualism that Llewellyn developed in contract interpretation. In
Some Realism, he expresses rule skepticism as a fundamental tenet of
legal realism.2 38  This thesis holds that the level of abstraction and
rationalization had reached a point in the law that there were always two
rules, mutually contradictory, available to courts when deciding a
particular case. Because of this, a court must look to the factual world
for guidance to choose between competing premises. 239 The necessary
corrective is found in the fact patterns of cases derived from contextual
reality.
A. Fact Sensitivity and Discarding Paper Rules
The corrective of social reality has both is and ought dimensions.
The "is" dimension recognizes that situation facts have always been the
covert force behind judicial decisions. Their importance has been hidden
behind the deductive-style of judicial writing. The communal technique
of legal reasoning dictates that opinions work deductively from
concept/rule to fact. This reasoning is the necessary product of classical
legal thought. Llewellyn attacked the vice of abstract conceptualism:
235. For a selective presentation of some of these writings see, AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM, supra note 6.
236. Realistic Jurisprudence, supra note 28.
237. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound,
44 HARV. L. REv. 1222 (1930-31) [hereinafter, Some Realism].
238. Llewellyn states a common point of departure for the legal realists' was a
"[d]istrust of traditional legal rules and concepts insofar as they purport to describe what
either courts or people are actually doing." Id at 1237.
239. "The search is for correlations of fact-situation and outcome which (aided by
common sense) may reveal when courts seize on one rather than another of the available
competing premises." Id. at 1240 (emphasis in original).
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"Too much is written and thought about 'law' and 'rules,' lump-wise." 240
He argued that in the ad hoc case it is necessary to separate ought and is.
In order to understand what a court is actually doing it is important to set
value judgments aside to see what facts are the driving forces behind the
decision.
The "ought" dimension comes into play in the re-conceptualization
of existing law to correlate it with the fact world. The aim of this
exercise is to forego abstract conceptualism in favor of narrower
categorization. In Some Realism, Llewellyn argues that Realists believe
in the value of "grouping cases and legal situations into narrower
categories [and they] distrust verbally simple [paper] rules-which so
often cover dissimilar and non-simple fact situations. 24n  In Realistic
Jurisprudence, he noted sarcastically that "[t]he old categories are
imposing in their purple, but they are all too big to handle." 242 Llewellyn
stated most cases affect only a small number of people.243 Thus, it is
inherent in the nature of the case system that rules have narrow
application. Therefore, any study of law, whether by scholar or
reformer, must begin with the study of "particularized situations. 244 In
his conclusion to Realistic Jurisprudence, Llewellyn stated that "the
clearer visualization of the problems [of law] involved moves toward
ever-decreasing emphasis on words, and ever-increasing emphasis on
observable behavior., 245  The result of such an approach is the
elimination of the "paper rules" of abstract conceptualism" in exchange
for "rules with real behavior correspondences. 246
B. The Situation-Sense of Transaction-Types
The most innovative and important of Llewellynian concepts in the
area of contract interpretation is situation-sense. Llewellyn defined
situation-sense as "the type-facts in their context and at the same time in
their pressure for a satisfying working result., 247  Type-facts are not
party-specific but facts that relate to a situation-type.248 Professor
240. Id. at 1239.
241. Id. at 1237.
242. Realistic Jurisprudence, supra note 28, at 457.
243. Llewellyn states "most pieces of law affect a relatively small number of persons
ever or at all, with any directness ...." Id. at 459.
244. Id. at 460.
245. Id. at 464.
246. Id.
247. COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 2, at 60.
248. Professor Todd Rakoff uses Jacob & Youngs Inc. v Kent to illustrate this point.
Todd D. Rakoff, The Implied Terms of Contracts: Of 'Default Rules' and 'Situation-
Sense,' in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 191, 208 (Jack Beatson & Daniel
Friedmann eds., 1995). Cardozo saw two situations-types for deciding whether a builder
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Rakoff, in an excellent reconstruction of situation-sense methodology,
lists eight distinctive features:
249
- The inquiry begins with the operative or "paradigmatic" facts of the
case. This begins the process of "constructing models which describe
type-situations."
250
* The different situation-types, although disparate, "link up to large
propositions about the way society works.
* The role-types of the parties (as determined by the situation-type)
and their relationships are constructed jointly by law and society.
25
It is the jointness of this construction that allows for the constant
refitting of rules to social dynamics.
* The refitting process is usually a product of interstitial change; the
rules to be refitted are taken from "a limited universe of
possibilities."'253 This gradual process of refitting is the essence of
common law change.
* Situation-sense recognizes that contract law embodies a "plurality
of evaluative premises" that are often in conflict when applied to a
given situation-type.
254
- Situation-sense methodology and the reconstruction of rules are
backward and forward-looking. They look to the past reason behind
the existing rule and how alternative reconstructed rules will fit and
is owed final payment despite constructing a building that possesses a relatively minor
defect. See id. The two situation-types were the sale of "common chattels" and a
contract to build a "mansion or a skyscraper." Id. Ultimately, he decided that the second
type required its own rule-substantial performance-while the first dictated the
application of the traditional rule of perfect tender. See id; see also, Todd D. Rakoff,
Social Structure, Legal Structure, and Default Rules: A Comment, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCP.
L.J. 19, 22 (1993) (noting that the construction of legal categories is partially an adoption
of roles and transactions defined by society).
249. Rakoff, The Implied Terms of Contracts: Of 'Default Rules' and 'Situation-
Sense,' supra note 248, at 216-19.
250. See id. Rakoff importantly notes that "[t]hese models do not aspire to the
universality present in abstract rules." Id. at 216. They are rules that are cut from social
content and not from an internal conceptual ordering. See id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 216-217.
253. Id. at218.
254. However, it avoids the use of meta-principles to choose among competing
premises. This avoidance of a method to choose between competing normative premises
is the weakest link in the situation-sense framework. I will deal with the use of meta-
principles in the reconstruction of rules in Part VI.D.
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justify situation-types in the future.
255
- The "problem" of discretion implicit in the fact that the judge
constructs the situation-type is ameliorated by her appreciation of
how things actually work.
2 56
- A wise solution to the novel fact pattern is achievable through the
uncovering of the needs, purpose, and meaning lying beneath the
legal and social situation.
7
Through this methodology, legal rules are made to fit a "structured"
social context.258
Llewellyn offered a mature version of situation-sense in his 1954
testimony before the New York Law Revision Commission:
[T]he existing law can sometimes point up clearly how not to make
law, whether simplicity has been sought by way of some mere word-
formula which does not fit the situation and the situation's set of
problems.... [T]he effort to throw into a single basket the hugely
varied situations.., has led again and again either to plain injustice
or to the court's jumping whatever traces were sought to be imposed
upon it-with a resulting complete uncertainty. Where operation and
results are today scrambled and unreliable even though the word-
formula looks, then what is needed is to re-examine the problems and
the material and to come out with language which really fits the
need.
259
Thus, a judge is not apt to find a ready-made rule directly applicable to a
given fact pattern. The indeterminacy of facts, however, in a novel case
can be somewhat ameliorated through their attachment to a category of
255. Rakoff, The Implied Terms of Contracts: Of 'Default Rules' and 'Situation-
Sense,' supra note 248 at 219.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 221.
259. Statement of Karl N. Llewellyn to the Law Revision Commission pertaining to a
Study of the Uniform Commercial Code, reprinted in, TWINING, REALIST MOVEMENT,
supra note 6, at 538. Llewellyn's view of the importance of situation-sense in interpreting
contracts was already apparent in his 1931 article Some Realism. "The search is for
correlations of fact-situation and outcome which (aided by common sense) may reveal
when courts seize on one rather than another of the available competing premises." Some
Realism, supra note 237 (emphasis in original). Continental influences can be seen at
work in his notion of situation-sense. In The Common Law Tradition he associates
situation-sense with G6ny's libre recherche. COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 2, at
260-6 1; see also Herman, Llewellyn the Civilian, supra note 168, at 1126 at n.3; see also
generally, FRANCOIS GENY, METHOD OF INTERPRETATION AND SOURCES OF PRIVATE
POSITIVE LAW (2d ed. 1954). "Situation sense... serve[s] ... to indicate the type-facts
in their context and at the same time in their pressure for a satisfying working result."
COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 2, at 60.
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facts 260 that the law views as significant.
This attachment of the particular facts to a category of facts is
affected not only by a natural affinity between case and category but also
by the subconscious filtering of the facts through the prism of the judge's
prior experience. Llewellyn was attempting to harness within the
judicial mind's subconscious processing of fact through situation-sense.
It is with these devices and the natural human processing of new facts
that the context of real-life continually replenishes and updates the law.
The next two sections offer an example of situation sense and its
potential interpretive power.
1. Llewellyn, Situation Sense, and Implied Warranties
Llewellyn gives an historical account of the replacement of caveat
emptor in sales law with implied warranties as an example of situation-
261sense working its magic. In the early part of the nineteenth century,
the situation-type that dominated the commercial sales cases involved the
factorage industry. Factors acted as conduits between manufacturers,
merchant parties, and consumers. The caveat emptor doctrine suited the
purpose of protecting the factorage industry from liability for defects in
the goods that they transferred. The thought was that the purchaser had
the right and the duty to inspect the goods before taking possession.
Therefore, any subsequent defects should be at the buyer's risk since the
factor did not normally have an opportunity to inspect. In addition, many
feared that affixing such liability for product defect would bankrupt the
factorage industry.
Over time, the role of the factorage industry began to diminish in
importance and a new situation-type, that of distance sales, developed.
In such sales, the goods were sold directly from the merchant producer to
the end consumer. In such sales, the purchaser takes legal possession of
the goods before or while the goods are in transit. Therefore, the
importance of inspection was greatly diminished since the purchaser was
likely to have already assumed the risk of loss, or incurred substantial
expenses prior to any such inspection. This recurring situation-type
260. In Llewellyn's 1930 casebook his narrow categorization of transaction types
included a separate index in which transactions were cataloged according to commodity
types. LAW OF SALES, supra note 166, at 1073-77. The Index listed the following
commodity types: Agricultural and Foodstuffs, Animal Products, Livestock, Fish, Forest,
Mineral, Semi-Manufactured Goods, Manufactured Foodstuffs, Other Finished
Manufactures, Stocks of Goods, and Obligations. LAW OF SALES, supra note 166, at
1073-77. Llewellyn saw the major task of the judge of"constant[ly] reaching for a sound
way to fit the facts into some significant pattern or type." COMMON LAW TRADITION,
supra note 2, at 125.
261. Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 699,
737-44 (1936) [hereinafter, Warranty I].
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impressed upon the courts262 the need to protect the purchaser and
exposed the poor fit of the general rule of caveat emptor.263 Thus, the
rule was reconstructed to allow for the implication of warranties in
distance sale of goods transactions.
2. Interpretive Power of Situation-Sense
In The Cheyenne Way,264 Llewellyn described the transformation of
situation-sense into law through the concept of regularity. The seeds of
situation-sense or transaction types begin with a singular occurrence that
is then repeated. Through a long-term process of regularity, the situation
or type is recognized as reflective of a legal practice.
[T]he regular makes its way into the legal.... [T]hey begin in non-
sophistication, in the operation of direct, primitive sense of justice out
of life practice. As they then pass through the crucible of conflict
into recognized result, they move into a process of more conscious
drive toward a regularity which rests not on life-practice but on legal
practice.
265
This is the concept Llewellyn refers to as the process of legality. The
danger is that the upward flow from transaction to type to rule is stymied
when the regularity as authority resists further adjustment or change.
This is the danger of legalism. The rules of law act as receptacles of
regularity but once filled are likely to stagnate. Therefore, the rules need
to provide a mechanism to constantly recycle the supply of regularity.
The drafting of singing rules, the use of purposive interpretation, and the
full admissibility of contextual evidence were Llewellyn's chosen means
to accomplish this end.
The natural effect of situation-sense was the categorization of
transactions along both general and particular fault lines. In the area of
general categorization, the two most prominent groupings evidenced in
the Code are the merchant-consumer and the relational-discrete
contracting distinctions.266 Llewellyn believed the sale of goods between
262. "Impressing" the courts occurs when a "given rule or principle or 'analysis'
grates against the immanent rightness of the situation-type." COMMON LAW TRADITION,
supra note 2, at 352.
263. Karl N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. REv. 873,
884 (1939) [hereinafter, First Struggle].
264. CHEYENNE WAY, supra note 184.
265. Id. at 286.
266. Others have argued that present day courts have been more apt to disregard the
distinction. See, e.g., William J. Woodward, Jr., Symposium: Consumer Protection and
the Uniform Commercial Code: "Sale" of Law and Forum and the Widening Gulf
Between "Consumer" and "Nonconsumer" Contracts in the U.C.C., 75 WASH. U. L.Q.
243 (1997).
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merchants and those to consumers were different situation-types.267
Therefore, he proposed a separate set of merchant rules. His major
underlying thesis was that different contract types needed to be dealt
with differently. This was opposed to the Langdell-Williston construct
of general principles and rules that applied to all forms of contract.
Although Llewellyn's idea of separate merchant rules was rejected, he
was able to incorporate merchant-consumer distinctions throughout the
Code.268
C. Law's Conceptual "Apparatus"
Llewellyn's 1931 article in the Yale Law Journal entitled What
Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective269 is arguably his most famous
article.270  He began his analysis with the inherent problems of
formulating a "general" theory of contract or what he refers to as "a
dream-thing and mayhap a monster.",27' He noted that any such theory
can only maintain coherence by peeling off parts of the body of law it is
attempting to theorize or systematize: "[They] drop quietly out of
contemplation, unnoticed, unmissed, unmourned-and unaccountable
for., 272 This idea anticipated the continued development of specialized
bodies of law, such as employment law, which was previously within the
core of contract law.
273
Llewellyn's awareness of the detachment of abstract conceptualism
from reality is pronounced. "Overwhelmingly is the realization of how
far a law still built in the ideology of Adam Smith has been meshed into
the new order of mass-production, mass-relationships. Overwhelming in
no less measure is the conviction that broad forms of words are chaos,
that only in close study of facts salvation lies., 2 74 The problem with
267. See, Wiseman, Merchant Rules, supra note 149.
268. See id. at 472.
269. What Price Contract?, supra note 61. What Price Contract? is one of a number
of seminal contract law articles to appear at this time. Others include: Gardner, An
Inquiry (1932), supra note 215, M. Cohen's The Basis of Contract (1933), supra note
220, and Lon Fuller and William Perdue's The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,
46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936) & 46 YALE L.J. 373 (1937).
270. A LEXIS search on October 14, 2001 uncovered 131 recent law review articles
citing Llewellyn's "What Price Contract?" The multi-layered nature of its discourse
presents an opportunity for exploration from the perspective of doctrine, theory, and
jurisprudence. It provides a prism into many of the issues of contract law that framed the
legal discourse during the era of legal realism. It is these same issues that continue to
affect contract law discourse at the turn of the twenty-first century.
271. What Price Contract?, supra note 61, at 704, 707.
272. Id. at 705.
273. It also reflects the earlier historical process of disaggregation of contract law that
began in the late nineteenth century. See generally, TRANSFORMATION II, supra note 49.
274. What Price Contract?, supra note 61 at 751.
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abstract conceptualism was not so much in its abstractness but its
formalism. Llewellyn well understood that law, especially contract law,
was inherently wedded to concepts and rules. The problem with abstract
conceptualism was its static nature. The abstract concepts may have
justified themselves from a "rule fit '275 measurement at the time of their
creation but their formalistic application over time increasingly divorced
them from social reality. 76
Llewellyn asserted that the systemization of contract law through a
pyramid of self-contained rules, doctrines, and principles would serve the
beneficial goal of establishing a framework of understanding. 77 The
price to be paid for an abstract conceptual system was the rigidification
of rules. The Formal style of adjudication that existed during the early
part of the twentieth century consisted of fossilized rules coupled with
formalistic application. A necessary product of such a style of thought is
a legal order that increasingly diverges from a dynamic social reality. In
What Price Contract, Llewellyn provided a game plan to prevent the
rigidification of rules under a systematized-conceptual rendering of
contract law.278 His price-reduction methodology included being awake
275. Infra Part VL.A.
276. A broad-based example of this phenomenon was the discrete transactional
paradigm at the core of classical contract law. The contract core at the end of the
nineteenth century was premised upon single transactional exchanges. The contractual
viewfinder remained fixated to the exact time of formation-the door to contractual
liability and interpretation was fixed in place at that moment in time. Proceeding through
the twentieth century, it became clear that the discrete transactional paradigm was ill
suited to the increasingly long-term, relational nature of modem day contracts.
Llewellyn's critique of abstract conceptualism related to the static nature of the
formalistic application of concepts noted previously and to the indeterminacy of judicial
decision-making due to overly broad generalizations in the law. As to the latter he states
that:
Outstanding among our lawmen is a distaste for and distrust of wide, sharp
edged generalization thought through and carried through with rigor.
Generalize we will, and we love to; and when the mood strikes us we will
generalize across the horizon. What we will not do is to fence the edges of our
generalizations, to fix them and follow them through to courageous,
inconvenient conclusions.
LLEWELLYN PAPERS, supra note 35, at 90. Professor Wiseman summarizes the
Llewellynian view that "the failure to think in narrower categories led law remote from
life, articulated opinions whose reasoning was necessarily covert-opinions that failed to
provide rules on which either merchants or their lawyers could rely." Wiseman,
Merchant Rules, supra note 149, at 493 n.121. See, e.g., "For it, we have paid,
increasingly heavy, of academic abstraction and remoteness." LAW OF SALES, supra note
166, at ix.
277. What Price Contract?, supra note 61, at 730 ("the self-government of groups
contract provides an original frame-work, a constitution, a source of ultimate sanction");
see also id at 736 ("the major importance of legal contract is to provide a frame-work").
278. "[Itf we can keep ourselves awake to the situations concerned.., we stand a
chance of avoiding that loss-via rigidification of rule and of imagination." Id. at 705
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to the situations of social reality, "awake to people and their doings," and
being aware of the "legal compartments" or categories of law that had
been systematized.279
D. Indeterminacy: Rules and Counter-Rules
Another prong of both Llewellyn's and the general realist attack
focused upon the indeterminacy of judicial reasoning in a domain of
abstract conceptualism. The bedrock of abstract conceptualism is that its
concepts and methodology of deduction lead the judge to the one right
rule and the one right answer. Llewellyn argued that an element of
choice existed throughout the conceptual pyramid: "[I]n our system we
have large numbers of mutually inconsistent major premises available for
choice-'competing rules,' 'competing principles,' 'competing
analogies.' 280 The limitation of the notion of a single right answer was
that it foreclosed inquiry into alternatives that could produce a "better"
right answer.28  The law as judicial choice was at the heart of the Realist
critique.
Llewellyn's best doctrinal writings appeared in the mid-1930s,
dealing with the issue of implied warranties. On Warranty of Quality
and Society was published in two parts.282 In it, Llewellyn chronicled the
monumental displacement of the doctrine of caveat emptor in the law of
283sales by a regime of implied warranties. He pointed out that the
transformation was influenced by mercantile necessity.284 It was not a
response to any sort of concern for consumer protectionism. Rather, in
this study it is evident that Llewellyn saw the increasing relational nature
of contracts. 285  The Willistonian construct of offer-acceptance-
consideration was ill prepared for such a non-discrete transactional or
relational contract world.
279. Id.
280. COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 2, at 12.
281. Id. at 24-25. "[Tlhe better is the enemy of the good, that an atmosphere or
climate of thinking that the right answer must be single can acquire its effect on the
process of deciding." Id. at 24 (emphasis in original).
282. See Warranty I, supra note 261; Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and
Society: 11, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 341 (1937) [hereinafter, Warranty II]. See generally,
Eugene F. Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the
Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11 VILLANOVA L. REV. 213, 230 (1966).
283. See, e.g., "But the level of dealing ... can shift far toward caveat venditor, and
has done so .. " Warranty I, supra note 261, at 718; "as Pennsylvania must be seen in
terms of supervening caveat emptor" Id. at 729; "a contract for future delivery ...
carries ... an obligation... [to] be at least merchantable.., and for such contracts
caveat venditor is explicitly announces." Id. at 741.
284. See Llewellyn's discussion of the replacement of factorage sales with direct
dealing. Warranty I, supra note 282, at 349-353.
285. Id. at 375-79 ("Continuing Transactions").
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The classical response to relational contracts was to regard them as
a series of divisible contracts. Once divided each contract could be made
to fit the Willistonian construct. Llewellyn criticized this approach as an
example of the sterilization of contract law and its divorce from
commercial reality:
Consider, for instance, the queer rules which courts indulge, severing
each contract between two parties from each other contract.... No
businessman . . . could think that way: what they see is 'an
account.' ... The law has, thus far, failed to come close to
perception of these standing relations, and has failed to develop tools
to pick them up or deal with them.
286
Llewellyn's contextual mindset allowed him to see how contract law
needed to be transformed from rules premised on the fixed to those
predicated on the continuing transaction.
In his doctrinal work of the late 1930s, one can see the germination
of ideas fundamental to his work on the Code.287 In The Rule of Law in
Our Case-Law of Contract,288 the development of a more complete
theory of rules becomes evident. Despite being labeled a rule skeptic,
Llewellyn saw an important place for rules in the case law system, but
only the right kind of rules. "[O]nly a right good, well-carpentered rule
of law will in a case-law field achieve those things-notably a clean
guidance and a moderate predictability. '289 The notion of a singing rule
is alluded to in his discussion of principle. He located principle between
the poles of fixed rules, or accepted formulae, and a full inquiry into
policy and ethics. Principle is a middle ground that "permits of frank
critique, of open change, and of responsible choice., 290  This middle
ground is the future domain of his singing rule, "for in its little way and
lesser range the concept of 'true rule' operates much along the same lines
as does 'principle.' ' 291 In a way the singing rule, when imbued with
patent reason, acts as a mini-principle or as a rule-ification of principle.
The benefit of the middle ground of rule-principle amalgamation is
286. Id. at 376-77.
287. The seedbed for Llewellyn's drafting of contextualism into the Code is found in
a prolific outpouring of writings on commercial and contract law during the late 1930s.
In chronological order these writings included: Warranty I, supra note 261 (1936); On
Warranty II, supra note 282 (1937); Title to Contract, supra note 61 (1938); Karl N.
Llewellyn, On Our Case Law of Contract-Offer and Acceptance (Part 1), 48 YALE L.J.
1 (1938); Across Sales on Horseback, supra note 163 (1939); First Struggle, supra note
263 (1939); and Our Case Law of Contract-Offer and Acceptance (Part 2), 48 YALE L.J.
779 (1939).
288. Rule of Law, supra note 61.
289. Id. at 1243.
290. Id. at 1249.
291. Id. at 1251.
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a clearer and more predictable law. In the conceptualist world of
abstraction and of fixed, formulaic rules coherency or rule fit is achieved
by "construing facts out of recognizability., 292 The facts are manipulated
in order to avoid the injustice of a particular rule application. In this way
the novel contextualism of a problem case is removed.293  Such
manipulation had created a divergence between doctrines as expressed
and as applied in the case law. The result was the rendering of much of
contract doctrine as non-law. For doctrine to be law, Llewellyn asserted
there had to be a semblance of fit between doctrine and practice.294
E. Transaction- Types and the Dissecting of Conceptualism
In 1939 and 1940, Llewellyn published the last of his series of sales
and contracts articles prior to beginning work on the new Sales Act that
would become Article Two of the Code.295 These articles included
Across Sales on Horseback,296 The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales
("First Struggle",),297 and The Normative, the Legal and the Law-Jobs."
The Problem of Juristic Method ("Problem of Juristic Method",).298 In
Across Sales on Horseback, Llewellyn viewed business, and the law of
sales, of the nineteenth century as being singularly fixated on price, and
uncaring about the satisfaction of the consumer.299 Behind the facade of
price, hide issues of quality and utility.300 These issues were exposed
during the early part of the twentieth century:
[W]atch Sales law over the last forty years [1899-1939] and you will
see ... the consumer and his interest shouldering in beside the purely
merchant-to-merchant problems of the prior century, you will see
regulatory practices and rules and practices emerging again to control
the individualistic haggling of the early 19 1h century market-all
moving to make price include in fact and deed the things which
292. Id. at 1253.
293. "For the nature of generalizing and ordering synthesis of particularized and
discrepant data is to force the rubbing out of attention any discrepant particulars." Id. at
1259.
294. "[T]hat where doctrine does not square with case-results, that doctrine is not
law." Id. at 1269.
295. This drafting exercise took the better part of a decade with the first published
version appearing in 1949.
296. Across Sales on Horseback, supra note 163.
297. First Struggle, supra note 263.
298. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of
Juristic Method, 49 YALE L.J. 1355 (1940) [hereinafter, Problem of Juristic Method].
299. "Business ... in Veblen's caustic eye, centers on price differential, and cares
less for ... giving satisfaction to consumers. Such was our earlier Sales law. Such is
much of it still." Across Sales on Horseback, supra note 163, at 725-26.
300. Across Sales on Horseback, supra note 163, at 725-726.
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people need to have included.
30 1
Llewellyn is unclear whether the internalization of cost and risk into the
price is primarily a private phenomena or one induced by public
regulation. Given the Realist distrust of the public-private distinction, it
is clear that the intemalization plays out in the practices of commercial
life whether privately or publicly induced.
Llewellyn's dissection of the abstract concepts of sales law
continued with an attack on warranty and title concepts in the follow-up
work First Struggle.30 2  The germination of situation-sense in First
Struggle is evidenced by the notion of "stock intellectual equipment. 30 3
Llewellyn's idea of stock equipment rested upon sales law developing
transaction types from the "fact-pressures ' 30 4 of cases. As to the task of
developing such transaction types, he had this to say:
It is dangerous business, this of setting up "types" of transaction.
30 5
But the job needs doing, it needs doing over until it gets done
306right. Our fields of law, our patterns of legal thinking, our legal
concepts, have grown up each one around some "type" of occurrence
or transaction, felt as a typical something ... and, as a type-
picture.
307
Clearly, for Llewellyn the job had not been done right in the existing
sales law. The problem with sales law was that it had failed to carve out
sufficiently narrow conceptual categories. The two targets of
Llewellyn's dissatisfaction were the twin pillars of title and caveat
emptor.
The concept of title in sales law was that of lump title borrowed
from property law. In such an abstract form, all key issues of risk of
loss, contractual duties, and ownership revolved around the single
determination of whether title had passed to the buyer. To Llewellyn,
301. Id. at 726.
302. First Struggle, supra note 263.
303. First Struggle, supra note 263, at 876. Compare Professor Kastely's excellent
article on the role of trade usage in the U.C.C. in which she borrows Llewellyn's coinage
of stock equipment. Amy H. Kastely, Stock Equipment for the Bargain in Fact: Trade
Usage, 'Express Terms,' and Consistency under Section 1-205 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 64 N.C. L. REv. 777 (1986) Professor Kastely's thesis is that courts
when construing written terms in conflict with trade usage should give effect to the usage
unless the parties expressly agree to a variant. This can be seen as a partial example of
the inverted hierarchical contextualism model discussed in infra Part V.B.2. Compare,
Kamp, Between-the Wars, supra note 195, at 335 (providing thesis that the "struggle to
unhorse sales" was Llewellyn's attempt to get the "common" out of the law of sales).
304. First Struggle, supra note 263, at 876.
305. Id. at 880.
306. Id. at 881.
307. Id. at 880.
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this abstraction of the title concept in sales law represented all that was
wrong with abstract conceptualism. In the longest footnote one may ever
come across, Llewellyn had this to say about the application of such
concepts: "[T]he problem has failed of study, as to . . .why judges
continue blind use of inadequate concepts, how far they remodel such by
finding useful qualifications and distinctions, how far they get results by
distortions of the facts which leave the legal formulae seemingly
unchanged.,30 8  These abstract, all-or-nothing concepts of title and
warranty were no longer reflective of the reality of commercial practice.
In attacking these concepts of title and warranty, Llewellyn noted
that categories of cases or fact patterns could no longer properly fit under
these broad conceptual umbrellas. In the area of title, the international
documentary transaction made the idea of lump title309 outdated. The
rights and duties of buyers and sellers did not hinge on who literally held
title to the goods. In the overseas documentary transaction, for example,
in the C.I.F. contract the risk of loss passes to the buyer at the point of
shipment while the title document is not transferred until later.310
Holding that the risk of damage to the goods remained with the seller
until the transfer of title was no longer a reflection of commercial
practice.
Ultimately, Llewellyn believed that it was the facts of a case or type
of transaction that should decide issues of loss and warranty and not any
lump concept.3' 1 Part V will examine the above facets of Llewellynian
thought in relationship to the theory of interpretation that Llewellyn
attempted to incorporate into the Code.
V. Contract Interpretation: U.C.C. Contextualism
By 1940, the foundation for the contextualist approach to
interpretation that Llewellyn brought to the Code project was firmly in
place. Problem of Juristic Method exposed a mature version of situation-
sense as a methodology to infuse legal rules with dynamic social
context. 31 2 If anything, Llewellyn saw the "trouble-case" as the impetus
308. Title to Contract, supra note 61, at 173 n.24.
309. Id. at 165.
310. See generally, JAN RAMBERG, ICC GUIDE TO INCOTERMS 2000 (ICC PUBLICATION
No. 620) (1999) (this guide of trade terms is universally accepted by businesspeople,
courts, and arbitration panels as authoritative; it provides 13 different terms of which 6
are "shipment terms," such as FOB and CIF, meaning that the risk of loss is transferred to
the buyer prior to the transfer of title).
311. First Struggle, supra note 263. This process of developing broad concepts such
as title rules centered around smaller transaction types has not come easily to the law.
"The getting of such stock equipment is a struggle." Id. at 876.
312. "If interlocking behavior gets patterned in fact, with a resulting back-and-forth of
adjusted action and adjusted expectation, deviations will bother .. " Problem of Juristic
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for a rule change 313 because the existing rule does not fit the new,
recurring fact pattern. Eventually the ill fit between rule and fact pattern
or situation-type places pressure on the courts to adjust or reconstruct the
legal rule. The rule adjustment pressured by social context comes within
the internal legal-conceptual structure of existing law. Thus, the solution
to the trouble case lies within an ascending degree of abstraction.31 4 This
process of generalization is not the transcendental nonsense of classical
legal thought. This process of generalization requires abstract concepts
to be stripped to their underlying purpose, reason, and principle. It is the
reason behind the rule that provides the means for law to reconstruct
itself in order to respond to the trouble-case, novel fact patterns, and new
situation-types.
Llewellyn possessed great insight into the intricacies and
deficiencies in existing commercial law. More so, he possessed an
unrivaled knowledge of actual commercial practice. It is this knowledge
that made him the logical choice to head the Code project. In 1930, he
wrote a snippet for the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences entitled Case
Law. He noted that in the case law system change is made only
incrementally. At times, however, a divergence develops between a
more rapidly changing society and the slower-to-change case law. This
divergence eventually calls for a major change that is the domain of the
legislature. It is clear from his writings in the late 1930s that he believed
the divergence between law and society had rendered many of law's
legal concepts unworkable.315  The time was right for a major
codification of commercial law.
Llewellyn's work in the 1940s as the Chief Reporter of the Code,
and as principal Drafter of Articles One and Two, and prior to that the
Revised Uniform Sales Act, provided him with an opportunity to apply
his jurisprudential ideas to law-making. The result was a code that
incorporated his view of contextual interpretation of contract rules and
their relationship to real world facts. The success of the Code project
transformed contract law through the ascendancy of contextualism in
contract interpretation.
The shift toward contextualism in the Code replaced Williston's
traditional-conceptual-static model of interpretation with Llewellyn's
Method, supra note 298, at 1360.
313. "Often enough it takes a trouble-case to crystallize perception that the right
pattern is there .. " Id.
314. "[T]he brain-sweat, of a trouble-case, though it be an utterly unique one, drives
by its whole quality toward generalization... [an] occasion for awakening to, and
voicing, normative drives which have been building unnoticed." Id.
315. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REV. 558
(1940) (notes that matters of international ocean commerce were left out of the Uniform
Sales Act).
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modem-contextual-dynamic approach. Williston's theory of
interpretation, embodied in the Uniform Sales Act, was built on a narrow
foundation of objective fact. These objective facts were dominated by
the "plain meaning" of words. Llewellyn's view of external
manifestations was that the written contract was only one piece of
evidence in a grand pool of objective fact.316
Williston's view of objective reality was merely a virtual reality
represented by word symbols; Llewellyn's goal was to unearth the actual
reality of transactions. Williston's view of reality was temporally and
spatially fixed. The focus of the Willistonian theory is the plain meaning
of the written words of contract at the exact time of formation. In
contrast, time or space does not tightly bind Llewellyn's objective
universe. The words of contract are only meaningful through a broad-
based contextual analysis. This analysis embraced background evidence
that evolves well before contract formation and continues throughout the
life of the contract relationship. The rest of this article is devoted to
understanding the contextualist turn in contract interpretation initiated by
Llewellyn's vision for the Code.
A. Triumph of Contextualism
The importance of U.C.C. contextualism in the development of a
theory of interpretation has gained the attention of an increasing number
of legal scholars. 317  This brand of contextualism is a reflection of
Llewellyn's theory of meaning as a "pragmatic blend of theory with
practice., 318 He believed that any theory of interpretation should focus
on actual practice or the actual agreement of the parties. He saw the
Willistonian construct, which placed express terms of the contract as the
central focus of the interpretive enterprise, as hopelessly acontextual.319
The primary premise of the Willistonian approach was that it was the job
316. See supra Part IV. A-B.; See also infra Parts V.A-B.3,VI.C.
317. See, e.g., Patterson, Of Liewellyn, Wittgenstein, supra note 14. See generally,
Symposium, Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL L. REV. 1 (1985); Nicholas M. Insua,
Note, Dogma, Paradigm, and the Uniform Commercial Code: Sons of Thunder v. Borden
Considered, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 249 (1999). Oliver Wendell Holmes championed the
contextual method of meaning. In his Theory of Legal Interpretation he noted that "[I]t is
not true that in practice ... a given word or even a given collocation in original collection
of words has one meaning and no other." Holmes, Legal Interpretation, supra note 29 at
417. The contextual nature of understanding the true meaning of language was stated in
Towne v. Eisner: "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a
living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances
and the time in which it is used." 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)
318. DENNIS M. PATTERSON, GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILITY 3, n.l 1 (1990)
[hereinafter, PATTERSON, GOOD FAITH].
319. Id. at 12-13.
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of the interpreter to seek the plain meaning of the express terms of a
contract. In contrast, Llewellyn worked under the premise that there is
rarely, if ever, a plain or singular meaning for the words of a contract.
The following excerpts demonstrate the stark contrast between these two
approaches to contract interpretation:
Williston On Contracts:
If a written contract is entered into, the meaning and effect of the
contract depends on the interpretation given the written language by
the court. The court will give that language its natural and
appropriate meaning; and if the words are unambiguous, will not




But if usage can be determined with some reasonable reliability, the
policy ... of giving usage as full a scope as reason will permit, is the
only sound policy....
Wherever the usages of a particular trade or mercantile situation
have.., been reduced to fair and balanced form by a body
representing both buyers and sellers of the character engaged in a
particular transaction, the incorporation of such body of usages into
the transaction, as the background of the particular terms of the
bargain, is presumed.32'
The practical difference between Williston's textualism and
Llewellyn's contextualism is in the very nature of the rules of
interpretation that they create. Williston's view results in rules of
interpretation that are formal, closed, and mandatory.322 In contrast,
Llewellyn's view dictates rules that are open, flexible, and
discretionary.323 The use of the word discretionary does not mean that a
court is free to disregard the rules, it means that the general rules of
320. WALTER H.E. JAEGER, 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 95 at 349-50 (3d ed.
1961).
321. SECOND DRAFT OF THE REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT, Vol. I U.C.C. DRAFTS 335
(complied by E. Kelly, 1984).
322. For an analysis of the mandatory-discretionary distinction see, Lawrence M.
Friedman, Law, Rules, and the Interpretation of Written Documents, 59 NW. U. L. REv.
751 (1965).
323. Closed, fixed rules are unable to respond to gaps in rules and unforeseen
situations. Llewellyn asserts that these problems can be solved through the use of rules
drafted "using a zone rather than a surveyor's line to border the rule." COMMON LAW
TRADITION, supra note 2, at 183.
2004]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
interpretation themselves do not preordain a particular result.
Particularized rules of interpretation that are mandatory in nature,
however, are warranted for certain transaction types. For example, as
contract law began to disaggregate and spin off specialized areas of law,
insurance, common carriers, federal warranty, and numerous mandatory
rules of interpretation were developed in each area. Thus, the "duty to
defend" in insurance law has developed a mandatory interpretation.324
The fiduciary duty of the common carrier has developed a fixed
meaning. Mandatory rules of interpretation are found in the Code. For
example, a limitation of liability clause in a consumer contract may not
preclude recovery for consequential damages.325
Particularized rules of interpretation aside, the general rules of
interpretation under Willistonian formalism tend toward the mandatory
type. The contract has a single meaning to be gleaned from a facial
analysis of the written agreement. For Llewellyn, a purely facial analysis
hides the multiple meanings of words and only a full-scale contextual
excursion will yield the true or intended meaning. This difference is a
reflection of their differing views of contract interpretation.
For Llewellyn, Williston's view subjected the meaning of contracts
and rules to the subjectivity of the interpreter. In contrast, he saw
contextualism as the means of overcoming the subjectivity of
interpretation. It is the contextualism of the contract that channels the
interpreter to the true objective meaning. Ultimately, both Williston and
Llewellyn claimed that there was a singular legal meaning for the words
of a contract; but for Llewellyn that meaning resided below the surface
of the words in the background of commercial reality. Figure 1 below
provides a typology of the different features of formal-conceptual and
realist-contextual theories of interpretation (the first two rows continue
below the solid line).
324. The insurance contract is an example is highly regulated through state statutory
and regulatory law. "A classic example [of law requiring specified terms] is legislation
prescribing standard terms for insurance policies." E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWOTH
ON CONTRACTS § 4.29 at 611 (2004).




Theories and Modes of Contract Interpretation
Formalism Conceptualism Abstraction Gaplessness
(Williston)
Legal Realism Particular/types Situation-sense Leeways
-- Textual Analysis Singular (facial) Meaning Plain Meaning Rule Bargain Theory
-- Contextual Analysis Multiple (facial) Meanings Extrinsic Evidence Reasonable
Expectations
Llewellyn's brand of contract interpretation embraced the relational
side of contracts and the view that contracts are living, evolving
entities.326  He referred to this type of long-term, relational form of
contracting as running combination.327 This focus necessitates a theory
of interpretation that moves beyond the actual words of the written
contract to the agreement embodied in the "relationship." It assumes that
the contract-as-written rarely reflects the actual agreement and that only
in cases of relational breakdown does the written contract become the
avenue of ultimate appeal.
B. Forms of Contextualism
The acceptance of a contextual analysis of meaning into a theory of
contract interpretation leads to the issue of application. What form
326. As is contract to government, so is mere agreement to contract; so also,
usage plus initiative and acquiescence to mere agreement. In the self-
government of sub-groups contract (agreement) provides an original frame-
work, a constitution, a source of ultimate sanction in dispute or breakdown....
[F]urther factual agreement from time to time, informed by usage and that
running combination of initiative and passivity which does not even call for
onscious agreeing, fills the framework with living content and often stretches or
overlays it as to make the initial contract a wholly misleading picture of what
occurs
What Price Contract?, supra note 61 at 730-31.
327. Later in the same article he summarizes his thought on the topic. "[Tihe major
importance of legal contract is to provide a framework.., a framework highly
adjustable, a framework which almost never accurately indicates real working relations,
but which affords a rough indication around which such relations vary, an occasional
guide in case of doubt and a norm of ultimate appeal when the relations cease in fact to
work. Id. at 336.
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should the contextual interpretive methodology take? The next three
sub-sections will examine three forms of contextualism. First,
hierarchical contextualism, the form most commonly associated with
Code methodology. Second is inverted contextualism, a form that flips
the traditional Code hierarchy. Third, full contextualism reflects the
interpretive methodology that most closely aligns with Llewellyn's
vision.
1. Hierarchical Contextualism
Judge Posner has stated the rationale for a priority approach to
evidentiary considerations of intent. The reason for excluding extrinsic
evidence in the face of a seemingly integrated contract is the "[d]esire for
certainty and predictability, perhaps combined with some distrust of
juries. 328  He then noted that extrinsic evidence should be used as a
default or "tie-breaker ' 329 when there is more than one plausible
interpretation of contractual language. Hence, contextual evidence's
only purpose is to "disambiguate" the contract. 330 This approach is more
closely related to the traditional, acontextual plain meaning rule.
Historically, under the edifice of the plain meaning rule, most
offerings of extrinsic evidence were denied.33' The plain meaning rule in
its strictest application was the evidentiary crutch of abstract
conceptualism. Under this interpretive style, concepts and words had
singular meanings. Most contractual language could be construed to
satisfy the threshold of plain meaning. A determination that a disputed
term is unambiguous, that it had a plain meaning, ended the contextual
inquiry.332
A simplified hierarchical contextualism, the one advocated above
by Posner, acknowledges the importance of extrinsic evidence but would
only seek its help in cases of ambiguity.333 This narrow view of the role
328. Residential Mktg. Group v. Granite Inv. Group, 933 F.2d 546, 548-49 (7th Cir.
1991).
329. Id. at 549.
330. Id.
331. See, e.g., Clifton Shirting Co. v. Bronne Shirt Co., 209 N.Y.S. 709 (1925), N.Y.
App. Div. LEXIS 8466 (holding that evidence of an obvious trade usage is inadmissible
when the meaning of the words of a contract are deemed clear).
332. See generally, Harry G. Prince, Contract Interpretation in California: Plain
Meaning, Parol Evidence and the Use of the "Just Result" Principle, 31 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 557, (1998) (using the California rules of contract interpretation argues that when
the normal rules of interpretation fail to provide an adequate solution the courts should be
guided by a "just result" principle).
333. See, e.g., Steven W. Feldman & James A. DeLanis, Resolving Contractual
Ambiguity in Tennessee: A Systematic Approach, 68 TENN. L. REv. 73 (2000) (explains
traditional hierarchical approach to interpretation but also notes a "flexible approach"
approved by the Tennessee Supreme Court holding that it is permissible to consider the
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of contextual or extrinsic evidence is rejected by the Code. The Code's
version of hierarchical contextualism prioritizes interpretative materials
from the textual to different types of contextual evidence.334 However, it
allows a broader use of contextual evidence to not only clarify an
ambiguity, but also to supplement the contract and to fill in gaps.
Nonetheless, the Code preserves the hierarchy of the traditional approach
in the event of evidentiary conflict. 335 The written contract prevails over
any conflicting contextual (extrinsic) evidence.
2. Inverted Contextualism
A variant of hierarchical contextualism has also been advanced.336
This variant poses an inverted hierarchy in which the sequential ordering
places express terms at the bottom of the "priority" rules of
interpretation. The trumping order would be along the following lines:
general standards of reasonableness, default rules, trade usage, course of
dealing, course of performance, and express terms.337 A critique of such
a theory of interpretation can be found in judicial concerns that parties
will use extrinsic evidence to rewrite their contracts in order to advance a
beneficial post hoc interpretation.338  The inverted hierarchy model
responds to this concern by granting greater priority to more generalized
standards and default rules. Such background evidence is less
susceptible to being manipulated by the parties.339
The inverted hierarchy model, advanced by Professor Zamir, is
differentiated not only from the more conventional hierarchical ordering
but also from the full contextualism model discussed in the next
section.340 Zamir asserts that Llewellyn's contextual analysis does not
"situation" of the parties and surrounding circumstances to interpret even a facially
unambiguous contract).
334. U.C.C. § 2-208 (2).
335. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-202(a) (1997) ("a writing intended by the parties as a final
expression... may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented [but not
contradicted] by course of dealing or usage of trade .. "); U.C.C. § 2-208(2) (when
inconsistent "express terms shall control [over] course of performance and course of
performance shall control both course of dealing and usage of trade").
336. Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and
Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710 (1997) [hereinafter, Zamir, Inverted
Hierarchy].
337. Id. passim.
338. See, e.g., Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Whitelawn Diaries, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 987
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
339. Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., Inc., 664 F.2d 772, 803, n.43 (9th
Cir. 1981).
340. Zamir, Inverted Hierarchy, supra note 336: "At the top of the hierarchical
pyramid stands the parties' express agreement" (conventional hierarchical). Id. at 1712.
"No clear hierarchy between these sources necessarily exists" (full contextualism). Id. at
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provide an ample place for default rules and general principles.34' In
short, it is only after the contextual analysis is complete that these two
sources of extrinsic evidence are used as a last resort. One could argue
that a more expansive view of default rules would incorporate trade
usage and custom.
Llewellyn saw the true default rules embedded in commercial
practice. Regarding general principles, the immutable quality of good
faith, fair dealing, reasonableness, and unconscionability ensured an
important role of general principles in Llewellyn's contextual analysis.
Besides these meta-principles, Llewellyn's incorporation of "singing
rules" into the Code was an attempt to make the underlying purpose,
reason, and policy of the rule part of every contextual analysis.
The second point of differentiation is Zamir's contention that
Llewellyn's contextualism is centered upon the finding of contractual
intent. In contrast, inverted contextualism "implies that social values
should, and do, play a key role in the interpretive process as well. 34 2
This assertion is hard to quarrel with other than to say that it is not at
odds with the ultimate aim of Llewellyn's contextualism. Llewellyn's
contextualism was a reaction to the formalism of traditional rules of
contract interpretation. The traditional obsession with the written
contract served to prevent the introduction of social forces into contract
law. Llewellyn's contextualism was meant to unblock the flow of social
values into contract, along with policy considerations, distributive
consequences, and extra-legal considerations. In addition, Llewellyn
viewed trade usage and custom as reservoirs of social values. The
inverted model is attractive to those who reject this normative dimension
of Llewellyn's theory of interpretation. The next section will assert that
the true meaning of contract is best served by disregarding all notions of
hierarchy.
3. Full Contextualism
Llewellyn's embrace of a fully contextual theory of contract
interpretation is evident in the earlier review of his writings. As was
provided in that review, Llewellyn considered as indeterminate all
written contracts. The true meaning of a contract is only available
through a thorough inquiry into the contextual background.343 The Code
1713.
341. Inverted hierarchy adds to "the list of sources ... overlooked ... by the
Llewellyn school, namely, statutory and judge-made default rules and general principles
of contract law." Id. at 1714.
342. Id.
343. Llewellyn's belief in full contextualism is apparent in Realistic Jurisprudence
when he states that "what we need is patience to look and see what is there." Realistic
[Vol. 109:2
REASON AND CONTEXT
provides support for both a hierarchical and a fully contextual analysis. 344
In fact, I will argue that the Code embraces full contextualism with the
hierarchical ordering triggered only when the full contextual analysis
fails to provide an answer.
Comment Four to Section 1-205 states that the language of a
contract "is to be interpreted as meaning what it may fairly be expected
to mean to parties involved in the particular commercial transaction in a
given locality or in a given vocation or trade. 3 45 This method envisions
a full contextual analysis to determine the meaning of a contract. The
ordering of contextual evidence is provided in Section 2-208, which first
requires an analysis of the express terms, course of performance, course
of dealing, and trade usage on an equal footing. It states that only if they
cannot be "construed... as consistent" do the priority rules apply.
346
The elements of full contextualism are listed below in Figure 2.
Figure 2
Elements of Full Contextualism
* language selection
" purpose for selection of language and contract type
* surrounding circumstances at time of writing (prior dealings, trade usage, custom)
" nature and type of transaction
" characteristics of parties
" course of performance (waiver, modification, practical construction)
* change of circumstances
" contextualism of the reader-interpreter (education, experience)
* remedial consequences
Jurisprudence, supra note 28 at 457.
344. See U.C.C. §§ 2-208(2) (hierarchical ordering); see also 1-205 (4-5) (full
contextualism).
345. U.C.C. § 1-205(2), Comment 4 (1990).
346. U.C.C. § 2-208 (2) (1990).
347. The second item on the list in Figure 2 refers to the purpose of the contracting
parties' selection of language and contract type. Ronald Dworkin describes the
uncovering of purpose as the aim of interpretation:
[E]ven if we reject the thesis that creative interpretation aims to discover some
actual historical intention, the concept of intention nevertheless provides the
formal structure for all interpretive claims. I mean that an interpretation is by
nature the report of a purpose; it proposes a way of seeing what is
interpreted....
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 58-59 (1986).
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The theory of full contextualism questions why a court should
exclude any evidence that is probative to its assigned task of finding
contractual intent or meaning. 348  In fact, some courts allow the
admission of all extrinsic evidence even in cases of a fully integrated
contract. 349 This evidentiary shift has been rationalized by referencing
the "ambiguity" exception to the parol evidence rule. 350 The admission
of extrinsic evidence may uncover an ambiguity that was not apparent in
a facial reading of a contract. Professor Kniffin noted the trend in some
state courts toward a "context rule" where the goal is to "find reality by
admitting extrinsic evidence without limitation.,
35'
The court in Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Butch Lewis Productions, Inc.
352
stated the case for full contextualism:
Although some courts still follow traditional bargain theory and
refuse to delve beyond the express terms of a written contract, the
better approach is for the courts to examine the circumstances
surrounding the parties' agreement in order to determine the true
mutual intentions of the parties. Courts today tend to be willing to
look beyond the written document to find the "true understanding of
the parties."
353
Llewellyn advocated the full contextualism view of contract
interpretation, despite the prioritizing of Section 2-208(2). 3 4 Professor
Patterson likens Llewellyn's vision of contract interpretation to a
348. In 1939, Marjorie Greene, premised the essence of full contextualism in a
question: "[I]f it is actual intent we are after .... [w]hy then ... does the court exclude all
evidence but that of the writing itself, which is necessarily inadequate evidence of motive
and intention?" Marjorie Greene, Theories of Interpretation in the Law of Contracts, 6
U. CHI. L. REv. 374 (1939).
349. See generally, Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 803,
n.43 (9th Cir. 1981); Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971);
Chase Manhattan Bank v. First Marion Bank, 437 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1971); Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
350. See generally, E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.12A AT
319 ("Determining Whether Language is Ambiguous").
351. Margaret N. Kniffin, A New Trend in Contract Interpretation: The Search for
Reality as Opposed to Virtual Reality, 74 ORE. L. REv. 643, 661 (1995). See, e.g.,
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. O'Kelley, 645 P.2d 767 (Alaska 1982); Berg v. Hudesman,
801 P.2d 222 (Wash. 1990); Hilton Hotels Corp, v. Butch Lewis Productions, Inc., 808
P.2d 919 (Nev. 1991); Smith v. Melson, Inc., 659 P.2d 1264 (Ariz. 1983); R. Zoppo Co.
v. City of Dover, 475 A.2d 12 (N.H. 1984); Dental Prosthetic Services, Inc. v. Hurst, 463
N.W.2d 36 (Iowa 1990).
352. Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Butch Lewis Productions, Inc., 808 P.2d 919 (1981).
353. Id. at 921-22.
354. See, e.g., David V. Snyder, Language and Formalities in Commercial Contracts:
A Defense of Custom and Conduct, 54 S.M.U. L. REv. 617 (2001) (arguing that custom is
a part of language). "The Code not only makes custom and conduct relevant to
interpreting an agreement; it makes them part of the agreement itself... (perhaps
Llewellyn never intended a strict hierarchy anyway)." Id. at 620-621.
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hermeneutic circle. 355 In short, the whole (contract or agreement-in-fact)
is greater than the sum of its parts (words, conduct, and context).
However, the meaning of any part (words) cannot be understood without
reference to the whole and the whole cannot be understood without
reference to its parts.356  Applied to contract interpretation "[t]o
understand the Agreement of the parties one must look at their language.
To understand the language one must investigate the commercial
background of its use[.] To understand any single element requires an
understanding of the totality." 357 The words of commerce can never be
fully understood without resort to the commercial practice in which they
are used.358
Justice Traynor in Pacific Gas v. G. W. Thomas Drayage Co.,
enunciated the theoretical side of full contextualism. 359  The case
involved an owner who hired a contractor to perform work at his
building. The contract included an indemnity clause protecting the
owner "against all loss ... resulting from ... injury to property, arising
out of the performance of the contract., 360  During the course of
performance the owner's property was damaged.361 The defendant-
contractor sought to introduce evidence that the indemnity clause was
meant only to cover injury to property of third parties.362 The lower
court determined that the indemnity clause had a plain meaning to cover
all forms of injury and barred the admission of extrinsic evidence.363
In reversing, Justice Traynor advanced a full contextual approach by
stating that the test of admissibility is not whether the text "appears"
unambiguous to the court but whether the extrinsic evidence can
reasonably support an alternative meaning.364 "Accordingly the meaning
355. PATERSON, GOOD FAITH, supra note 318, at 34.
356. Id. at n.67. See generally, M. HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 194-95 (J.
Macquarrie & E. Robinson trans. 1962).
357. Id. at 34-35.
358. Patterson ultimately regards the Llewellyn vision akin to Wittgenstein's view
that "the meaning of a word is its use in the language." Id. at 35, citing, L.
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 43 (G. Anscombe trans. 3d ed. 1968).
359. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644-45
(Cal. 1968).




364. In so doing he rejects Learned Hand's narrow objectivity in favor of a full
contextual determination of meaning. See id. In his well-known "twenty-bishops"
hypothetical on the objective theory of contract Hand asserted that, "[a] contract is an
obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words,
which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent." Hotchkiss v. National City
Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). Hand further states that "if, however,... when
he used the words, he intended something else than the usual meaning which the law
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of a writing '... can only be found by interpretation of all the
circumstances that reveal the sense in which the writer used the
words.' ' 365 Thus, the plain meaning rule was expressly rejected. More
importantly, Traynor introduced the importance of the reader's context
along with the context of the writing. The singular meaning attached by
a judge is a product of his or her particular experience, education, and
linguistic skill. The verbal context is thus expanded to include the time
of the writing and the time of the reading. Immersion in the context of
the writing is a way of filtering out the contextual bias of the reader. A
full contextual analysis curtails the subjectivity of the interpreter.366
imposes on them, he would still be held [liable]." Id. Lord Denning in Storer v.
Manchester City Council offers a similar explanation: "A contract is formed when there
is, to all outward appearances, a contract. A man cannot get out of a contract by saying:
'I did not intend to contract' if by his words he has done so." [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1403,
1408 (C.A. 1974). Of course this begs the question: What is the "usual meaning" of the
words? For Justice Hand, a plain meaning reading by a court is the usual meaning. For
Lord Denning, a similar singular meaning of words is implied. In contrast, Justice
Traynor sees full contextualism as the primary paradigm for contract interpretation,
placing the plain meaning paradigm in the realm of unreality. Justice Traynor asserts that
such absolute objectivity of word meaning does not exist, and therefore, words cannot on
their own act as operative external signs of meaning. If words had absolute and constant
referents, it might be possible to discover contractual intention in the words ... [w]ords,
however, do not have absolute and constant referents." 442 P.2d 641, 644. Traynor's
embrace of full contextualism is not unrestricted. He distinguishes two purposes for the
admission of extrinsic evidence: to show that the contract is susceptible to more than one
meaning and then to prove that alternative meaning. If the extrinsic evidence does not
prove that the written contract is "reasonably susceptible" to more than one meaning,
then it is excluded from supporting an argument for an alternative meaning. The
important point is that Traynor's full contextualism does embrace the unrestricted
admission of extrinsic evidence for the first purpose. Ultimately, whether it is admitted
for the second purpose is simply a determination that the "meaning issue" is will be
determined as a matter of law (no alternative meaning) or a matter of fact.
365. Id., partially quoting, Universal Sales Corp. v. Cal. Press Mfg. Co., 128 P.2d
665, 679 (emphasis added). Traynor quotes Arthur Corbin's The Interpretation of Words
and the Parol Evidence Rule:
The meaning of particular words or groups of words varies with the ... verbal
context and surrounding circumstances and purposes in view of the linguistic
education and experience of their users and their hearers or readers (not
excluding judges) .... A word has no meaning apart from these factors; much
less does it have an objective meaning, one true meaning.
Id. at 644-45, quoting, Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol
Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 187 (1965).
366. Chase Manhattan Bank v. First Marion Bank, 437 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1971).
"The Code manifests the law's recognition of the fact that perception is conditioned by
environment: unless a judge considers a contract in the proper commercial setting, his
view is apt to be distorted or myopic, increasing the probability of error." Id. at 1046.
The court in Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co. was even more emphatic in its
reasons for admitting contextual evidence despite the existence of an express term. It
reasoned that contextual evidence ensures that a ruling "reflects the reality of the
marketplace and avoids the overly legalistic interpretations which the Code seeks to
abolish." 451 F.2d 3, 10 (4th Cir. 1971). The court also stressed important roles that
[Vol. 109:2
REASON AND CONTEXT
C. Application of Full Contextualism
The following two sub-sections provide examples of the impact of
the contextualist turn on American contract law.367 The first involves the
Nanakuli Paving v. Shell Oil368 case that illustrates the application of full
contextualism from the judge's perspective. The second section ventures
some introductory insights of contextualism's role in directly shaping
contract doctrine during the later part of the twentieth century.
1. Praxis: Nanakuli Paving v. Shell Oil Co., Inc.
The distance that contextualism has advanced since the writings of
the early-Llewellyn is illustrated in Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell
Oil Co, Inc. ("Nanakuli ").369 Nanakuli involved a dispute concerning a
long-term supply contract in which the defendant was a supplier of
asphalt paving materials. The plaintiff was a paving contractor that sued
for breach of contract when the supplier summarily increased the price of
prior dealing and trade usage play in the Code's interpretive process. Trade usage and
prior dealings play "unique and important roles" and therefore "overly simplistic...
interpretation of a contract should be shunned." Id. at 11.
367. Contextualism has also worked a transformation in legal education. This
transformation is apparent when comparing law school exams prior to the turn of the
twentieth century with those immediately prior to the turn of the twenty-first century.
Exams on file with author. The 1872 Harvard Law School Contracts Exam consists of
fifteen mini-essay questions of one to two sentences in length. The grip of Langdellian
conceptualism is firmly in place after but two years of tenure. The first ten questions
directly relate to the nuances of the consideration doctrine while the last five questions
attempt to ferret out the characteristics of dependent and independent conditions and
promises. This is intended to be purely a doctrinal analysis void of any contextualism.
The questions are those of a conceptualist interested only in testing the intricacies of a
self-contained conceptual system. Essay questions taken from four law school sections
(four different professors) given in January and May of 1996 show how contextualism
now pervades legal education. One question involves the interpretation of a contract to
clear trees for the purpose of constructing an electric transmission line. The fact pattern
implicates the full range of contextual analysis, along with the duty of good faith
performance and the duty to re-adjust. It references trade usage, custom, large variation
in bid prices, and a variation of prior dealing evidence. It also implicates the meta-
principle of good faith from both the promisor and promisee perspectives.
In another exam question, the meaning of the written words is once again at issue.
The student is offered two types of contextual evidence-the pre-contract negotiations
and industry custom. A review of the remaining exam questions shows one question
expressly inviting the student to extend or distinguish Jacob and Youngs v. Kent. Two
other questions deal with the issue of implied employment contracts and good faith
discharge, and another one deals with the use of promissory estoppel to enforce an
assurance given in connection with a trucking contract. All of the questions challenge the
express terms of a written contract and invite a fuller contextual analysis.
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its products.370 The contract expressly granted the supplier the right to
unilaterally post new prices without notice. 371  The contractor asserted
that despite the express term it was a widely accepted trade custom to
"price protect" contractor-purchasers under long-term supply
contracts. 372 The District Court had set aside the jury verdict in favor of
the contractor holding that the express contract was clear and
unambiguous on the issue of price protection.373 The Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded holding that, despite the clarity of the express
term in allowing ad hoc price increases, the jury was at liberty to
construe the trade usage of price protection as consistent with the express
term.374
The appellate court saw the trade usage of price protection, within
the context of this particular contract, as overwhelming evidence of the
true understanding of the parties. 375 However, the court was unwilling to
completely ignore hierarchical contextualism. Instead of allowing the
jury to find that the trade usage (context) trumped the operation of the
376express term, it instructed that the jury be given authority to construe
the contradictory express term as being consistent with the trade usage.377
370. Id. at 777.
371. Id. at 778 (noting "Shell's Posted Price at time of delivery").
372. Id.
373. Id. at 777.
374. "Lastly we hold that, although the express price terms ... may seem, a first
glance, inconsistent with a trade usage ... a jury could have reasonably construed price
protection as consistent with the express term." Id. at 780.
375. Id. at 793 ("Nanakuli went beyond proof of a regular observance; there clearly
was enough proof for a jury to find that the practice of price protection in the asphalt
paving trade existed").
376. The Nanakuli court addressed an issue within the contextual analysis of how one
defines a "trade" for purposes of applying the appropriate trade usage. A number of
hypothetical cases can be used to flesh out this issue. In case one, suppose that price
protection was a more unique feature of the asphalt supply industry in Hawaii than
Hawaiian supply contracts in general. This finding would provide the strongest case for
accepting a variant meaning than the one offered by a simple reading of the express term.
The court held that under the Code "[a] party is always held to conduct generally
observed by members of his chosen trade." Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil
Co., 664 F.2d 772, 791 (9th Cir. 1981). Suppose instead that price protection was not
common within the asphalt supply business, but was common in most (Hawaiian) long-
term supply contracts in general. Section 1-205 (2) of the Code states that "any practice
or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as
to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in
question." The court interpreted this to "mean that parties can be bound by a usage
common to the place they are in business, even if it is not the usage of their particular
trade." Id. The court, however, places an important limitation on "general" usage by
holding that a party is held to such a usage "to the extent of his actual knowledge of these
practices or to the degree his ignorance of those practices is not excusable." Id. It is
clear, however, that whether a general business practice or a specific trade use, their
meanings are a contextual undertaking.
377. The Nanakuli analysis involved a number of specific issues of contract
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Nonetheless, the theory of full contextualism is espoused
throughout the opinion:
[T]he commercial context, which under the U.C.C. should form the
background for viewing a particular contract. The full agreement
must be examined in light of the close, almost symbiotic relations
between [the contracting parties.]378
[C]ourts should not stand in the way of new commercial practices
and usages by insisting on maintaining the narrow and inflexible old
rules of interpretation. We seek the definition of trade usage not
only in the express language of the Code but also in its underlying
purposes, defining it liberally to fit the facts of the particular
commercial context.
379
The twin pillars of Llewellyn's theory of rule and contract interpretation
are displayed in these two quotes. The first quote embraces the
contextual-relational view of contracting. The second quote reflects the
purposive interpretation of Code provisions envisioned in Llewellyn's
notion of singing rules.
The Nanakuli court's embrace of full contextualism was not
complete, however. The court asserted that a full contextual inquiry is
mandated under the Code but then stepped back to assert a default rule
borrowed from hierarchical contextualism, namely the priority of the
written contract over contextual evidence. 380 Given the facts of the case,
in which a trade practice better reflected the true understanding of the
parties and yet was inconsistent with an express term in the contract, the
court's implication that the jury still needed to read them as consistent is
a salutation to a bygone era of contract interpretation symbolized in the
interpretation. One such issue was whether two instances of price protection by the
supplier constituted a course of performance or a waiver? If it is determined that the two
subsequent instances of price protection were evidence of a course of performance, then
the jury is free to use that evidence to "interpret" the express term of the contract or to
find a modification of that term. If considered a waiver, then it may be considered as
evidence that the parties construed the price term to not require price protection. In
addition, a waiver does not modify an express term. For our purposes, the fact that
subsequent acts, whether construed as course of performance or waiver, are admitted into
evidence is a victory for contextualism. In fact, the court rejected the waiver argument
and held that the subsequent conduct could be used as part of a full interpretive inquiry
into the meaning of the express contract.
378. Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co., 664 F.2d at 778.
379. Id. at 790.
380. See id. "Performance, usages, and prior dealings are important enough to be
admitted always, even for a final and complete agreement." Id. at 795 (emphasis added).
See also, Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971); Michael
Schiavone & Sons, Inc. v. Securally Co., 312 F.Supp. 801 (Conn. 1970). Cf Southern
Concrete Services, Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1975),
affirmed, 569 F.2d 1154 (5 th Cir. 1978) (unpublished opinion).
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plain meaning rule. Any reasonable reading of the express term, price to
be "Shell's Posted Price at time of delivery" precludes any duty to price
protect. Yet the court holds that a jury could read the express term as
being consistent with the trade usage of price protection. Despite the
consistency mandate, the court's appeal to contextual evidence is a
rejection of the plain meaning rule's embrace of a priori determinations
of word meaning.
2. Importance to Contract Doctrine
The contextualist turn in contract interpretation, at least partially
initiated by the Code, directly affected the doctrinal development of
contract law. The increased use of contextual evidence made possible a
situation-sense approach that produced a "bulking"381 of facts resulting in
changes in the law. This process and its impact on contract are topics for
another article. Two areas of contract law, however, readily come to
mind in this regard: pre-contractual liability and implied contracts. In the
area of pre-contractual liability, the fine line between contract and non-
contract has been increasingly blurred.382
The most wide-ranging effect of contextualism is the allowance of
the entrance of a pre-contractual promise through the backdoor of
contract interpretation. Evidence of promises made during the
negotiation stage, formerly precluded by strict application of the plain
meaning and parol evidence rules are now admitted as evidence to
"clarify" the written contract.383
A contextualist approach also led to the expansion of implied
contracting. Implied contracts expand the role of courts from simply
enforcing express contractual obligations to implying contract rights and
duties in fact (and ultimately those implied in law). It is generally
accepted that certain contract rights evolve from societal recognition.
381. "[T]he emergence of a new interest will even by random selection result in
bulking fact and emotional pressures repeatedly on a single side, and thereby result in
appropriate change of law." Case Law System, supra note 61, at 251.
382. The expansion of contractual liability into pre-contract has not won its day but
there are signs of movement. See generally, G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in
the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 221 (1991); E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminari
Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1987);
Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673 (1969).
The ability of promissory estoppel to affix liability for non-contractual promise
represents the most aggressive foray into pre-contract See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo &
Rene Sacasas, Credit and Value Comfort Instruments: Crossing the Line from Assurance
to Legally Significant Reliance and Toward a Theory of Enforceability, 47 BAYLOR L.
REV. 357 (1995) (potential liability for representations made in informal business letters).
383. See, e.g., Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 803 (9th
Cir. 1981 ); see also discussion infra Part V.C. 1.
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The rights are then implied into the contractual relationship through
either the implied-in-fact or the implied-in-law doctrines.384
The expansion of implied-in-fact contracts into the employment
relationship illustrates the importance of contextualism. This intrusion
into the employment-at-will doctrine was made possible through the
expanded use of evidence, such as employee manuals, company policies,
and orientation materials, leading to the "contractualization" of the
employment relationship.
In a broader way, contextualism made possible the rise of reliance
theory and the expansion of the good faith performance doctrine. As
contractual liability increasingly began to hinge on the reasonable
expectations of the promisee and not the plain meaning of the words of
the promisor, contextual evidence became imperative in order to prove
reasonable reliance. Good faith as embodied in the Code necessarily
requires a contextual inquiry. Professor Patterson puts the issue
succinctly: "Acting in good faith is not a self-defining term. A party acts
in good faith relative to the agreement. . . [t]hus, one must first analyze
the agreement of the parties. ' 385 The acontextual nature of classical
contract law and its fixation on contract language retarded the evolution
of a thicker conceptualization of good faith.
The application of a full contextual analysis to contract law
interpretation resulted in the demise of the definiteness requirement
(certainty of terms). This allowed for the expansion of implied contracts
through the greater implication of terms. In the area where written
contracts possess too few terms, classical contract law rendered such
writings non-contracts. In order to make an enforceable contract, the
parties had to demonstrate a definitive agreement on all material terms.
Contextualism, as implemented by the Code, discards the definiteness
requirement. Context can now be used to provide the definitiveness
lacking in the written agreement. The use of custom, trade usage, and
the doctrine of good faith to imply contract terms has enabled courts to
find contracts where none would have been found under pre-Code
classical contract law.386
384. See, Julia Barnhart, The Implied-in-Fact Contract Exception to At-Will
Employment: A Call for Reform, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 817 (1998) (commenting on
California court decision expanding doctrine to include not only wrongful termination,
but employee demotions); Tammy Harris, Employer and Employee-Employee
Handbooks: Leveling the Playing Field?, 33 LAND & WATER L. REv. 351(1998)
(describing use of employee manuals in in-fact lawsuits).
385. See Patterson, Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, supra note 14, at 185.
386. See generally, Richard E. Speidel, Contract Law: Some Reflections Upon
Commercial Context and the Judicial Process, Wisc. L. REv. 822, 830 (1967). See
generally, Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L.
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The implication of terms through contextual evidence is true to
Llewellyn's insight. First, commercial context provides the true
understanding of the parties. This true understanding should be
referenced in all cases of contract interpretation. When the written
agreement fails to provide the necessary material terms, the commercial
context is used to imply the needed terms. But, more importantly,
commercial context is used to truly understand even written agreements
that facially provide all material terms. Second, the importance of
finding contractual intent is accentuated by the contextual approach.
Under classical contract law, finding intent was collapsed into finding an
apparent intent from a reading of the contract. Contextualism requires an
inquiry into the background in search of the true intent of the parties.
VI. Dual Track Theory of Interpretation
Rule skepticism was one of the central tenets of the Realists critique
of classical legal thought. Llewellyn was much more a centrist in this
regard. He was a believer in the usefulness of properly drafted rules. In
his view, rules that sang with patent reason and were open-textured
enough to allow the law of society (commercial practice) to illuminate
that reason overcame the shortcomings of the old abstract rules. An
unpublished manuscript, The Theory of Rules,38 7 provides insight into
Llewellyn's view of the proper role of rules in the legal order. He
rejected the ultimate precision of legal rules.38 8 Instead, he attributed the
goal of legal precision to the "ideology of formal logic" of abstract
conceptualism. Llewellyn asserted that if a corrected ideology is
implemented by stripping the dominate ideology of the formalism of
logic and its goal of a logically precise legal structure, rules could be
made to sing.389 Although not a true believer in the transformative or
critical power of law, he nonetheless saw a role for rules as guiding
principles. 390 They could encourage the selection of the better options
REV. 261 (1985) (notes two problems of implied or standard terms: an institutional bias
against unconventional expressions and restraint on market forces that might encourage
innovation). See also, LARRY A. DIMATTEO, CONTRACT THEORY: THE EVOLUTION OF
CONTRACTUAL INTENT 40-41 (1998) [hereinafter, DIMATTEO, CONTRACT THEORY].
387. "Rule of Thumb and Principle" in LLEWELLYN PAPERS, supra note 35, at 81
(Professor Twining estimates that it was written in the period 1938-40).
388. The demise of rule precision is endemic in the dynamic nature of modem
society: "The pace of an industrial civilization, its ongoing regroupings of interest,
people, and problem, have presented new states of fact too rapidly for knowledge to keep
up with them." Id. at 83.
389. The rules of classical legal thought were detached from underlying purpose and
policy. "A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or objective, is nonsense."
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950).
390. See, e.g., COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 2. "Rules Are Not to Control,
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available in commercial practice.39'
For Llewellyn, the contextual nature of contract interpretation
required the formulation of rules that allowed a free flow of context into
rule application. These types of rules had two features. First, the rule
itself had to provide guidance for its application to a wide variety of
contexts, including unforeseen novel fact patterns. Associated with this
notion of guidance, is a normative dimension often neglected in the view
of Llewellyn's realism as ought is is. This normative dimension holds
that proper rules can have a transformative impact on real world practice.
In short, it allows a court to draw commercial practice from context and
then to enforce good while rejecting bad practices. This feature is
captured in Llewellyn's notion of the singing rule as it is through the
reason behind the rule that a court is able to differentiate good and bad
practice. Second, the rule had to be flexible enough to allow for its
continuous reformulation (expansion and contraction) in order to allow it
to be applied to contexts not foreseen at the time of its original
formulation. This second feature is best captured in the open-ended,
standard-like rules that pervade the Code. This part will examine the
features of these types of rules that Llewellyn believed were needed to
make the Code a truly living law.
A. The Singing Rule: Collapsing the Verticality of Principle to Rule
The rule that Llewellyn targets for criticism is what he calls the
rule-of-thumb or paper rule. It is a rule cut off from its underlying
rationale or purpose:
For the nature of rule-of-thumb classification of cases-and it is the
precise ascription of the raw case to its class, and so to its legal
consequence, which is the heart of the matter-the nature of such
classification is that problems of the purpose of the classification, the
reason of the classification, the use or value of the classification, can
be disregarded in using the rule because they have been solved and
left behind.
392
Furthermore, in a given fact situation there is likely to be opposing rules
of thumb. Thus, functional rules need to supply something more than a
rule of thumb. The opposite of the rule-of-thumb would be a singing
rule, one that sings of its purpose, reason, and use. Llewellyn believed
that the essence of rule formulation and application was "the search for
but to Guide Decision. Where the rule rates high in wisdom and is technically clear and
neat, the guidance is indeed so cogent as, in effect, to be almost equivalent to
control .... Id. at 179.
391. See infra Part VI.D.
392. Id. (emphasis in original).
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purpose and the creative application of that purpose to the facts at
hand."'3 93 This epistemological view that it is the purpose behind words
that give them meaning fits into Llewellyn's overall contextual approach
to statutory and contractual interpretation.
The contextualism inherent in contract interpretation placed stress
upon the inherently rigid nature of rules. The varied contextual
landscape required differentiation in rule application. The courts, in the
grand style 394 tradition, are left the task of infusing contract rules with
needed flexibility of application. Forcing courts to deal with the reasons
behind rules or contracts required them to fit and justify their own rule
applications. This process ameliorates the danger of a technically correct
rule fit that nonetheless diverges from the ideal fit that the reason behind
the rule would dictate. This is what Llewellyn saw as the difference
between the harsh form of a rule and the rule of reason.395 The
differentiation in application requires a purposive analysis of both the
rule and the contract. What purpose does a rule hope to achieve; what is
the rationale for the rule?
3 9 6
Llewellyn believed that good drafting, whether in statute or contract
writing, made the patent reason for a clause or provision readily apparent
to the reader. It is from this patent reason that an interpreter of the
provision can glean its intended meaning. Biographer William Twining
explains Llewellyn's view that "construction and application are
393. John M. Breen, Statutory Interpretation and the Lessons of LIewellyn, 33 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 263, 285 (2000) (argues that what is commonly describes as intent has
always been a matter of convention).
394. "Llewellyn frequently spoke as though an optimum mode of legislative-judicial
interaction would be for legislatures to articulate a policy preference in their statutes, and
for courts to resolve situations according to the reason of the policy. This mode of
decision-making he termed the Grand Style and praised it highly." Danzig,
Jurisprudence of the U. C.C., supra note 164, at 632 n.39. See also, John E. Murray, The
Article 2 Prism: The Underlying Philosophy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 2 (198 1) ("Article 2 is singular in its emphasis upon purposive
interpretation and construction"). Professor Corbin stated the matter of Grand Style
contract interpretation succinctly:
[A]t some point it becomes necessary for courts to look to substance rather than
the form of the agreement, and to hold that substance controls over form....
What the are doing here .... is but a recognition that the parties occasionally
have understandings or expectations that were so fundamental that they did not
need to negotiate about those expectations. When the court "implies a
promise" . . . it is recognizing that sometimes silence says more than words,
and it is understanding its duty to the spirit of the bargain is higher than its duty
to the technicality of the language.
3 ARTHUR CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 570 (rev. ed. 1960).
395. "[A] rule in its harshest form is applied in a recurring situation which the harsh
form of the rule happens to fit." COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 2, at 124
(emphasis in original).
396. See generally, Patterson, QfLlewellyn, Wittgenstein, supra note 14, at 190-91.
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intellectually impossible except with reference to some reason and theory
of purpose."'3 97 Llewellyn saw the idea of purposive interpretation in the
grand style reasoning and it appealed to him. Purposive interpretation
and grand style judging were necessary components of Llewellyn's
overall theory of interpretation.398  Llewellyn "wanted judges to
understand the goals of the [Code], and to interpret and apply its
provisions to carry out the law's purposes." 399  In this way, the
application of Code rules could be made to sing with patent reason.
400
B. Singing Rules and Contextualism
Llewellyn, although not named as such, defines the singing rule, as
397. TWINING, REALIST MOVEMENT, supra note 6, at 321-22.
398. Llewellyn's belief in purposive interpretation guided his drafting of the Code.
Comments to Section 1-102(2)(b) reflect Llewellyn's view of the importance of patent
reason to a "semi-permanent" code:
This Act is drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is intended to be a semi-
permanent piece of legislation, it will provide its own machinery for expansion
of commercial practices. It is intended to make possible for the law embodied
in this Act to be developed by the courts in light of unforeseen and new
circumstances....
... The Text of each section should be read in the light of the purpose and
policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the Act as a whole, and the
application of the language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the
case may be, in conformity with the purposes and policies involved.
... The Code seeks to avoid.. . interference with evolutionary growth....
The principle of freedom of contract is subject to exceptions found elsewhere in
the Act ... [good faith, fair dealing, unconscionability] .... In this connection,
Section 1-205 incorporating into the agreement prior course of dealing and
usages of trade is of particular importance.
U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b), Comments 1 & 2 (1990).
399. Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn 's Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 541, 564 (2000).
400. Professor Gedid explains Llewellyn's theory of patent reason:
In drafting the Code, Llewellyn continuously and consistently employed policy
and purpose as the central device to convey and clarify statutory meaning. As a
result, purpose, policy, and reason are major determinants of what the language
of the text means .... The patent reason principle also assigns a definite role to
the courts in interpreting and applying the open-ended principles of the
Code.... The important point is that Llewellyn's understanding of the judicial
process led him to draft language of principle and to use policy, purpose, and
reason to convey meaning. Faced with that statutory architecture, courts should
not and probably cannot avoid using policy and purpose in interpreting the
Code.... Nor should courts automatically resort to the plain meaning of a
statute or the dictionary meaning of a word.
John J. Gedid, U.C.C. Methodology: Taking a Realistic Look at the Code, 29 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 341, 385-386 (1988). Llewellyn's belief that any semi-permanent code
must incorporate patent reason was further evidenced in his drafting of the Comments to
the Code provisions. They are a reservoir of the policy and purpose behind the Code
provisions. The Comments were "clearly an integral part of the patent reason device
incorporated into the Code." Id. at 383.
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a rule that is the product of the drafting "technique of explicit
principle., 40 1 It is a rule that articulates the reason for its existence and
incorporates the reason onto its face. Such rules are attractive because of
their "open-endedness," they are "free to meet new conditions with
guidance; it presses [judges] toward resolving questions on new
emergent facts along similar lines; it enables them, under the use and
guidance of the rule itself, to solve such problems in a satisfying
fashion. 40 2 In this way, the rules of law are true to their legal heritage
while at the same time being re-worked to respond to an ever-changing
social reality.40 3 As a result, the judge and jury can balance the concerns
for certainty and fairness.
The emergent fact patterns Llewellyn alluded to necessarily
implicate the rule at its edges. Fact patterns that confront the rule at its
core are dealt with summarily in Figure 3 ("solid lines"). The problem
with rule-of-thumb and formalistic application is they do not provide a
means to deal in a substantive way with cases at the edge. Because no
leeway or adjustment is provided by the rule-of-thumb, the rule is
applied in an all or nothing mode. In contrast, singing rules provide both
the letter and spirit of its existence. It is from the spirit of the rule that
solutions to cases at the edge can be substantively solved. The following
excerpts from The Theory of Rules stress the importance of open-ended
flexibility and clarity of reason:
What I am trying to say is that when it comes down to cases, a rule is
seen and felt as "clear" not in terms of verbal rule-of-thumb precision
but in terms of a sense or intent or bearing or essence which the
language does not state and circumscribe with precision but merely
indicates with adequacy.
40 4
What we do have is an urge and practice, treating as "the rule" some
line of sense to which the most authoritative formulation is but a
guide.
40 5
The best of singing rules possess both the quality of purpose and the
quality of direction. Such a rule gives a "direction of such guidance
from within the rule to the purpose of the rule.
40 6
401. LLEWELLYN PAPERS, supra note 35 at 86.
402. Id.
403. "[T]he better and best law is to be built on and out of what the past can offer; the
quest consists in a constant re-examination and reworking of a heritage, that the heritage
may yield not only solidity but comfort for the new day and for the morrow." COMMON
LAW TRADITION, supra note 2, at 36.
404. LLEWELLYN PAPERS, supra note 35, at 91 (emphasis in original).
405. Id. at 94 (emphasis in original).











Llewellyn explained that direction is found not only in the
expansion of the rule or the principle behind the rule, but also in its
contraction. 0 7 Further, the adjustment of rule to fit the case at the edge
(problem or novel case408) requires a broadening of the purposive
interpretation upward from the specific rule to the entire body of rules or
area of law (shown in Figure 3, "dotted line"). The interpreter is called
upon to formulate a rule adjustment that not only provides a proper fit for
the specific rule, but also fits and justifies the rule application within the
context of the entire body of law.40 9
For Llewellyn, rules are much like words in that they are non-
407. The reason for the rule may indeed dictate a "whittling or modification by way
of principle." Id.
408. This is akin to Ronald Dworkin's concept of the hard case. See, Ronald
Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1057 (1975).
409. The concept of "fit" and "fit and justify" is taken from the works of Ronald
Dworkin. See generally, RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); RONALD DwORKN,
A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985). This notion will be expanded upon in the next section.
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notational in character. In Case Law System in America4 10 he stated that,
"[w]hat a word symbol signifies can extend beyond that which already
occurred or [had] ... been conceived of only in a normative sense, not in
a descriptive sense., 4 1 The indeterminacy of words, and by necessity,
the indeterminacy of legal rules, provide both limitation and opportunity.
The rules have no meaning until infused with particular life experiences.
Resulting flexibility of word meaning or context-driven meaning allows
for, using Llewellyn's words, law's "immanent expansive capacity. '41 2
It is this capacity that allows "singing rules" to be fitted to novel fact
patterns. Or in recognition of the symbiotic relationship between rule
and fact, allows for the novel fact pattern to infuse the rule with meaning.
The marriage of context with rule reason can best be explained by the
dual track theory of interpretation discussed in the next section.
C. Dual Track Theory of Interpretation
The dual track theory41 3 of rule-contract interpretation, anticipated
in Llewellynian thought, incorporates a conceptual track and a
contextual-factual track (see Figure 3). The contextual track connects
the fact pattern of the case at bar with a given situation-type. In this way,
the greater context is allowed to flow through the case and into the rule.
The rule's application to a novel or problem case also requires an upward
flow along the conceptual track. In the problem case, the rule reason
does not provide sufficient guidance for a rule adjustment to fit the fact
pattern. This situation can exist where there is a rule non-fit or rules
conflict. In the former, there is no one rule that directly fits the case.
There is a gap either in the Code or within the rule itself. In the case of
rules conflict there are a number of rules that could conceivably fit the
case. In both these cases the interpreter is required to review the Code or
area of law in its entirety, including resort to the law's meta-principles
414
to develop a rule application or fit that is true to the law as a whole.
410. LLEWELLYN, CASE LAW SYSTEM, supra note 61.
411. Id. at 74, n. I (emphasis in original).
412. Id at 74. See also, DIMATTEO, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 386, at 13.
413. 1 am not 100 percent sure whether this term is original or of my making.
Llewellyn's term doubled-barreled objectivity relates to the different types of contextual
inquiries but not to a conceptual and a contextual dichotomy. See generally, COMMON
LAW TRADITION, supra note 2. In double-barreled objectivity the interpreter using the
reasonable person standard first examines the conduct of the contracting parties through
the prism of trade usage and custom. The second barrel is the determination of whether
the parties intended a variant meaning than the one implied by usage and custom. See
generally, Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person
Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S C. L. REV. 293, 329-331 (1997).
414. The Code's meta-principles include the duties of good faith, fair dealing, the
doctrine of unconscionability, and the principle of commercial reasonableness.
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The two tracks require multiple of contextual analysis in the
infusing of meaning into contracts and contract rules. First, the meaning
of a Code provision is to be determined before being applied to a
contract dispute. The main focus of this contextual analysis is the reason
for the Code provision. For Llewellyn, the reason or purpose for the
drafting of a Code provision is not merely an historical analysis. The
reason, although historically uncovered, is forward-looking and not
confined to a temporal moment. The contextual meaning of a Code
provision is not a bounded reason aimed at affecting a certain result to a
particular reality. Rather, it is one of unbounded reason looking to
respond to possible future realities. In a future context, the question
becomes can the rule be extended to make a rule application comply with
its underlying purpose? That underlying purpose or reason is found
within the context of its writing and subsequently by the reasoned
application of the rule over time. Second, the meaning of the contract
being disputed must be infused with meaning. That meaning is also
uncovered through a contextual analysis. Contextual analyses are used
to infuse meaning into both the contract and the rule being applied. In
this way, the rule is constantly refreshed with real world change.
In the area of rule meaning, two contexts are relevant: the context
(purpose) for its creation and the context of the particular rule
application. This is the dual track theory of interpretation. Track one is
the initial formulation of rule meaning through an understanding of its
purpose and that purpose within the entire system of contract rules and
principles. The result is a search for meaning within the conceptual side
of contract law. Track two involves understanding the meaning of the
words of a contract to which the rule is to be applied through an
enhanced contextual analysis. This enhanced contextual analysis or track
is reflected in Llewellyn's notions of situation-sense and transaction-
types.
A common understanding is that a court looks solely at the facts of
the case at bar and simply applies a static rule of law to resolve a dispute.
For Llewellyn, before any such rule application, the decision-maker is
required to ascend a factual-contextual track. Before the application of
rule to case, the decision-maker works up from the facts of the case to a
situation. The situation-type includes a variety of variables, including:
(1) The subject matter of the contract (transaction-type), such as type of
goods, services, and property, and the characteristics of the transaction
(long-term, discrete); (2) The type of person (role-type), such as
merchant, consumer, minor, stranger, long-term supplier; and (3) The
type of business, industry, profession (group-type). The examination of
these broader contextual factors allows for the placement of the case
within an evolving usage or custom and uncovers the rule-in-the-facts.
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The rule-in-the-facts approach is made possible by open-textured rules
that allow the contextual findings to be incorporated through flexible rule
application. Thus, the rule is allowed to evolve in order to effectuate a
reasonable rule fit to a new situation-sense or transaction-type.
D. Normative Side of Dual Track Interpretation: From "Ought as Is"
to "What Might Be"
Llewellyn's allegiance to notions such as situation-type and the
immanent law of business transactions characterize him as a believer of a
ground up view of commercial law. Singing rules simply direct the
judicial decision-maker to find the law of the case in the background or
context of business dealings. The dual track theory of interpretation need
not be so narrowly defined. In fact, Llewellyn's vision incorporates a
two-way-street in which context impacts rules but at the same time, the
purpose/principles behind the rules inform practice. His belief in patent
reason worked at both the levels of rule and real world practice. The
flow is in both directions from rule/principle to facts and from facts to
rule/principle.
The contextualist turn to some extent has converged the is and
ought of contract law into a dialectical relationship. Llewellynian
hermeneutics has made the "is" of commercial practice into the "ought"
of contract law. The reality-centered notions of situation-sense and full
contextualism provide the narratives of contract law-in-action. It is in
these narratives of commercial life where the meanings of contract rules
are located. In the words of Professor Cover, "[o]nce understood in the
context of the narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a
system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live. 4 15 All
legal and normative rules are found in the contextual narrative that
supplies them "with history and destiny, beginning and end, explanation
and purpose. ,416 Thus, the reality of commercial life is the normative
prism upon which law is modified or adjusted. In the case where the
rules fail to reflect practice they cease being law from both is and ought
perspectives.41 7 For Llewellyn, contract law was best formed through
open rules. Open rules allow for continuous adjustment to satisfy the
normative reality.
The "ought as is" equation is not impervious to attack. A successful
415. Robert M. Cover, Foreward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 4-5
(1983).
416. Id.
417. "Each boring yields new evidence that our accepted formulations of the rules of
law in the field of [c]ontract do not express the cases ... the impression is, in a word, that
large portions of currently accepted [c]ontract doctrine neither are law, nor ought to be
law." Rule of Law, supra note 61, at 1268.
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attacker would show that in fact a normative alternative exists beyond
commercial reality. That, in fact, a choice is presented between the
normative value of practice and an imagined alternative.418 In this
critique of real-world practice, the law or rules of contract act as a vision
to what practice should be. In fact, Llewellyn's open and singing rules
do provide a normative vision. The conversion of is to ought in contract
rules represents but the first step in the normative function of contract
law. It provides the interpretive meaning of the parties' agreement. The
second step involves the issue of whether the court, through the meta-
principles of contract or sales law, should convert the agreement into a
legal contract. This is the second or normative step, the reconfiguration
of the "is" to the "what might be. 419
The key to a singing rule is to provide both the rule and the reason
for the rule. The patent reason given for the rule is more than a guide for
the judge applying the rule. It is a mandate for the judicial decision-
maker to provide a reason for her particular application or interpretation
of the rule. The language of a singing rule aims "to elicit the court's best
judgment, in applying or in developing the principles stated; and as being
apt language to elicit from a court a statement of the reasons which move
it to read the act as it may read it."420  Thus the rule informs the
interpretation and the interpretation in turn replenishes the rule with real
world application. It is in this way that the rules and principles of the
law become self-revising. Each revision, as orchestrated by judicial
application, is aimed at bringing the rules into accord with real world
421practice.
418. Critical legal scholars have asserted the notion that structures of law foreclose
alternative possibilities. See generally, DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF
ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIACLE) (1997); Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980) (city as an essentially restricted entity and powerless versus
alternative possibility: as a beacon of civic activism and virtue); Karl E. Klare, Judicial
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness,
1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1978) (management-labor relations set within the
frame of employer domination versus an alternative possibility of a workplace where the
true power rests with the workers).
419. "To live in a legal world requires that one know not only the precepts, but also
their connections to possible and plausible states of affairs. It requires that one integrate
not only the 'is' and the 'ought,' [but] ... the 'what might be."' Cover, Nomos and
Narrative, supra note 415, at 10. For another example of the merger of is and ought is
what Professor Richard Parker refers to as "prescriptive-descriptive tenets." Richard D.
Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981).
420. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REv. 558, 564
(1940).
421. "[Black into the life of the [persons] who live under it, in those particular spots
in which the gears have come to lose their meshing, or to grind." Id.
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VII. Conclusion
Contextualism's import in contract law is based on the belief that
the creation of a written contract works to separate the text from the
context of the writing. This metaphoric distance becomes pronounced as
the writing travels through time from creation to contract dispute and
ultimately, interpretation. The same is true in the distancing of legal
rules from the creation of their text to the context of their application. As
with contracts, the reification of practice into rule imbues real life into an
artificial thing that will need to be interpreted in subsequent applications.
Liewellyn sought to provide the means of constantly decoding text
or rule by opening the interpretative process to a continuous flow of
context. By pushing the flow of context into contract, he hoped to
diminish the distance between the rule and the context of its creation.
The elimination of this dichotomy would serve both to uncover true
contractual understanding and to keep his Code fresh and alive.
Ultimately, Llewellyn's immanent law provided that in every
contract dispute it is the context that colors the pre-existing rule or Code
provision. The core feature of realism was to look into the world and
"see it fresh; see it as it works. 422 The negative version of this Realist'
aphorism leads to conceptual nihilism. Conceptual nihilists view the
actual workings of legal thought and judicial reasoning as revealing the
emptiness of law's concepts.
The later Llewellyn was more optimistic. His extended aphorism
attests to this belief in a workable conceptual system where "the fresh
look is always the fresh hope. 423 The fresh look is both backward and
forward-looking. It is through this duality that form and substance,
regularity and fairness, and concept and context are turned from
adversaries into dialectical partners. For Llewellyn this process required
the infusion of context into the rules governing contracts. Through the
dual track method of interpretation, rules could be saved from becoming
the relics of abstract conceptualism. Instead, the law of contracts would
be continuously updated through the use of contextual inquiry mandated
by open-ended, singing rules.
422. LLEWELLYN PAPERS, supra note 35, at 16. Llewellyn spoke of the "neglected
beauty of the obvious." See COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 2, at 339.
423. COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 2, at 510.
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